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Abstract 
Since the early 60s researchers have tried to understand why management may 
voluntarily disclose information by considering the potential benefits they may gain from 
this extra disclosure. To do so, theoretical frameworks have been developed to try to 
explain this practice. This study focuses on voluntary disclosure (financial and 
others) in the annual reports of Islamic banks operating in four countries with 
emerging capital markets, namely: Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan. The study 
attempts to examine whether the theoretical frameworks developed in the 
literature to explain annual reports disclosures can be applied to the specific case 
of Islamic banks. 
The present study differs from other empirical studies conducted in the field of 
voluntary disclosure in two respects. Firstly, it adds to the existing knowledge in 
the literature by addressing the specificities of Islamic banking. Secondly, it 
includes additional company-specific variables that have not been considered in 
previous studies on the level of disclosure such as the AAOIFI standards and 
level of IAHs. 
There are a number of factors affecting the disclosure behavior in the annual 
reports of a firm. In this study three factors are taken into consideration when 
developing the hypotheses; regulatory related factors, bank specific factors, and 
country specific factors. This study has taken into consideration the specificities 
of the Islamic banks in the development of the hypotheses, and those hypotheses 
were developed based on the arguments stated in agency and signaling theories. 
For the purpose of identifying variables hypothesised as possible determinants of 
voluntary disclosure, the data sets of years 2002 and 1997 were analysed using 
multiple regression analysis, among other statistical tests. Different forms of 
transformation (rank and normal scores using Van der Waerden) were undertaken 
11 
to ensure the results are robust across various methods. Both parametric and non- 
parametric tests were undertaken in analysing the association between voluntary 
disclosure and the bank and country specific characteristics. 
Results indicate that the level of voluntary disclosure increased after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards. Based on the theory, the hypothesis 
predicts a decrease in the level of voluntary disclosure, given that much of what 
was voluntarily disclosed before, is now considered mandatory. This might be 
attributed to the increase in the central banks, stock exchange authorities, rating 
agencies and IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements during the period from 1997 to 
2002, beside the fact that the users of the financial statements became more 
sophisticated and demanding for extra information for decision making. 
Results also indicate that there is a positive relationship (negative in the case of 
government ownership) between a number of bank-specific characteristics, 
namely: proportion of non-executive board member, level of IAHs, government 
ownership and shareholders profitability', and the level of voluntary disclosure in 
the Islamic banks' annual reports. On the other hand, no support were found from 
the statistical analysis for the relationship between the proportion of non- 
executive board members who are IAHs, listing status and the IAHs profitability 
with the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks. 
Finally, the study results indicate that the level of voluntary disclosure in Sudan 
was significantly lower than that in the three other countries (Bahrain, Qatar and 
Jordan) both before and (even more) after the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards. This appears to be associated with the influence of government 
ownership and weaker market discipline in Sudan. 
'for 1997 only. 
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Chapter 1 
An Overview of the Research 
1.1 Introduction 
Introduction 
Information disclosed in the annual reports of Islamic banks is either mandatory or 
voluntary, and the level of both types of disclosure depends on a number of factors, such 
as legal, environmental, social, geographical .... etc. Researchers have tried to understand 
why management may voluntarily disclose information by considering the potentional 
benefits they may gain from this extra disclosure. To do so, theoretical frameworks have 
been developed to try and explain this phenomenon and practice. 
This study focuses on the voluntary disclosure (financial and others) in the annual reports 
of Islamic banks, and establishes whether the theoretical frameworks developed to 
explain disclosures can be applied to the specific case of Islamic banks. 
In this study two factors are taken into consideration when developing the hypotheses: (a) 
regulatory related factors i. e. Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) standards, and (b) bank and country specific factors e. g. the listing 
status, profitability and market discipline. One major interest of this study is to examine 
the effect of those factors in the settings of four developing countries with emerging 
capital markets', namely, Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan. 
Another major interest of the study is that it will be looking at the annual reports of a 
unique type of financial institutions i. e. Islamic banks that represent a radical departure 
from conventional banking as they comply with the rules and principles of Islamic 
economic and finance, and more generally with Islamic Shari'a (law). Among these rules 
is the prohibition of paying and charging of 
interest which is considered as riba (usury), 
and prohibition of speculation (gharar). According to Standard and Poors (2002 p. 1) " the 
growth of Islamic banking services has outpaced that of conventional banking during the 
Unlike most of previous research studies which were conducted 
in developed countries with efficient 
capital markets like north America and 
Europe. 
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past decade, making it one of the most dynamic areas in international finance. The 
annual growth of Islamic financial institutions (IFI) has been estimated at 10% in the Gulf 
and almost 15% worldwide over the past 10 years". 
This section provides the foundation for the thesis. It discusses the problem to be 
investigated and historical background, research objective, the significance of the study, 
and the research plan. 
1.2 Research Problem and Historical Background 
Studies conducted under AAOIFI supervision showed that there are differences in the 
method of presentation and disclosure of transactions conducted by Islamic banks. The 
presentation of information is important for the decision making process by parties who 
deal with the Islamic banks. Investors in Islamic banks want to ensure that their funds are 
used effectively (i. e. invested according to Islamic Shari'a principles) and efficiently (i. e. 
producing a fair and reasonable rate of return). 
Thus, lack of transparency and information asymmetry, could result in unfairness and 
injustice treatment by the Islamic bank to the various parties that are interested in the 
Islamic bank's operations. Especially, the Investment Account Holders (IAHs), who 
consider the annual reports of the Islamic banks as the main, if not the only, source of 
information for decision making. Although, the IAHs are an important stakeholder 
because they: (a) are partner in the profit sharing with the Islamic banks, and (b) are the 
largest source of funds for most Islamic banks 2; however, they are not treated similarly to 
the shareholders of the bank. For example, they are not allowed to appoint members of 
the board of directors, external auditors or Shari'a Supervisory Boards (SSB), and enforce 
monitoring measurements on the management. 
Before the implementation of AAOIFI standards, the Islamic banks in the 
countries under research (namely, Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan) were 
operating under a "semi-regulated market" where the process of accounting policy 
2 See Al-Deehani et al. (1999) and Capital Intelligence (2002). 
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making (in some banks) is carried out with the help of the bank's SSB. 3 During 
this period, Islamic banks were following the International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) or the national accounting standards of the country in which they operate, 
those standards are not designed to cater for the nature of the Islamic bank's 
operations and activities i. e. they do not address the specificities of Islamic banks. 
The following are examples of Islamic banks specificities that are considered by 
the researcher in the development of the research objectives, questions and 
hypothesis: 
Islamic banks were developed on a foundation that does not permit the 
separation between temporal and religious matters. Accordingly, those 
banks are founded on the concept of sharing profits consistent with the 
Islamic concept of "profit is for those who bears risk". Hence, Islamic 
banks reject interest as a cost for the use of money and loans as 
investment vehicles (see AAOIFI 1999: 44). 
Islamic banks offer types of finance that are absent in conventional 
banks, for example, Murabaha for resale of goods on credit, Istisna'a 
for pre-finance of the production of specified items, and Ijara for 
leasing. 
Islamic banks mobilise funds on a profit and loss sharing basis (via 
Mudaraba contract4) in the form of restricted and unrestricted 
investment accounts. Those accounts are neither liability nor they are 
equity. 
In addition to other risks ( for example, rate of return risk), Islamic 
banks has the following two risks: 5 
3 See Karim (1995 p. 287). 
a Under this contract, one party (Rab al Mal - IAH) supplies funds to an entrepreneurial party (Mudarib - 
the Islamic bank) for trading and investment purposes. The profits are divided according to the ratios 
stipulated in the contract. In case of a loss, the Mudarib receives no remuneration, but does not share in the 
loss. 
5 See Archer and Karim (2001), 
3 
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o Fiduciary risk: This is related to the nature of the Mudaraba 
contract, which places liability for losses on the Mudarib in 
case of malfeasance, negligence or breach of contract on the 
part of the management of the Mudaraba. 
o Displaced commercial risk: This is related to the common 
practice among Islamic banks to `smooth' the financial returns 
to IAHs by varying the percentage of profit taken as Mudarib 
share. 
Hence, Islamic banks were asked by the banking authorities (e. g. Bahrain 
Monetary Agency and Central Bank of Sudan) to prepare their financial 
statements using AAOIFI standards. 
The research problem will have the following elements: 
" Level of disclosure before the implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
" Level of disclosure after the implementation AAOIFI standards. 
" Degree of change in the level of disclosure. 
" Impact of certain independent variables on the level of voluntary 
disclosure 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The primary objective of the study is to examine to what extent the Islamic banks behave 
like any other firm with regard to their disclosure. The following are the other objectives 
of the study: 
a. To extend our knowledge to the overall level of disclosure in the annual report of 
Islamic banks. 
b. To assess whether there is a relationship between the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic 
banks. 
4 
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c. To assess whether there is a relationship between certain bank characteristics and 
the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks. 
d. To identify areas of concern for future research in the field of financial reporting 
in Islamic banks. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
The rational for undertaking this study is because there have been very few 
extensive and in-depth research in the area of Islamic banking despite its 
importance and rapid growth as mentioned above. The reason for considering 
only voluntary disclosure is because it is expected that the Islamic banks will meet 
substantially much of the AAOIFI standards requirements, specially the banks 
which are operating in Bahrain as it has a strong regulatory authority and a fairly 
strong accounting profession to ensure compliance. 
The present study differs from the other imperial studies6 conducted in the field of 
voluntary disclosure in the following respects: 
a. It adds to the existing literature by addressing the specificities of 
Islamic banking. 
b. It includes additional company-specific variables that have not 
been considered in the previous studies on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Namely, AAOIFI standards and the level of the IAHs. 
The significance of the study comes from the fact that it is the first empirical study 
on disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks operating in the center of 
Islamic banking (i. e. Bahrain). Furthermore, a study of this type would be of 
particular relevance to the accounting policy makers (e. g. AAOIFI) and the 
regulatory agencies because it helps them to: 
Understand the disclosure behaviour of Islamic banks and why they adopt 
certain disclosure policies and strategies. 
Develop a coherent and acceptable set of mandatory disclosure 
requirements. 
6 For example, see table 4.1. 
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1.5 Research Plan 
Introduction 
Figure 1.1 shows the research plan of this study. It starts with an introductory 
chapter, followed by four chapters relating to the literature review. The 
development of research hypothesis is covered in chapter 6, followed by chapter 7 
that covers the research design and methods. Data analysis and testing are covered 
in chapter 8 to 10. The thesis is concluded by chapter 11 which covered the 
researcher's conclusion and remarks. 
The Research Plan 
Wish to do Resea cr h? 
Research Topic 
Formulation and Clarification 
1 
Literature Review 
1 Developing of Hypotheses and 
Research Design 
1 Data Collection 
and Analysis 
1 Writing the 
Project Report 
Chapter 1 
Chapters 
2to5 
Chapters 
6and7 
Chapters 
8 to II 
Fig. 1-1 The Research Plan (adopted from Saunders et al , 2000) 
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Chapter 2 
Accounting Regulation 
2.1 Introduction 
Generally accepted accounting principles require firms to give full, fair and adequate 
disclosure in their financial statements. However, the nature and extent of accounting 
policies and methods used by firms varies depending on the industry in which they 
operate in and the regulatory environment surrounding that industry. 
The regulatory environment represents the rules and regulations issued by the accounting 
bodies, the various securities exchange, or the government. The purpose of these rules 
and regulations is to increase the benefits and to provide more transparency to the 
different users of these financial statements. Among which are the prevention or 
minimisation of fraud and misrepresentation, fairness to non-insiders and lower 
transaction and information costs to the investors. 
In this chapter, the accounting policies in unregulated settings, the effects of accounting 
regulation on the accounting policy choice and the regulation of Islamic banks will be 
discussed. 
2.2 Accounting Policies in Unregulated Settings 
Accounting policies of a given firm "are the specific accounting principles and methods 
currently employed and considered most appropriate to present fairly the financial 
statements of the enterprise". (Kieso et al. 2001). 
Significant accounting policies are usually disclosed as the first note to the financial 
statements (the notes are considered as part of these financial statements), this note is 
important to the analysts as they examine the summary of the significant accounting 
policies to determine whether the firm is using conservative or liberal accounting 
7 
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practices. For example, amortising intangible assets over the maximum allowed period 
(e. g. 40 years for Goodwill in USA) is considered liberal. On the hard, using LIFO 
inventory valuation in a period of inflation is generally viewed as a conservative practice. 
Gaa (1988) stated that "the period prior to the 1930's was marked by a multiplicity of 
financial reporting practices that caused the evaluation of firm's position and activities by 
outsiders to be quite tenuous. There was no systematic official or unofficial set of 
standards (except textbooks) providing guidance in choosing among alternatives, 
although there must have been some intuitive framework. Nor was there any kind of 
consistency required or expected". 
Reliance on unregulated markets for the allocation of resources raises problems in two 
respects. First, there may be circumstances where the conditions necessary for the 
achievement of pareto efficient allocations are not met and markets might fail because of 
lack of rules governing market behavior, market distortions and externalities and public 
goods. Second, a means must be found of selecting between alternatives, that is, of 
exercising social choice on matters affecting equity and distribution. For example, the 
government might adopt policies to alter endowments of accounting information in order 
to remove a cause of an inequitable distribution of income and wealth (Taylor and Turley, 
1986). 
Accordingly, in unregulated settings, it is assumed that the management use accounting 
policies and methods that maximise their own benefits, "since principal (owner) and 
agent (management) are all assumed to be expected utility maximising ... so the actions 
chosen by the agent to maximise the agent's own expected utility does not in general 
maximise the principal's expected utility" (Gaa, 1988). 
2.3 Nature and Objectives of Accounting Regulation 
Accounting regulations consist of the laws, rules and generally accepted accounting 
standards and principles concerning timing, content and form of firms financial reports 
and other kinds of required filings. 
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Taylor and Turley (1986) defines the accounting regulation as the " imposition of 
constraints upon the preparation, content and form of external financial reports by bodies 
other than the preparers of the reports, or the organisations and individuals for which the 
reports are prepared". 
There are many sources of accounting regulation, but the main are: 
a) Self-regulation by the accounting profession through convention, precedent and 
training. 
b) Public sector regulation through regulation bodies such as the Department of Trade in 
UK and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in USA, and Ministry of Commerce 
and Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) in Bahrain. 
c) Private sector regulatory institutions, such as the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) 
in UK and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in USA. Such institutions are 
usually associated with the accounting profession. 
d) Regulation by the securities industry, for example, the SEC in USA has exercised an 
influence over companies financial reporting in the content of the issue of and trading in 
company securities. 
Taylor and Turley (1986) argued that "the regulation of the market for information could 
be under-taken in different ways and to different degrees. For example, government might 
adopt a prescriptive approach by which detailed principles, rules and procedures are laid 
down and enforced by law. If the degree of prescription is high, there might be no place 
for private sector bodies in accounting regulation. Less extremely, government could 
establish less detailed rules, and private sector bodies might emerge to become involved 
in additional regulation". 
Thus, the sources of regulation can be categorised into public sector (the legal regulation 
of statute) and private sector (the self- regulation of the accounting profession and the 
securities industry). 
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Archer and Abid (1996) stated that "self-regulatory accounting standards bodies have 
little, if any, power to enforce observance of their standards. The acceptance by the 
regulatees of the rules proposed by the self regulatory body, and hence, the effectiveness 
of self-regulation, depend on consensus between the self-regulatory body and regulatees, 
which the latter will with-hold if the former is perceived as too demanding ". 
Although, It is true to say that the relationship between public and private sector 
regularity bodies is a complex one, however, this relationship is complementary and 
necessary, in the sense that the government may rely on the flexibility of self- regulation 
to ensure that rules are developed quickly to cope with changes in the business 
environment. On the other hand, professional bodies rely on the government recognition 
of their status and role in regulation, and on the possibility of their rules having indirect 
legal effects. 
2.4 Reasons for Accounting Regulation 
There are many arguments for accounting regulation and not giving the firms the 
complete freedom to choose their own accounting policies. The following are some of 
these arguments: 
a) The market cannot be relied upon to take prompt disciplinary action, where necessary, 
with firms that are allowed the freedom to choose what and how to report. This argument 
rests on the peculiarity of information as a commodity and the problems of free riding, 
and those regulations are needed to correct these irregularities (Accounting Standards 
Committee, 1981). 
Taylor and Turley (1986) argued that "without regulation, accounting information would 
either be priced above marginal cost by monopoly suppliers, thereby distorting the 
market, or not to be provided at all. Accounting regulations requiring minimum 
disclosures may be the only means of guaranteeing the provision of information". 
b) There is a need for comparability of financial information between published 
statements by various firms. In the absence of standards, there would be no reward which 
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might encourage a large firm to conform to any particular model for the sake of 
comparability (Accounting Standards Committee, 1981). 
c) The existence of standard setting bodies "ought to have the improvement of the 
efficiency of the securities markets as an objective" (Gaa, 1988). 
d) There is some concern over the limited capacity of the receivers of information to 
interpret and use accounting information. In the absence of standards, explicit and lengthy 
statements would be necessary to accompany the accounting reports for this purpose 
(Benston, 1980; Accounting Standards Committee, 1981). 
e) There is some public concern regarding the ability of financial reporting to present a 
true and fair view when different standards are used (Al-Modahki, 1986). 
2.5 The Effects of Accounting Standards 
" Since the 1960s, there has been a growing interest in the economic and social effects of 
accounting regulations, particularly accounting standards ... accounting standards setting 
bodies such as ASC and FASB, have been confronted with arguments that particular 
proposals for accounting, or existing standards, given rise to economic consequences" 
(Taylor and Turley, 1986). 
Quoted in Taylor and Turley (1986), Zeff (1978) defines the economic consequence as 
"the impact of accounting reports on the decision making behavior of business, 
government unions, investors and creditors ". 
Cheung (1988) stated that " in recent years, the economic consequences theory of 
accounting choice has gained reasonable acceptance as an explanation for the preferences 
of accounting methods by different economic agents ". He further argue that the " most 
fundamental contribution of this theory lies in explaining why cosmetic changes in 
accounting have an impact on the firm's cash flow, and thus, management's choice of 
accounting methods ". 
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Taylor and Turley (1986) argue that the management's choice of accounting policies may 
be based upon an anticipation of economic consequences: either in order to avoid 
undesirable consequences (on their remuneration or their firms operations for example), 
or in order to achieve desirable consequences (for example, a subsidy from the 
government). 
Gaa (1988) believes that the role of the standard setter is to "act in the interest of users by 
evaluating the consequences to investors of actions in accordance with financial 
accounting standards". 
2.6 Regulation of Islamic Banks 
Because of the key macroeconomic role of banks with regard to the supply of credit, and 
the importance of this for monetary and exchange rate policies, as well as the issue of 
public confidence, banking is a regulated industry in almost all countries. 
Islamic banks are a new type of financial institution that must adhere to the doctrines of 
Islam in their operations and financial transactions, and almost all of those banks are 
regulated by the central banks in the countries which they operate. However, as argued by 
Archer and Karim (2005) and Karim (1996), there is absence of commonly accepted 
regulatory and supervisory guidelines and best practice that cater for the specificities of 
Islamic banks. For example, it is argued8 that accounting standards developed for Western 
business organisations are hardly relevant for Islamic banks, because: 
The nature of the operations of Islamic banks and the financial instruments that 
they use differ from those of traditional banks. For example, the prohibition of the 
receipt and payment of 'riba' (usury) means that Islamic banks cannot use net 
present value as a measurement attribute. 
The balance sheet model of Western business organisations, which reflects 
contractual relationships between these organisations and their debt and equity 
fund suppliers, is inadequate to cater for the different contractual relationships 
See chapter 5 for more details about Islamic banks. 
8 See Archer and Karim (1997, p. 105) and Karim (1996, p. 117). 
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between Islamic banks and their debt, profit sharing investment accounts and 
equity fund suppliers9. 
The conceptual framework of accounting currently applied in the West finds its 
justification in a dichotomy between business morality and private morality. As 
such, it can not be implemented in other societies which have revealed doctrines 
and morals that govern all social, economic and political aspects of life. That is, 
the Western accounting standards are secular and technical in nature and have a 
limited concern with the ethical perspective' 0 
In addition, before the introduction of AAOIFI accounting standards, it is claimed that the 
accounting policies of recognition, measurement and disclosure used by Islamic banks 
tend to differ from one country to another, from one Islamic bank to another in the same 
country, and sometimes from one year to another for the same bank (Karim, 1996). 
Karim (1990) claims that Islamic banks have taken the initiative to self-regulate their 
financial reporting for fear that the regulatory bodies in the countries in which they 
operate may otherwise intervene and mandate the accounting policies that Islamic banks 
should adhere to. 
Accordingly, in 1991 the Bahrain based Financial Accounting Organisation for Islamic 
Banks and Financial Institutions (FAOIBFI)" was established by Islamic banks as an 
international self-regulatory body to set accounting standards12 based on the Shari'a 
precepts for Islamic banks. Karim (1996) claims that AAOIFI pronouncements are 
intended to serve Islamic banks in the various countries in which they operate, but at 
present, the AAOIFI has no power to enforce its standards 13. The main objectives of 
AAOIFI as stated in its constitution (see article four) are as follows: 
9 Hence, we find separate standards issued by AAOIFI to cater for this. 
1° According to Islam, rights and obligations in the provision of financial accounting information are 
matters to be governed by principles of religious duty, the Shari'a, including the duty of trusteeship or 
Amana (Karim, 1997 p. 105). 
" In 1995, the name changed to Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI). 
12 Now AAOIFI also issues auditing and governance standards. 
13 Some countries like Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan, made it mandatory for the Islamic banks to adhere 
to the AAOIFI standards. 
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a. To develop accounting and auditing thought relevant to Islamic financial 
institutions. 
b. To disseminate accounting and auditing thought relevant to Islamic financial 
institutions and its applications through training, publication of periodic 
newsletters, carrying out and commissioning of research. 
c. To prepare, promulgate and interpret accounting and auditing thought relevant to 
Islamic financial institutions. 
d. To review and amend accounting and auditing thought relevant to Islamic 
financial institutions. 
The organisation structure of AAOIFI consists of a general assembly of 75 Islamic 
institutions from 16 countries. The AAOIFI has a board of trustee and a board of 
accounting and auditing standards, each consisting of 15 members, a Shari'a board 
consisting of not more than 15 part-time members, an executive committee, and a 
secretary-general who is a full-time executive and head the general secretariat. 
The AAOIFI has an extensive due process that governs the production of its accounting, 
auditing and governance standards. The process includes checking for Shari'a juristic 
suitability of the proposed standards by the Shari'a committee. The AAOIFI invites 
interested parties to express their opinions on the proposed statements and standards 
before their final approval. The AAOIFI also holds two public hearings in two different 
countries to discuss exposure drafts. 
In October 1993, FAOIBFI issued the Financial Accounting Standards No. 1 "General 
Presentation and Disclosure in the Financial Statements of Islamic Banks and Financial 
Institutions", which became effective in 1996. This disclosure standard may be in part 
regarded as a major adoption of the IAS 3014 approach in order to meet the needs of 
Islamic banks. A list of the standards issued by AAOIFI up to year 2005 is shown in 
appendix (1). 
" IFRS 7 is released by International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) on 18 August 2005, which 
replaces the disclosure required now by IAS30 (Deloitte, 2005). 
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2.7 Concluding Remarks 
In order to be able to evaluate the need for and nature of regulations governing 
accounting statements, it is important to analyse the accounting information from the 
point of view of an economic good. For a variety of reasons, the unregulated markets 
could not be relied upon to satisfy all needs for information; hence, in this chapter the 
researcher identified the arguments for accounting regulation and not giving the firms the 
complete freedom to choose their own accounting policies. 
The researcher also identified the role that can be fulfilled by regulations in general and 
by specific private sector regulatory bodies. Hence, Islamic banks appreciated the need to 
establish a private self-regulatory body (i. e. AAOIFI) to promulgate accounting, auditing 
and governance standards based on the Shari'a precepts for Islamic banks. The AAOIFI 
pronouncements are intended to serve Islamic banks in the various countries in which 
they operate, but at present, the AAOIFI has no power to enforce its standards. 
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Chapter 3 
Theories of Disclosure 
3.1 Introduction 
In recent years, the disclosure of information and transparency issues by corporations has 
received a lot of attention. This may be attributed to the higher level of accountability 
required resulting from the increase in incidence of fraud, changes in the general 
economic and financial conditions and the immense complexity of corporate groups in 
existence today (Cook, 1989). Lee (1987) describes information as a communication 
function which increases the knowledge of its recipient and reduces his uncertainty about 
the future. This chapter will focus on some of the theories of disclosure that are relevant 
to this study. 
3.2 Theories of Disclosure 
As discussed in the previous chapter, regulation might be one of the main reasons for 
accounting disclosure. But, even in the most regulated environment, companies can avoid 
these regulations. Al-Modahki (1996) claims that this could be done at certain cost or 
minimal or misleading disclosure could be made. On the other hand, some companies 
may voluntarily disclose more information than what is required by the regulation. 
Gibbins (1992) define financial disclosure as "the release outside the organisation of 
information concerning the economic performance, position or prospects of the 
organisation, particularly as measured in financial terms". And Choi (1973) defined 
disclosure as "the publication of any economic information relating to a business 
enterprise quantitative or otherwise, which facilitates the making of investment 
decisions". 
AAOIFI (1993a: para 8), stated that the "financial statements should disclose all material 
information that is necessary to make those financial statements adequate, relevant and 
reliable for their users". 
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Gaa (1988), argues that accounting theories are sufficient conditions for evaluating 
financial accounting standards, appear to be committed to the concept of the public 
interest. The correct accounting theory will determine the best financial reporting 
practices. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the primary objective of an accounting theory is to set 
the hypothesis and the plans for the investigation of accounting phenomena, and to 
provide the basis for the prediction and explanation for that phenomena or behaviour. 
However, it is not possible to find a theory that will be able to hypothesise, predict and 
explain all accounting phenomena. The reason as explained by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) is that "theories are simplifications of reality, and the world is complex and 
changing. Theories try to explain and predict a class of phenomena and, as a 
consequence, try to capture in their assumptions, the variables common to that class". 
The result is that, facts particular to a given observation or subset of observations and not 
common to the whole class, are ignored and are not incorporated into the theory's 
assumptions. As a result, ignoring these facts or omitted variables, will necessarily lead to 
a theory not predicting or explaining every observation. Hence, the mere fact that a theory 
does not predict perfectly does not cause researchers or users to abandon that theory. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) claim that the literature contains many of accounting 
theories. In the past, this literature used to be normative (i. e. prescriptive) which 
concentrates on "what"should be the contents of financial statements. However, the 
introduction of the efficient market hypothesis in the 1950s had a great impact on the 
accounting research. During the late 1960s, there was a move towards an economic 
approach called "positive accounting theory ". The introduction of positive accounting 
theory was the bases for the new theories on accounting disclosure, which is concerned 
with explaining "why "financial statements take their current form. 
According to Beattie et al. (1994), positive accounting theory has made a significant 
contribution to our understanding of corporate reporting practices. In particular, it has 
provided an explanation of managers' choice among accounting methods and has 
established the existence of incentives for earnings management. Managers' choice of 
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accounting method is explained in terms of the underlying trade-off between these 
various incentives. 
In the following sub-sections the researcher will discuss some of the theories relevant to 
the accounting disclosure that are considered in this study. 
3.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory attempts to provide an explanation of the agency relationships between 
parties who are involved with the firm, especially with regard to accounting information. 
Because the critical factor is accounting information, it could be said that agency theory 
tries to give a theoretical explanation of the accounting profession. In particular, an 
understanding is sought of the nature of the demand for financial information, and the 
cost of supplying such information (Kam, 1986). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) call the contract between the owner-manager and 
shareholders an agency relationship. They define an agency relationship as: 
"a contract under which one or more (principals) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent". 
In the manager-shareholder contract, the owner-manager is viewed as the agent and the 
shareholder as the principal (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
One of the basic assumptions of the theory is that the agent has access to superior 
information and the fact that the principal cannot observe the agent's behaviour raises 
concern that the agent will take advantage of this position to maximise his own benefits at 
the expense of the principal (Beaver, 1981). 
The conflicts of interest inherent between the principals and the agents give rise to 
`agency costs'; which is "the cost of monitoring the agents' actions especially where there 
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is a separation of ownership and controls of a firm" (Fama and Jensen, 1983)15. The 
presence of agency costs may explain why agents voluntarily disclose information. 
Agents, in the knowledge that principals will seek to control their behaviour through 
bonding and monitoring activities16, will have an incentive to try and convince the 
principals that they are acting optimally to try and reduce these costs. 
According to Archer et al. (1998), there are three types of agency problems that are 
considered in the agency theory literature. They are as follows: 
a. The non pecuniary benefits or perquisites which the owner-managers of a firm which 
they only partially own, are likely to consume beyond those which a sole owner would 
consume. 
b. The problem of adverse selection arising from the use of debt financing under limited 
liability of shareholders, given that there is an incentive to the latter: (a) to undertake high 
risk projects that effectively transfer wealth from lenders to shareholders; and (b) to forgo 
new profitable investments which benefit only lenders. 
c. Information asymmetry, namely that the principal cannot observe the actions of the 
agent, where as the latter is better informed of the firm's performance and prospects. 
Agency theory predicts that agency costs will vary with different corporate 
characteristics ". For example, it has been argued that the greater the size of the 
company, the more likely it is to depend on outside capital, and hence the greater the 
agency costs incurred. The implication of agency theory has given rise to several 
hypotheses. Among others, the board composition hypothesis, gearing hypothesis and 
listing status hypothesis which will be discussed in chapter 6 "development of hypotheses 
and research design". 
13 Ross et al. (2002) defined agency cost as the "costs from the conflicts of interest among stockholders, 
bondholders and managers". 
16 Bonding and monitoring costs include, auditing costs, enhancing the internal control systems in the firm 
and establishing incentive compensation schemes. 
1' See Watson et al. (2002) p. 290. 
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3.2.2 Capital Market Theory 
The capital market theory suggests that the impetus for disclosure is to help reduce 
investor uncertainty and therefore risk, and hence, the required rate of return (Cooke, 
1989b). The theory also suggests that companies voluntarily provide information that will 
enable them to raise capital at the lowest possible cost. At the same time revealing 
information will reduce information asymmetry which in turn can reduce a company's 
cost of capital and improve shareholders' welfare (Al-Modahki, 1996). 
There are economic incentives affecting the disclosure decision by the affecting 
managers. One of the main factors is the costs and benefits. Two main benefits identified 
by the capital market theory are the increase in the share price of the firm because under 
this theory, the argument is that the information disclosed by the firm, will reduce the 
perceived uncertainty of the investors18, thus, the demand for the firm's shares by the 
investors will increase. The second advantage is lowering of the investor's information 
cost. 
The main disclosure costs, under this theory, are regulatory and competitive costs. As 
companies try to raise capital at the lowest possible costs, they will compete within 
themselves to disclose more information (Foster, 1986). This might lead to over 
disclosure and more efforts and other resources being spent on disclosure more than what 
is socially optimal. In this case, competition costs will take place, since the excess 
disclosure provides information to competitors. 
`8 Meek and Gray (1989) pointed out that hiding or not revealing information can be expensive for firms 
competing for funds because they may be perceived as more risky. See also, Wolk and Tearney (1997 
p. 16). 
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3.2.3 Signaling Hypothesis'9 
This hypothesis has been developed to explain problems of information asymmetry in 
labour markets and how it can be reduced by the party with more information signaling to 
others (Morris, 1987). Signaling hypothesis can be used to help explain voluntary 
disclosures. Signaling is a reaction to informational asymmetry in markets, where firms' 
have information that investors do not. Hence, asymmetry can be reduced if the firm, as 
the party with more information, signals this information to others. 
A number of authors (e. g. Lev, 1988 and Wolk & Tearney, 1997) have argued that the 
ability of the firm to raise capital will be improved if it has a good reputation with respect 
to financial reporting and disclosure. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) assume that firms 
whose share prices are undervalued have an incentive to expand additional resources to 
signal that fact. By contrast, firms whose share prices are overvalued would implicitly 
signal that fact by disclosing no additional information. 
Hence, despite information asymmetry, management still has incentives to provide 
quality information to reduce signaling costs, especially the effect on share prices. 
Verrecchia (1983) tried to show that managers with superior information on the demand 
for its products will disclose more to convince both competitors and the capital market of 
the quality of its products, thereby increasing the value of the firm's stocks. 
Ross (1979) argued that firms' with no information or bad news also have incentives to 
signal just like those with good news in order to distinguish their firms from others. In 
other words, it might be the case that the disclosure of the `bad news' will put the firm in 
a better position than the `non disclosure', as the latter, might be regarded by the market 
as a signal that the unpublished data are `adverse'. 
19 Some of the researchers call it "Signaling Theory", for example, Watson et al (2002) , 
Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986). 
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3.3 Concluding Remarks 
Although many different theories surrounding voluntary disclosure exist, it should not be 
concluded that these theories are mutually exclusive, i. e. for one theory to be correct does 
not necessarily mean that another is not. For example, Morris (1987) explored whether 
agency theory and signaling hypothesis were consistent, equivalent or competing. He 
found that they are consistent with each other, and that there is a considerable overlap 
between them. Similarly, signaling hypothesis can be seen as being complementary to the 
capital market theory, as money capital becomes scarce, firms will try to signal their 
quality and spread the good news in order to obtain funds at a favourable terms. 
This chapter described some of the disclosure theories that are covered in the literature, 
which are relevant to the objectives of this study. Disclosure is deemed important 
because users rely on information to make necessary decisions, as such, efforts made 
towards improving the quality and quantity of disclosure as practiced by the various firms 
should be welcomed. However, a proper balance between the costs and benefits of 
disclosure should be maintained. 
Studies on disclosure have provided several theories to explain disclosure practice. Some 
of the hypotheses derived from these theories will be discussed together with the 
development of hypotheses for the current study in chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Review of Previous Empirical Research on 
Level of Disclosure 
4.1 Introduction 
Accounting researchers have investigated associations between certain corporate 
characteristics and extent of disclosure since 1961. Those researchers have noticed that 
not all corporations disclose equal level of information, and this had led them to attempt 
to measure different levels of disclosure and to seek to explain the results. 
The typical methodology employed in most of the above mentioned researches was to 
construct a relevant disclosure index and to relate the quantity of informational items 
disclosed to selected corporate characteristics such as: size, listing status, industry type, 
audit firm, profitability, leverage and number of shareholders. 
Dependent on the research objectives and country being examined, the disclosure index 
comprises voluntary and/or mandatory information items. Disclosure measurement may 
be either weighted or unweighted. The determination of weight is usually based on the 
perceived relative importance of selected items by a user group such as investors and 
financial analysts. Alternatively, an un-weighted index scores each item equally. 
According to Ahmed and Courtis (1999 p. 36), the purpose of using an un-weighted, 
present or not present (dichotomous) index, is to reduce subjectivity in determining 
weights. 
This chapter will review some of the research studies that tested the relationship between 
corporate characteristics and the extent of disclosure in the financial statements /annual 
reports issued by those corporations. At the end of the chapter a concluding remark is 
made that summarises the main observations in these studies. 
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4.2 Cerf (1961) 
Cerf has been regarded as the first researcher to deal with some of the factors that might 
affect the extent of disclosure in the financial statements of corporations. 
In his study, Cerf tested the effects of three variables i. e. asset size, number of 
stockholders and profitability, on the adequacy of disclosure in 527 American companies. 
The methodology used was the disclosure index of 31 weighted items chosen based on 
the literature on investment decision making, as well as some interviews with financial 
analysts. 
After the application of the disclosure index on the annual reports sampled in relation to 
the above mentioned variables, the results indicated that all of these variables were 
positively associated with the index scores (i. e. disclosure level). 
4.3 Copeland and Frederick (1968) 
Copeland and Frederick think that it is unfortunate that practitioners do not have a precise 
definition of extent of disclosure. In the research study that they carried out which is titled 
"Extent of Disclosure", they attempted to develop a measure for the extent of disclosure 
and relate it to conventional measures of materiality. 
A cross sectional sample of 200 New York Stock Exchange listing applications for 1964 
was randomly selected for the study. The variable chosen was the changes in common 
stock outstanding. 
The researchers examination of listing applications revealed 310 reasons for listing 
subsequent to the issue of common stock (the original listings, listings of boards and 
preferred stock, listing of a new class of stock not already listed, listing by municipalities, 
and listing by foreign countries and firms were excluded from the sample). The 310 
reasons were then classified into six categories; namely, convertible stock, cash, 
acquisitions, convertible bonds, stock options, and other purposes. 
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Two measures of materiality were used, one was based on the total market value of stock 
attributable to each reason for listing , and the other was the relationship 
between the size 
of each firm's subsequent issue to the total number of shares it has outstanding at the time 
of the listing. An average measure of materiality was calculated for each of the six 
categories. 
To evaluate the disclosure of changes in common stock, the researchers used a criterion 
based on both changes in dollar amounts reported and on the specific descriptive 
information which they thought should be presented in annual reports, and a check sheet 
was marked when a particular criterion was satisfied. 
To measure the extent of disclosure, Copeland and Frederick counted the total number of 
criteria for each purpose for listing stock and multiply it by the number of companies, 
who listed stock for that purpose. The resulting product is the total number of items that 
would be marked on the check sheets if every company had met every criterion. Then, 
they divided the actual check sheet listing by this product; the resulting percentage is 
defined as the numerical equivalent to the extent of disclosure. 
Copeland and Frederick thought that accountants generally believe that there is, or should 
be, a relation between materiality and disclosure. So, they were interested in determining 
if the more material purposes for listing stock are relatively better disclosed. 
To test for such a relation, they used a Spearman's rank correlation test . This correlation 
measures the relation between two methods for ranking data about a given phenomena. 
The researchers chosen this nonparametric test, because the actual distribution of their 
population was not known (Copeland and Frederick, 1968 p. p. 111). 
The result of this test was +. 595, which tend to support the hypothesis that there is a 
positive relation between materiality and disclosure, but the coefficient was insignificant 
at the . 05 
level. 
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4.4 Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
This study was an up to date to the one conducted by Cerf in 1961. However, two 
important variables were added to those tested by Cerf i. e. the influence of the auditors 
and the corporations' earnings margin. 
Thus, this study examined the affect of (a) asset size, (b) number of stockholders, (c) 
listing status, (d) auditors, (e) rate of return, and (f) earnings margin on the adequacy of 
financial disclosure in the annual reports of corporations. 
Singhvi and Desai used the multivariate linear regression model as their statistical 
technique, and made modifications to Cerf's disclosure index. 
By applying the tests of the above mentioned variables on a sample of 100 listed and 55 
unlisted corporations' annual reports for fiscal years ending between April 1,1965 and 
March 31,1966, the sample was randomly selected from the 500 largest United States 
industrial corporations included in the fortune's directory of 1965. 
The study results indicated that the corporations which disclose inadequate information 
are likely to be: (a) small in size as measured by total assets; (b) small in size as measured 
by number of shareholders; (c) free from listing requirements; (d) audited by small audit 
firms; (e) less profitable as measured by rate of return ; and (f) less profitable as measured 
by earnings margin. 
4.5 Buzby (1975) 
Buzby conducted a study of the relationship between a subcomponent of adequate 
disclosure (which he defined as "the extent to which selected items of information are 
presented in corporate annual reports" p. 16) and two company characteristics i. e. size of 
the company in terms of its total assets and the company's listing status. 
He constructed a measure of disclosure based on the information desire of financial 
analysts, and defined in terms of 39 selected types of information which might appear in 
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the annual reports. Similar to Cerf's approach, weights were assigned to each of the 39 
items / types of information in order to recognize differences in the relative importance of 
their disclosure. Weights were assigned based on a questionnaire sent to financial 
analysts. 
The above mentioned measure of disclosure was applied to the annual reports of 88 
companies whose fiscal year ending between June 30,1970 and June 30,1971. These 
companies were divided into two samples; (1) companies whose stock was traded on 
either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX); (2) companies whose stock was traded in the over the counter market. 
The annual report sampling was based on the matched-pairs i. e. the annual reports of 
unlisted companies were matched with listed companies according to asset size, which 
created 44 pairs of companies. The purpose of the pair-match-design was to test the effect 
of listed versus unlisted companies on the extent of disclosure. 
Buzby's study results indicated that the extent of disclosure in annual reports is positively 
associated with the size of a company's assets and not affected by listing status. 
4.6 Firth (1979) 
Firth carried out a study similar to Buzby (1975) in which he tested the relationship of 
three company characteristics, (1) company size, (2) listing status and (3) external 
auditors, with the level of disclosure in the annual reports of these companies. 
The first step in his research was to construct a list of items of information that appear, or 
could appear, in corporate annual reports. A review of relevant literature and discussion 
with various users of accounts was made for this purpose. The results were a construction 
of a list of 48 items, which were used as a disclosure index. 
Weighting were attached to the items in the list. This was done by sending the list of 
items to a sample of financial analysts and asking them to evaluate the importance of each 
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item using a five point scale, in which assigning of score 5 meant the item was very 
important and score 1 meant the item was not important. 
Firth used three samples consisting of (a) 40 companies with no stock exchange listing, 
(b) 40 stock exchange companies, who were paired with the unlisted companies on basis 
of size and industry, and (c) 100 stock exchange listed companies. 
Firth carried out two statistical tests on the data collected. There were a "standard test" 
and "Wilcoxon matched pairs signed marks test". These tests showed that both size and 
stock market listing variables were positively related to voluntary disclosure, where as the 
auditor factor has no impact at all. 
4.7 Kahl and Belkaoui (1981) 
In their study "Bank Annual Reports Disclosure Adequacy Internationally", Kahl and 
Belkaoui investigated the overall extent of disclosure by 50 banks located in 18 countries. 
The disclosure adequacy was measured by the extent to which 30 selected information 
items are presented in the annual reports using a disclosure index. 
A review of investment, financial and accounting literature was first conducted by the 
researchers to select a list of items that is most appropriate for bank annual reports. In 
addition, some other items were included based on the researcher's perception of 
information relevance to the banks investors' decisions. 
Kahl and Belkaoui assigned weights to the items in the disclosure index by asking 15 
business administration professor of the faculty of administration of the University of 
Ottawa, to rank each of the 30 items in the index on a scale of zero to four, with higher 
score indicating greater importance. 
The researchers thought that there is a possibility that the sample of professors mentioned 
above might not be an adequate proxy for users of bank annual reports internationally, 
which is a very true fact, the same questionnaire was sent to all 50 of the bank financial 
analyst holding the professional designation Certified Financial Analysts (CFA). Ten 
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responses were received, and their ranking of items was identical to that of the professors 
with some slight, but not statistically significant differences in the weights. 
The researchers concluded that (1) differences in disclosure adequacy exist 
internationally; at least for the countries included in the study, with considerable 
variability in extent, and with USA banks as leaders, and (2) there is a positive correlation 
between asset size and extent of disclosure. 
4.8 Rowe (1985) 
The Roman Catholic Church in the United States is divided into 166 independent 
territories called "dioceses". Rowe conducted a study on 156 dioceses, and one of the 
study objectives was to examine the influence of four characteristics; (1) use of the attest 
function; (2) type of report distributed; (3) size and (4) geographical location, on the level 
of disclosure in the financial statements of each of the 156 dioceses. 
A disclosure score index was constructed with 18 items weighted at 100 total points. By 
using the general linear models procedure of the Statistical Analysis Technique, with a 
0.10 confidence level the researcher found that reports audited by "big eight" audit firms 
and "non-big eight" audit firms were not significantly different; but the reports not 
audited at all were significantly inferior. 
Reports typed "complete" were significantly superior to the "incomplete" reports. Reports 
distributed as "haunts" and through "diocesan newspapers" showed no significant 
difference in disclosure scores. 
The size and geographical location of dioceses were not significantly related to the 
disclosure scores i. e. no relationship found between the level of disclosure and these two 
factors. 
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4.9 Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) 
Chow and Wong-Boren conducted a study on 52 Mexican stock exchange-listed firms, to 
test three firm characteristics on the level of voluntary disclosure by those firms. The 
three characteristics are the firm size, leverage and proportion of assets in place. 
The researchers used the disclosure index that consists of 24 voluntary disclosure items 
identified by referring to the pronouncements of the Mexican authorities and prior studies 
in this area. The items in the disclosure index where rated by a sample of loan officers 
who were asked to indicate, on a seven- point scale, the importance they placed on the 
disclosure items in evaluating an average loan application. The end points were: (1) "of 
no importance at all" and (7) "of utmost importance". 
The results of the statistical tests applied, i. e. mean, median and standard deviation, 
showed that the extent of voluntary disclosure increased with firm size, and that there is 
no significant effect due to financial leverage or assets in place. 
4.10 Cooke (1989b) 
Cooke has studied the extent of disclosure in the annual reports of 90 Swedish listed and 
unlisted corporations. The purpose of the study was to assess whether there is a 
significant association between the extent of disclosure and listing status and size (in 
terms of total assets, sales and number of shareholders). 
Cooke used a disclosure index to test the above variables, and the results of his study 
showed a significant association between the corporations listing status and size with the 
extent of disclosure. 
4.11 Ng and Koh (1994) 
This study was conducted in Singapore and it investigates the effect of certain corporate 
characteristics proposed by agency theory, namely; (1) size, in terms of total assets and 
turnovers, (2) profitability, in terms of after tax profit, rate of return on assets and rate of 
i 
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return on investments , 
(3) solvency, in terms of liquidity and leverage ratios, 
(4) operational complexity, in terms of number of industrial segments in which the 
companies operate (5) type of industry, in terms of level of regulation i. e. highly 
regulated and less regulated , and (6) auditors size. 
Out of a population of 124 companies, only 106 listed companies were included in the 
study sample which covered the 1986 financial statements. 
Based on a multivariate approach using probate analyses, the study showed that 
compliance with non-mandatory accounting pronouncements depends significantly on the 
above mentioned characteristics. In particular, the study showed that companies that are 
large, profitable, and highly geared are more likely to comply with non- mandatory 
accounting pronouncements. Companies in the "Industrial and Commercial" sector, and 
companies audited by large audit firms are more likely to comply with non-mandatory 
accounting pronouncements than do their counterparts. The results also showed that less 
complex companies are more likely to comply with non- mandatory pronouncements, but 
this relationship was not statistically significant. 
4.12 Frost and Pownal (1994) 
Frost and Pownal study based on the periodic accounting disclosures of 107 firms from 
13 domiciles with equity securities traded on U. S. A and /or U. K exchanges during 1989. 
The researchers compared the frequency and timing of accounting disclosures made by 
foreign and domestic firms, and assessed compliance with disclosure rules in the USA 
and U. K Jurisdictions. They also investigated the influence of several firm characteristics, 
namely, (1) size, (2) domicile, and (3) U. S exchange listing on the level of disclosure. 
The results showed that disclosure frequency is positively associated with the firm size 
and exchange listing. 
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4.13 Ahmed and Nicolas (1994) 
Ahmed and Nicholas conducted an empirical study to assess the extent of mandatory 
information disclosed in the annual reports of 118 listed non-financial companies in 
Bangladesh. 
The effect of certain company characteristics; namely, company size, total debt, 
multinational company influence, professional qualification of the principal accounting 
officer of the company and size of audit firm; on the level of disclosure in the financial 
statements of these companies was examined. 
The results of the study showed that none of the sample companies complied with the 
existing financial regulations. Through the use of multiple linear regression analysis, 
Ahmed and Nicholas have concluded that subsidiaries of multinational companies and 
large audit firms had significant positive impact on the level of mandatory disclosure 
compliance. The qualification of the principal accounting officer of a reporting company 
has less influence. 
4.14 Raffournier (1995) 
The aim of Raffournier's study was to look for possible determinants of the disclosure 
policy of Swiss companies by relating the content of 161 Swiss listed companies annual 
reports to several of these companies characteristics. 
The researcher developed a disclosure index consisted of 29 items derived from the fourth 
and seventh European Committee Directives, these items were used as a basis for 
measuring the extent of disclosure in the annual reports of the companies in the sample . 
The extent of disclosure has been found to be significantly related to size (in terms of 
total assets and sales); internationality level (i. e. multiple-listed companies found to have 
a higher level of disclosure than those quoted in Switzerland only); size of auditing firm. 
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And to a smaller extent, to industry type and profitability (measured by the net income on 
net worth ratio i. e. ROI). 
Inversely, no relationship was found between the level of disclosure and leverage 
(measured by debt on total assets ratio); and ownership diffusion (defined as the 
percentage of shares not held by known shareholders). 
4.15 Gray et al. (1995) 
The researchers explained in their study the impact of international capital market 
pressures on corporate voluntary disclosures in the annual reports of 116 U. S and 64 U. K 
multinational corporations. Specifically, the study provides evidence about whether 
intentionally listed U. S and U. K multinational corporations voluntarily disclose more 
harmonized information in their annual reports than U. S and U. K multinational 
corporations listed only on their respective domestic stock markets. 
In order to carry out the study, the researches obtained the 1989 annual reports of the 
sample of U. S and U. K companies. The contents of the annual reports were then 
compared to the items of a disclosure index that consisted of 12 items divided into 3 
groups: (1) strategic information; (2) non-financial information and (3) financial 
information. If the annual report contained the disclosure item, a code "one" is given to it, 
and if not a code "zero" is given to it, this is subject to the applicability of the item 
concerned. 
The results showed that there were significant differences in financial reporting behavior 
as between internationally listed and domestic listed multinational corporations. The 
researchers noticed that the international listing effect is especially important in respect of 
strategic information disclosure. 
At the sometime, there is a significant country effect, notably in respect of the disclosure 
of non-financial information serving as a persistent influence on multinational corporation 
voluntary disclosure behavior. 
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Thus, the findings of this study suggest that participation in international capital markets 
is significantly, associated with additional voluntary disclosures in the annual reports of 
multinational corporations. 
4.16 Hossain et al. (1995) 
In this study, the relationship between five firm characteristics and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of 55 companies listed in the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange was investigated. 
The five firm characteristics are (1) size, measured in terms of total assets; (2) leverage, 
measured in terms of the ratio of long term debt to owners equity; (3) assets-in place, 
computed by the ratio of bank value of fixed assets (net after depreciation) to total assets; 
(4) type of audit firm; and (5) foreign listing status. 
The empirical evidence showed that firm size, leverage and foreign listing are statistically 
related to the level of information voluntarily disclosed by New Zealand companies in 
their published annual reports. The researchers think that, in general, voluntary 
disclosures are used as a means to reduce agency cost, as firms grew in size and increase 
leverage. 
In contrasts, the results of study showed that the level of voluntary disclosure is not 
affected by the type of audit firm and assets-in-place. 
4.17 AI-Modahki (1996) 
As part of her thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Accounting, submitted to 
the University of Exeter in 1996, Al-Modahki conducted a study which is concerned with 
the development of accounting disclosure in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The aim was 
to measure the extent of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure in 33 Saudi listed 
companies' annual reports for 5 years period from 1986 to 1990, and test the significance 
of its development over this period. 
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The effect of two variables i. e. industry type and company size, on the extent of 
disclosure in the annual reports of those companies was also tested. The companies 
grouped into 4 industry types, (1) banking; (2) manufacturing and cement; (3) services 
and electricity and; (4) agriculture. 
Company size measured in terms of, (1) assets; (2) sales; (3) number of shareholders; and 
(4) total paid-in capital. 
The tests results have shown no association between the four types of industries and the 
extent of aggregate disclosure over the 5 years period, except between two types of 
industries: banking and manufacturing and cement for the first three years in the study i. e. 
1986 to 1988. 
Also, the results of the tests showed no association between the variables: assets, sales 
and number of shareholders and the extent of disclosure. The only significant association 
was found between the total paid-in-capital, as a measure of size, and the level of 
disclosure. 
4.18 Marston and Robson (1997) 
Marston and Robson conducted a study to measure the changes in the level of disclosure 
in the financial statements of 29 large Indian companies over the period betweenl982 and 
1990. The changes in the level of disclosure were measured using a disclosure index of 17 
items. The other objective of the study was to test the effect of the company size. 
The researchers found that disclosure had increased overtime and both periods (i. e. 1982 
and 1990) disclosure was positively associated with the company size. 
They think that the reasons for improved disclosure in the Indian companies include 
increased compliance with International Accounting Standards (which were advisory at 
the time of the survey) and an increase in the disclosure required by those standards. 
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4.19 Ahmed and Courtis (1999) 
Ahmed and Courtis prepared a paper that analysis the association between corporate 
characteristics and disclosure levels in the annual reports using a "meta-analysis" 
statistical technique. 
The purpose was to integrate prior disclosure studies (since Cerfs, 1961) and to identify 
underlying factors that moderate the apparent variation in results. 
A meta-analysis of 29 studies confirms significant and positive relationships between 
disclosure levels and corporate size, listing status and leverage. No significant association 
is found between corporate profitability or size of audit firm with aggregate disclosure 
levels. 
The study advised the users of the results to interpret them with caution. This is because: 
(1) the study is based on only published studies and may have introduced bias by 
including a dominant number of studies which have found significant results, (2) all 29 
studies used in the sample have employed a different composition in the construction of 
disclosure indices used the basic data gathering technique, (3) other limitations are related 
to the effect of having studies from different countries, different periods, different 
operational definitions used in measuring the explanatory variables (such as total debt to 
equity, and long-term debt to equity for leverage) and the employment of a wide variety 
of research methods, (such as parametric, non-parametric, univariate and multivariate 
techniques). 
Ahmed and Courts stated that the above concerns are frequently expressed against the 
suitability of meta-analysis, that is, "apples and oranges" problems. Despite these 
limitations they believe that meta-analysis is a well established social science technique 
for aggregating test statistics, and the inclusion criteria used in their paper are consistent 
with the literature. 
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4.20 Chen and Jaggi (2000) 
This study examined whether a higher proportion of independent non-executive directors 
(INDs) on Hong Kong corporate boards is associated with more comprehensive 
disclosures within the mandatory disclosure framework. The study also examined 
whether family ownership and control of firms had an impact on the association between 
INDs and financial disclosures because a substantial number of Hong Kong firms are 
family owned and controlled. The study has been conducted on a sample of 87 large 
Hong Kong firms and using a disclosure index developed by Wallace and Naser (1995). 
The classification of firms into family owned and controlled and non-family owned and 
controlled has been based on criteria used by prior studies. The study covers a two-year 
period of 1993 and 1994. 
The researchers argued that because of family ownership and control structure, the 
appointment of INDs in family controlled companies is likely to be influenced by the 
management's close relationship with prospective INDs and the likelihood of their- 
support for the management's philosophy and policies. Consequently, in the presence of 
family ownership and control, INDs' independence may be compromised and their 
contribution to improve the management's responsiveness to investors might be reduced. 
Thus, these factors may reduce the INDs' effectiveness in family owned and controlled 
firms. 
The research results suggest a positive association between the proportion of INDs on 
corporate boards of Hong Kong firms and comprehensiveness of financial disclosures. 
This in turn suggests that inclusion of INDs on corporate boards has a positive influence 
on the management's decisions to disclose financial information. The results also suggest 
that the positive association between the proportion of INDs on corporate board and 
financial disclosures is stronger for non-family owned and controlled firms than for 
family owned and controlled firms. Hence, the researchers think that this result in turn 
suggests that family ownership and control may reduce the INDs' effectiveness in 
convincing management to disclose more comprehensive financial information. 
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4.21 Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between a number of corporate 
governance, cultural and firm-specific characteristics and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian companies. The independent variables used 
by the researchers are as follows: 
Corporate characteristics : 
Size 
Assets-in-place 
Industry type 
Listing age 
Complexity of business 
Level of diversification 
foreign activities 
Gearing 
ii. Ownership structure : 
Top ten shareholders 
Foreign ownership 
Institutional investors 
Profitability 
Type of auditors 
iii. Corporate governance characteristics : 
Board composition 
Cross-directorship 
Role duality 
Family members on the board 
Finance director on the board 
Chairperson with cross-directorships 
Chairperson is non-executive director 
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iv. Personal characteristics : 
Race of chairperson 
Race of managing director 
Race of finance director 
Racial ownership structure 
Racial composition of directors on board 
Qualification of directors 
Qualification of finance director 
Literature Review 
Results based on the full regression model indicated that only two groups of variables, 
namely corporate governance and firm-specific characteristics, were associated with the 
extent of disclosure. The significance of the two corporate governance variables identified 
(i. e., family members setting on board and non-executive chairman) indicate the 
importance of these variables as determinants of voluntary disclosure. 
Specifically, the chairperson as non-executive director is negatively associated with the 
extent of voluntary disclosure and has the highest regression coefficient. This seems to 
contradict agency theory which suggests that non-executive directors are needed as check 
and balance mechanism. Hence, the researchers argued that a non-executive chairperson, 
as agent, obtains greater utility by keeping private information secret. Accordingly, they 
recommended that the relevant authorities in Malaysia which; recommend companies to 
have non-executive chairperson as part of "good corporate governance practice"; might 
need to reconsider their recommendation, particularly if the non-executive chairperson is 
making a private gain. 
4.22 Naser et al. (2002) 
This study, reports the results of an empirical examination of factors that could possibly 
influence the extent of disclosure in the annual reports of a sample of Jordanian firms 
listed on the Amman Financial Market. 
Fifteen specific firm attributes that impact the depth of information disclosure are 
examined. These are : the number of shareholders, auditor firms status, return on equity, 
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foreign (non-Arab) ownership ratio, government ownership ratio, Arab ownership ratio, 
individual ownership ratio, type of industry, profit margin, net sales, gearing ratio, market 
capitalisation, liquidity ratio, number of employees and assets size. 
In order to measure the depth of information disclosure in a firm's annual report, a 
disclosure index was constructed which consisted of 86 items. 
A sample of 84 non-financial firms listed on the Amman Financial Market and operating 
in both the manufacturing and services sector (forming 64 percent of the total population 
of the sample) were used. A disclosure index was constructed to assess the depth of 
disclosure in the sample firm's annual reports. Moreover, the determined firms' attributes 
were then regressed against the constructed disclosure index to recognise factors that may 
influence the depth of information disclosure. 
The result of the regression analyses revealed that six out of the fifteen variables applied 
in this study demonstrate a statistically (negative or positive) significant association with 
the depth of information disclosure in the annual reports of the sample of firms tested. 
One of these, the liquidity ratio, reported a negative significant association, leading to the 
rejection of the hypotheses concerned. On the other hand, market capitalisation, audit 
firm status, gearing ratio, sales and profit margin reported a positive and significant 
association, resulting in the acceptance of the hypotheses concerned. 
4.23 Chau and Gray (2002) 
This study examines the association of ownership structure with the voluntary disclosure 
of listed companies in the Asian setting of Hong Kong and Singapore. An analysis of 
annual reporting practices by those companies showed that the extent of outside 
ownership is positively associated with voluntary disclosures. In particular, the result 
indicated that the level of information disclosure is likely to be less in "insider" or family- 
controlled companies, a significant feature of the Hong Kong and Singapore stock 
markets. 
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The researchers state that Hong Kong and Singapore are the focus of this study for 
several reasons as follows: 
Firstly, because of their unique and similar backgrounds as emerging market 
economies with rapidly growing capital markets. 
Secondly, voluntary disclosure deserves special attention in the Asian context 
because firms in these countries have less incentive for the transparent disclosure 
than their Anglo-American counterparts. 
Thirdly, the disclosure orientation of firms in these countries is also greatly 
influenced by the form of their ownership and management structure. In Hong 
Kong and Singapore, listed companies are usually controlled by a family group 
who staff many of the senior positions and also own a large proportion of the 
shares. In Hong Kong, a survey conducted in 1997 by the Hong Kong Society of 
Accountants confirmed the widespread view that the extent of control of listed 
companies in Hong Kong by one shareholder or a family group of shareholders is 
significant. 
Accordingly, this study examined whether ownership structure is associated with the 
voluntary disclosures of listed companies in Hong Kong and Singapore. It also 
investigated whether family ownership and control of firms had an impact on the level of 
voluntary disclosures because a substantial number of firms are family-owned and 
controlled. 
To ensure that samples selected from Hong Kong and Singapore were homogeneous, the 
researchers selected only industrial companies for their tests. Annual reports of 60 firms 
(represents about 32% of the total population) for 1997 were analysed. A similar 
procedure was carried out for Singapore companies, with a sample size of 62 companies 
out of the total population of 133 (representing about 47% of the total population). 
The result of this study of voluntary disclosure behavior by Hong Kong and Singapore 
listed companies provide support for the agency theory-based hypothesis that there is a 
positive association between wider ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
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The empirical findings also highlighted the importance of the contextual characteristics of 
Hong Kong and Singapore. The strong prevalence of "insider" and family-controlled 
companies is likely to be associated with lower levels of disclosure. This hypothesis is 
supported strongly in the case of Hong Kong. However, in the case of Singapore, it was 
not possible to test for this directly, owing to a lack of data, though indirect support is 
provided by the findings on ownership in general. 
4.24 Hamid (2004) 
This study provided empirical evidences on the corporate social disclosure in one of the 
highly regulated industries in Malaysia, namely banking and finance. 
It investigated the effect of a number of corporate characteristics on the level of 
disclosure. Firm size, financial performance, corporation age, listing status, and company 
profile has been chosen to represent corporate characteristics for the independent 
variables. 
The researcher argued that annual report has been chosen as the reporting medium by this 
study, because (1) it acts as a channel for the communication of messages provided on a 
regular basis, (2) it has been widely used in prior researches and (3) the information 
contained in it possess higher credibility. A Sample of 48 banks out of the population of 
66 banks are chosen, representing 72% of total population. 
The result of the hypotheses testing shows that size, listing status and age of business 
appear to significantly influence the disclosure practice. The profitability variable shows 
insignificant relationship possibly due to prior literature notion that decision to disclose 
social information is related to public pressure variable rather than profitability variable. 
For Company profile variable, the result shows negative and insignificant relationship. 
42 
Chapter 4 Literature Review 
4.25 Collett and Hrasky (2005) 
The purpose of this research was to examine the corporate governance disclosure 
practices of listed Australian companies at a time prior to when mandatory requirements 
for disclosure were introduced (i. e. 1995). The researchers examined the possible 
motivations for the voluntary disclosure of governance information, and proposed a 
model that links disclosures about governance to future financing intentions. 
The hypotheses tested in this study were as follows: 
Hypothesis One: In the absence of mandatory requirements to do so, companies 
are more likely to disclose corporate governance information if they intend to 
raise new share capital in the year following disclosure. 
Hypothesis Two: In the absence of mandatory requirement to do so, companies are 
more likely to disclose corporate governance information if they intend to raise 
new debt funds in the year following disclosure. 
Thus, in this study the researchers predicted that there would be an association between a 
firm's decision to make voluntary corporate disclosures and its future financing 
intentions. The study results supported this prediction for share issues but not for debt. 
The results are consistent with the capital market transaction hypothesis. They suggest 
that firms intending to issue shares in the subsequent period have an incentive to make 
voluntary corporate governance disclosures. 
However, no significant association was found between debt raising intentions and 
voluntary corporate governance disclosures. This could reflect the nature of the debt 
market in Australia where there is much greater reliance on private rather than public 
debt. 
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4.26 Alsaeed (2005) 
Literature Review 
This study examined the effect of specific firm characteristics on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure by a sample of non-financial Saudi firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(SSM) for the year 2003. The variables investigated consisted of the firm size; debt; 
ownership dispersion; firm age; profit margin; return on equity; liquidity; audit firm size; 
and industry type. 
The association between the level of disclosure and various firm characteristics was 
examined using multiple linear regression analysis. It was hypothesised that for the 
sample firms, the level of disclosure would be positively associated with the above 
mentioned firm characteristics. 
The annual reports of year 2003 were chosen because they are relatively more recent and 
easier to obtain. The sample composes of 40 firms, forming approximately 56% of the 
total population of firms listed on the SSM, and fairly represents a wide cross-section of 
industries. 
A disclosure index was constructed as a yardstick to measure the level of disclosure by 
the listed firms. The construction of disclosure index was based on the information that 
firms supplied in their annual financial reports to shareholders. 
The study found that firms, on average, reported 33 % of the voluntary information stated 
in the disclosure index developed by the researcher. The researcher argued that the low 
disclosure level is most likely refers to the fact that this type of information is voluntary 
in nature, and no existing disciplines set out by the authoritative accounting and reporting 
bodies in Saudi Arabia require public firms to display such information. In other words, 
voluntary disclosure is left to the discretion of management. Furthermore, in an effort to 
examine the relationship between the disclosure level and selected corporate attributes, 
the study revealed that large firms tend to present more voluntary information than small 
firms. The other remaining firm characteristics were found not to be significantly 
associated with the level of disclosure. 
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4.27 Summary and Concluding Remarks: 
Due to globalisation, harmonisation of accounting standards and transparency, the 
pressures has increased on the companies to increase the level and extent of both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure of information. The most important media to release 
this information is the annual reports, other routes by which company information is 
communicated includes press release, interim reporting, communications with analysts, 
letters to shareholders and debt holders, question and answer sessions and so on. 
Researchers have noticed that not all companies disclose the same level of information, 
and this has led them to attempt to measure different levels of disclosure and relate them 
to various company characteristics and seek to explain the results. 
Since Cerfls 1961 study which was designed to identify the major disclosures and to 
explain, through association with certain company characteristics, why some firms might 
adhere to better disclosure policies than others; several succeeding studies have 
investigated the association between disclosure and company characteristics such as 
company size, listing status, profitability, size of audit firm, leverage, number of 
shareholders and so on. Table 4.1 summarises the main results of some of previous 
empirical researches on the level of disclosure. 
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Table 4.1: Results of previous studies on the extent and level of disclosure in the 
annual reports 
Author (s) Country Significant/ Not significant /Not 
Positively related positively related 
1 Cerf (1961) USA Size of firm 
Number of stockholders 
Profitability 
2 Copeland and USA Materiality 
Frederick (1968) 
3 Singhvi and USA Size 
Desai (1974) Number of stockholders 
Listing status 
Audit firm size 
Profitability 
4 Buzby (1975) USA Size Listing status 
5 Firth (1979) U. K Size Audit firm size 
Listing status 
6 Kahl and Various Size 
Belkaoui (1981) 
7 Chow and Wong- Mexico Size Leverage 
Boren (1987) Assets in place 
8 Wallace (1988) Nigeria Size Gearing 
Number of stockholders 
9 Cooke (1989b) Sweden Listing status 
Size 
10 Cooke (1992) Japan Size 
Number of shareholders 
Industry type 
Listing status 
11 Ng and Koh Singapore Size 
(1994) Profitability 
leverage 
audit firm size 
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Author (s) Country Significant/ Not significant /Not 
Positively related positively related 
12 Frost and Pownal USA and Size 
(1994) UK Listing status 
13 Hossain et al. Malaysia Size Leverage 
(1994) Foreign listing Assets in place 
% of Shares owned Auditor size 
14 Raffournier Switzerland Size Leverage 
(1995) Internationality Ownership diffusion (i. e. 
Listing status % of shares owned by 
Audit firm private by public) 
Industry type 
Profitability 
15 Hossain et al. New Size Audit firm 
(1995) Zealand Leverage Assets in place 
Listing Status 
16 Al Modahki Kingdom of Total paid in capital Industry type 
(1996) Saudi Total assets 
Arabia Sales 
Number of stockholders 
17 Ahmed and Bangladesh Size Qualifications of 
Nicholas (1996) accounting officer 
18 Ahmed and various Size Profitability 
Courtis (1999) Listing status Audit firm size 
Leverage 
19 Chen and Jaggi Hong Kong Proportion of non-executive Ownership concentration 
directors on board 
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Author (s) Country Significant/ Not significant /Not 
Positively related positively related 
(2000) 
20 Haniffa and Malaysia Assets in place Independent non- 
Cooke (2002)20 Ownership concentration executive directors 
Profitability 
21 Naser et al. Jordan Audit firm size Size 
(2002) Leverage Industry type 
Profitability (profit No. of shareholder 
margin) Profitability (return on 
equity) 
22 Chau and Gray Hong Kong Ownership concentration 
(2002) and 
Singapore 
23 Hamid (2004) Malaysia Size Profitability 
Listing status Company profile 
Age of business 
24 Alsaeed (2005) Saudi Size Leverage 
Arabia Ownership dispersion 
Firm age 
Profitability 
Industry type 
Audit firm size 
As table 4.1 shows a variety of firm characteristics have been examined in annual report 
disclosure studies. The most frequent of these characteristics have been (1) firm size, as 
measured by total assets, total revenue, or number of shareholders (2) listing status, (3) 
leverage, as measured by debt to equity or debt to total assets and (4) size of audit firm. 
20 Due to the large number of independent variables covered by Haniffa and Cooke study, the researcher 
covered only the ones relevant to this study as shown in the summary table. 
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In most of the studies, size has been found to be positively associated with the level of 
disclosure. This suggests that "larger companies follow better disclosure practices in 
developed countries" (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999 p. p. 37). 
Also, it supports the argument that (1) it is less costly for large firms to provide more 
information as this information is already produced for internal management decision 
purposes, (2) smaller firms may be reluctant to provide more information as they fear the 
use of this information by competitors, (3) according to Watts and Zimmerman (1978), 
large firms are more sensitive to political costs, therefore, they will disclose more in order 
to allay public criticism or government intervention in their affairs and (4) proper 
disclosure will increase investors confidence, this in turn might improve the marketability 
of firm securities and make external financing through the securities market both easier 
and cheaper. 
Frost and Pownal (1994), Raffournier (1995) and Hossain et al. (1995), all of them found 
that there is a positive association between listing status and disclosure, except Buzby 
(1957) who did not find a significant association. The significant relationship between 
listing status and disclosure is related to the fact that firms have to comply with minimum 
disclosure requirements of market regulation authorities. In addition to these mandatory 
disclosure requirements, and as stated in the above paragraph, listed firms may also 
voluntarily provide more information to show that they are more transparent in order to 
increase the investors' confidence, and thus obtain better financing conditions and deals. 
Some studies found positive association between leverage and disclosure level (Ng and 
Koh, 1994 and Hossain et al: 1995). This is consistent with the hypothesis that agency 
costs are higher for companies with a higher proportion of debt in their capital structure. 
Thus, it is to their advantages to disclose more information to reduce agency costs. 
Furthermore, most debt covenants may specify additional or supplementary disclosure 
requirements. However, other studies showed that the level of disclosure is not 
significantly affected by leverage, for example, Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and 
Raffournier (1995). This unexpected result may arise because "leverage is a poor 
surrogate for external financing" as argued by Raffournier (1995). 
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Although it has been argued by many researchers that the audit firm size is a determinant 
of disclosure level due to the ability of large audit firms to exercise influence or provide 
advice regarding the level of disclosure that company management should give, however, 
the empirical support for a positive relationship between audit firm size and disclosure 
level is inconclusive. 
Singhvi and Desai (1974) and Raffournier (1995) found a positive relationship between 
the audit firm size and level of disclosure. However, Firth (1974) and Hossain et al. 
(1995) found that there is no relationship between the audit firm size and the level of 
disclosure. 
The above narrative review of prior studies indicates that there is an inconclusive 
evidence about the association between disclosure level and (a) leverage, (b) size of audit 
firm and (3) listing Status. There is also variability across studies with regard to the extent 
of the association between disclosure levels and corporate size and listing status. 
Raffournier (1995) stated that there is a "high correlation between size of company and 
other variables (a matter that suggests) that size serves as a proxy for several influences". 
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Chapter 5 
Islamic Banking - An overview 
5.1 The Evolution 
Ariff (1988 p. 40) claims that the first modem experiment with Islamic banking was 
undertaken in Egypt when Mr. Ahmed El Najjar established a saving bank based on a 
profit and loss sharing concept in the Egyptian town of Mit Chamr in 1963. This 
experiment lasted until 1967, by which time there were nine such banks in the country. 
These banks, which neither charged nor paid interest, invested mostly by engaging in 
trade and industry, directly or in partnership with others, and shared the profits with their 
depositors. Thus, they functioned essentially as saving investments institutions rather than 
as commercial banks. The Nasir Social Bank, established in Egypt in 1971 as. the first 
commercial bank in the country conducting its operations on interest-free basis. 
Shenoy et al. (2005) consider the formation of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in 
Saudi Arabia in 1975 as an important stimulate in the development of Shari'a compliant 
banking activity in the Middle East, because one of the IDB's founding objectives was the 
promotion and development of Islamic banking worldwide. 
Now, and in addition to the Arabian Gulf, Middle East, Far East and Asia; the United 
Kingdom, too, has paved the way for Islamic Shari'a compliant banking to come into 
mainstream financial services by authorising, in August 2004, the Islamic Bank of 
Britain, as the first stand alone bank in Europe planning to operate in accordance with 
Shari'a principles (Shenoy et al., 2005). 
Islam prohibits Muslims from taking or giving riba (interest) regardless of the purpose for 
which such loans are made and regardless of the rates at which interest is charged (Ariff, 
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1988). Technically, riba2' refers to the addition in the amount of the principal of a loan at 
a rate decided depending upon the risk, duration and amount of the loan. "While earlier 
there was a debate as to whether riba relates to interest or usury, there now appears to be 
consensus of opinion among Islamic scholars that the term extends to all forms of 
interest" (Algaoud, 1996). 
Hence, one of the main principles according to which the Islamic banks have to operate is 
the elimination of interest in all forms of transactions. Other principles include the 
followings (Elgaili, 1996) and (Sarker, 1999): 
a. Undertaking business and trade activities on the basis of fair and legitimate (Halal) 
profits. 
b. Providing social services reflected in utilizing Zakah fund for the benefit of the 
poor and needy. 
c. Avoidance of Gharar22, which means that the deals should be fair and transparent 
between the various parties, and any unjustified enrichment arises out of 
uncertainty or undefined of the essential pillars of contract is prohibited. For 
example, gambling is a form of Gharar because the gambler is ignorant of the 
results of the gamble. 
d. Assisting long-term investment. 
5.2 Characteristics of Islamic banks 
Islamic banks are ethically funded organisations. Satkunasingam and Shanmugam (2004) 
stated that Islamic banks have a moral burden placed upon them as their very foundation 
is based upon religious principles and the bank's Muslim customers believe that they 
22) Riba is translated in English language as "usury", but interpreted by modern Islamic scholars as being 
equivalent to interest. Sarker (1999) argues that Riba is a prominent source of unjustified advantage, 
because Shari'a does not consider money as a commodity such that there should be a price for its use. 22 Gharar is originated out of deception through ignorance by one or more parties to a contract (Sarker, 
1999). 
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answer to a higher authority. Archer et al. (1998) claim that Islamic banks are established 
with the mandate to carry out their business and financial transactions in strict compliance 
with Islamic Shari'a. Almost every Islamic bank has a board of Shari'a scholars, 
commonly known as its Shari'a Supervisory Board (SSB), to review the juristic 
correctness of the bank's transactions. They further argue that the SSB is one of the main 
monitoring systems developed by Islamic banks to assure the stakeholders of the banks' 
adherence to Shari'a precepts. Recent standards promulgated by the AAOIFI require both 
the SSB and the financial auditors of Islamic banks to report on these banks' compliance 
with Shari'a doctrines. 
The following are major characteristics of Islamic banks: 
a. Prohibition against the payment and receipt of a fixed or predetermined rate of interest. 
This is replaced by profit and loss sharing (PLS) arrangements where the rate of return 
on financial assets held in banks is not known and not fixed prior to the undertaking of 
the transaction. The actual rate of return can be determined only ex-post, on the basis of 
actual profits accrued from real sector activities that are made possible through the 
productive use of financial assets (Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998). 
Archer et al. (1998) stated that "As an alternative to the payment of riba (interest), 
which among other things is strictly prohibited by the Shari'a, Islamic banks use a 
version of the Mudaraba contract to mobilize funds in investment accounts. (The 
original form of the Mudaraba contract is very similar to that of the 'commenda' 
contract in general use by Italian and other merchants in the late middle ages and early 
modem period). The Mudaraba contract is a profit sharing financial instrument that is 
neither a financial liability nor an equity instrument. Unlike equity instruments, Islamic 
investment accounts are redeemable at maturity or at the initiative of their holders, but 
(usually) not without the prior consent of the bank". 
b. The relationship between IAHs and the Islamic bank is not similar to the fiduciary 
services that are provided by traditional banks or similar organisations acting in a 
position of trust to administer assets or discharge other responsibilities on behalf of 
another party. The Islamic bank does not undertake to give priority to meeting the 
IAH's financial claims over those of its shareholders. In addition, unlike traditional 
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banks where there is (at least in principle) a sharp division (or what is known as a 
"Chinese wall") between the fiduciary service function and other areas of the bank, in 
the majority of Islamic banks the IAH's funds are commingled with shareholders' funds 
and are invested in the same investment portfolios (Archer et al. 1998). 
c. IAH's funds, plus some of the shareholders' equity and other sources of funds (e. g., 
current accounts) usually finance the aggregate investment portfolio or asset pool of an 
Islamic bank. Archer et al. (1998) and (Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998), claim that if the 
aggregate investment portfolio yields a positive return, then the shares of profit are 
allocated between the parties to the contract according to their proportionate shares of 
their respective investments in the portfolio. If the bank's aggregate investment portfolio 
yields a negative return, then this loss is borne by IAHs and shareholders pro rata to 
their respective investments in this portfolio. However, according to the Mudaraba 
contract, if the loss is due to misconduct or negligence of the Mudarib, then the Islamic 
bank will bear the whole losses. 
d. Demand deposits are guaranteed in capital value, although no returns are paid on them. 
The reason to justify the capital value guarantee is the assumption that those type of 
deposits have been placed in the bank as Amanat (i. e. for safekeeping). Hence, they 
belong at any time to depositors. 
5.2.1 Relationship basis between the Islamic bank and IAHs 
The Mudaraba contract forms the basis for the relationship between the Islamic bank and 
IAHs. If this contract resulted in profit, this profit is distributed according to the ratio 
agreed upon at the time of signing the contract. In case of loss, the Islamic bank losses its 
efforts and the IAHs lose their capital investment. 
It is possible for the Islamic bank to act as a Mudarib and Rab al mal in the same time, if 
it commingles the IAHs money with its own money (i. e. the shareholders funds) or the 
money that it held as fiduciary (e. g. the current accounts). Thus, in case of loss, the 
Islamic bank will lose both its efforts as a Mudarib and its money as Rab al mal. 
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The Islamic scholars specified the following points for the validity of Mudaraba contract 
(Karim, 1994): 
a. The agreement parties should know capital invested. 
b. The capital should be physically present at the time of agreement not un-present or 
on account/accrued. 
c. The share of profit should be decided upon at the time of agreement. 
d. The share of profit between Rab al Mal and the Mudarib should be a percentage 
not a fixed amount. 
e. Losses are borne by Rab al Mal, except in case of misconduct, negligence or 
violation of the conditions agreed upon by the Mudarib. 
There are two types of Mudaraba contracts, namely, unrestricted and restricted. Under 
the unrestricted Mudaraba contract, the IAH (Rab al Mal) gives the Islamic bank 
(Mudarib) the absolute authority and right to invest his funds without laying any 
restrictions as to where, how and for what purposes the funds should be invested. In 
addition, under this agreement the Islamic bank can commingle the IAH funds with his 
own funds or with other funds the Islamic bank has the right to use e. g. current accounts. 
Under the restricted Mudaraba contract, the IAH imposes certain restrictions as to where, 
how and for what purposes his funds are to be invested. The Islamic bank may also be 
restricted to commingle his own funds with those of IAH. 
With regard to commingling of the IAHs funds and the Islamic bank's funds, there are 
two group of banks, one with no commingling practice i. e. total separation between IAHs 
funds and the Islamic bank's own funds. In this case, the advantages are that the 
Mudaraba revenue and expenses are separated and appropriately accounted for. Hence, 
the Mudaraba profits or losses are accurately accounted for and allocated. The 
disadvantages are some ethical issues such as; to what portfolio the most profitable or 
least risky investments should go? In which portfolio should the most qualified and 
success managers be assigned? What explanation could the Islamic bank give if the rate 
of return on shareholders funds is greater than the IAH's funds? 
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The other group is with the commingling practice, where the advantages will be the 
elimination or reduction of most if not all the above ethical issues. The main 
disadvantage is that the Mudaraba revenues and expenses are mixed up with other 
revenues and expenses; this creates accounting difficulties in the process of allocating 
profits or losses between the IAHs and shareholders. 
5.2.2 Islamic modes of finance 
As discussed above, Islamic banks are established according to a set of fundamental 
principles; the most important of which are those of profit and loss sharing, joint venture 
and permissible forward contracts. These are set out in accordance with Islamic Shari'a 
rules and principles. In the act of using the IAHs funds, an Islamic bank employs a 
number of financial instruments, of which the most famous are described in details in 
appendix (2). The following is a list of them: 
a. Mudaraba finance (restricted and unrestricted). 
b. Ijarah (leasing). There are two types of Ijarah, operating Ijarah and Ijarah Muntahia 
Bittamleek (ownership transferred to lessee at the end of Ijarah period). 
c. Salam. 
d. Istisna'a. 
5.3 Agency Theory and Islamic banking 
The contract between the owner-manager and the shareholders is an agency relationship. 
Archer and Karim (1997) argue that the form of the Mudaraba contract used by Islamic 
banks for mobilizing and managing investors' funds may be seen as involving a complex 
agency problem. The bank's management acts as agent for the shareholders, while the 
bank as a Mudarib acts as an agent for the IAHs. This gives rise to the possibility of 
conflict of interest facing the bank's managers, in their dealings with the shareholders and 
the IAHs. 
ýý1 
: ý7 
; "1 
56 
Chapter 5 Literature Review 
One of the basic conditions of the Mudaraba contract (whether restricted or unrestricted) 
is the separation of ownership from management of funds. Like shareholders, therefore, 
IAHs have no right to interfere in the management of their funds which is the sole 
prerogative of the Mudarib, i. e., the Islamic bank. 
However, unlike shareholders, at present the corporate governance of Islamic banks does 
not give IAHs any power to appoint (or dismiss) the management, the SSB or the external 
auditors. In addition, whereas the capital of both shareholders and IAHs is at risk, unlike 
shareholders, IAHs neither have control over the management nor are they in a position to 
enforce monitoring measures on the management. In the last resort, they can withdraw 
their funds (Archer et al., 1998). 
According to Archer and Karim (1997), agency theory, is relevant to the situation of an 
Islamic bank in two ways. On the 'liabilities' side, the bank is accountable to various 
categories of investors, including (in addition to shareholders) IAHs whose returns must 
be calculated on a profit sharing basis. Islamic investment accounts operate on the basis 
of the Mudaraba contract, according to which the investors receive the profits or bear 
their share of the losses from the pool of assets in which the funds are invested, while the 
bank as entrepreneur (Mudarib) receives a commission which consists of a share of the 
profit, being zero in case of a loss or zero profit. 
In the case of restricted investment accounts, the bank must invest the funds in a 
designated pool of assets, while funds in unrestricted investment accounts are normally 
commingled with the bank's own funds and invested in the bank's general pool of assets 
(this is the bilateral Mudaraba). 
In the latter case (and also in the former case if the bank has invested part of its own 
funds in the designated pool of assets), profit calculations involve apportioning the profit 
or loss on the pool of assets between shareholders and holders of investment accounts. 
The latter are entitled to their proportionate share of profit, less the banks commission as 
Mudarib; the bank (i. e. the shareholders) receives the proportionate share of profit on any 
of its own funds which have been invested in the pool, plus its commission. 
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In the case where the return on the pool of assets has been negative, the losses are shared 
as indicated above, while the amount of the Mudarib commission will be zero. These 
profit and loss calculations are not observable by the investors, and this is a particular 
instance of information asymmetry. 
While for the ordinary company, it is the relationship between management and 
shareholders which gives rise to an agency problem (the so-called 'internal agency 
problem'), a further 'internal agency problem' thus arises in the case of an Islamic bank. 
This problem is due to the combination of the existence of profit-sharing investors other 
than shareholders, and of the incentives the management of the bank may have to favour 
one category of investors over another. 
For example, shareholders have the right to vote in the general assembly meetings and 
thus have some control over the board of directors and the appointment of independent 
auditors, but IAHs do not. Moreover, in some of the largest Islamic banks, the 
shareholdings are concentrated in a few hands, and the separation of ownership and 
control barely exists. 
The non-observability of the accounting calculations made to determine the returns due to 
the various categories of investor thus becomes a crucial agency problem. This indicates 
that in an Islamic-banking context, there is a potential role for accounting standards (and 
for auditing) over and above what is the case for the conventional firm. 
This argument also applies to a second way in which Islamic banks may be affected by 
agency problems, namely on the 'assets' side if they themselves invest funds on a profit- 
sharing basis, for example by providing venture capital by means of a Musharaka 
contract. Here, the bank faces the problem that its investee may fail to report its profits 
correctly, so that the bank is deprived of its rightful share. 
This agency problem (of asymmetric information and opportunistic behavior) can be 
overcome only by the use in the venture of accounting, financial reporting and external 
auditing procedures of a quality, such as to provide the bank with adequate assurance that 
profits are not being misreported. Such procedures are covered by the term 'monitoring' in 
the agency literature. 
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5.4 Corporate Governance 
The separation of ownership and control of the corporation and the resultant agency 
problems raise the issues of the accountability of management for its actions in managing 
the firm, and of the powers over the management of the parties affected by its actions; in 
other words, corporate governance. 
But as we have seen in connection with IAHs in Islamic banks, such issues are not 
confined to management-shareholder relations. Nor, indeed, need they be restricted to 
relations between management and investors or suppliers of capital. In the 1970s, 
questions were raised concerning the accountability of managers, particularly those of 
very large firms, to other groups in society liable to be affected by their actions as 
managers. The rights to financial information of such groups as employees and customers 
were considered and endorsed in the U. K. in The Corporate Report, as well as in the 
Canadian Study Corporate Reporting: its Future Evolution. 
For Islamic banks, as for other businesses for which adherence to specific ethical 
principles is a central part of their mission, the management may be held accountable for 
their adherence to the ethical principles which they have publicly espoused and which 
constitute an important part of their 'customer and investor appeal'; such adherence then 
becomes an issue of corporate governance. 
Thus, the managers of Islamic banks are required to follow Shari'a principles, including 
those of Amana (Trusteeship). Forbidden forms of transaction (e. g. those involving riba 
or interest) must be avoided, and measures taken to recover delinquent accounts 
receivable must follow Shari'a guidelines (e. g. if the debtor is deemed insolvent and fails 
to settle his debt, the creditor should defer collection of the debt until the debtor has 
become solvent). It follows that issues of corporate governance extend to management's 
managing the bank in accordance with Islamic principles, and this has implications for the 
'monitoring' systems and organs of corporate governance used by Islamic banks, such as 
the Shari 'a Supervisory Board" (Archer and Karim, 1997). 
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The SSB is an "independent body of specialised jurists in fiqh almua'malat (Islamic 
commercial jurisprudence). However, the SSB may include a member other than those 
specialised infiqh almua'malat, who should be an expert in the field of Islamic financial 
institutions and with knowledge of figh almua'malat. The SSB in entrusted with duty of 
directing, reviewing and supervising the activities of the Islamic financial institution in 
order to ensure that they are in compliance with Islamic Shari'a roles and principles. The 
fatwas and rulings of the SSB shall be binding on the Islamic financial institution" 
(AAOIFI, 1999 pars 2 p. 5). 
Shari'a supervision plays a very critical role in Islamic banks. Shari'a scholars work for 
the bank either on advisory or consultancy basis to ensure that the day-to-day policies and 
activities of the bank are in accordance with Shari'a roles and principles. SSB and the 
internal control that support it are important for those who deal with the Islamic bank and 
require assurance that its activities are in Shari'a compliance. 
AAOIFI Governance Standard for Islamic Financial Institutions No. 1 of 1999 states that 
"every Islamic financial institution shall have a SSB to be appointed by the shareholders 
in their annual general meeting upon the recommendation of the board of directors, taking 
into consideration the local legislation and regulations". 
5.5 Accounting Standards in Islamic banking 
Accounting has a close relationship with the values of the society (social, economical and 
political). Thus, the present-day accounting has evolved over centuries. Initially, the 
record keeping has been limited in scope as it met the need of a sole proprietor who owns 
the business and he manages that business. With the advent of Industrial Revolution, new 
forms of organisations came into existence, and the most significant change was the birth 
of joint stock companies. 
New forms of ownership and control came into existence, the ownership has separated 
from the day-to-day management affairs of the business, and professional managers 
started to take the latter role. New types of accounts came into existence, e. g the long- 
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term debts, common shares (stocks) etc. All the developments compelled accountants to 
respond to the needs of the society. 
Similarly, with the introduction of banks and other financial institutions that operates 
according to the Shari'a principals, a social and religious need emerged to have 
accounting standards for these new type of organisations. Accordingly, several Islamic 
banks lead by the Islamic Development Bank (Jeddah), joined hands to set up a 
supervisory committee and prepared a plan to develop accounting standards for Islamic 
banks. It commissioned several studies from experts in accounting and the Shari'a. This 
committee wanted to know the needs of users of financial statements of Islamic banks and 
financial institutions; it also aimed at studying and analysing the financial statements of 
various Islamic banks to specify their shortcomings and the quality of additional data and 
information which should be disclosed. 
The experts prepared a number of studies, which were compiled and deposited in the 
library of the Islamic Research and Training Institute of the Islamic Development Bank, 
Jeddah. These studies led to the formation of the Financial Accounting Organisation for 
Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions in 1991 (renamed as the Accounting and 
Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions- AAOIFI) with the primary 
objective of establishing and promulgating accounting standards for Islamic banks 
AAOIFI was registered as in international self-regulatory body in 1991 in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain. The main objectives of AAOIFI as stated in its constitution are already 
discussed in details in Chapter 2. 
Thus, the organisation set up a Financial Accounting Standards Board for Islamic banks 
and Financial Institutions which started functioning from 26th December 1990 (Khan, 
1996). 
It is important to notice that the" accounting standards developed for secular business 
organisations are of limited applicability to Islamic banks. This is because of the ethical 
aspect; conceptually, Western (secular) accounting standards are presented in a manner 
that minimises or even excludes the ethical perspective. According to Islam, rights and 
obligations in the provision of financial accounting information are matters to be 
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governed by principles of religious duty, the Shari'a, including the duty of trusteeship or 
Amana (Archer and Abid, 1996). 
Gambling (1996) stated that "the practice of Islamic banking and the sort of accounts and 
reports, which such banks ought to produce, are not very different from those which 
ought to be followed by any organization which claims to be ruled by ethical standards". 
He believes that "Islamic banking is a major response to the general desire for more 
ethical business methods. Presumably highly ethical business ought to prepare highly 
ethical accounts". 
From the above, it is clear that if the accounting standards for Islamic banks and Islamic 
financial institutions, are followed by the firms operating according to the Shari'a 
principals, they should be able to disclose the sort of information needed and expected by 
the Islamic society. Beside profitability, liquidity, solvency and efficiency, the following 
matters should also be recorded and reported (Khan, 1996): 
a. Within the Islamic modes of business organization and finance, how is income 
generated and distributed? 
b. What is the true figure of Zakah payable? 
c. How far does the business firm keep its promises and fulfill its contracts? 
d. How does the business firm affect its environment? 
e. How does a business firm treat its employees? 
f. What is the contribution of the business firm toward' the socio-economic 
development of a society? 
The above are not an exhaustive list of questions; (Khan) believes that the point of 
reference is the "over-all objective of the Shari'a". 
As a leading financial center in the region, the concerned government bodies in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain have issued a number of instructions in the form of ministerial 
orders and announcements, to the Islamic banks and Islamic financial institutions 
operating in Bahrain asking them to comply with certain accounting standards and other 
controls. 
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For example, in 1998, the Minister of Commerce issued a ministerial order asking all the 
banks and other financial institution that are operating according to the Islamic Shari'a, to 
comply with the accounting and auditing standards issued by the AAOIFI starting from 
the 1St January 1999. (Official Gazzet, 1998). Before that, BMA made it mandatory for 
all Islamic banks to follow AAOIFI standards starting from the financial year 1998. 
Also Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) which acts as the central bank in Bahrain has 
issued a number of procedures in September 1997 to strengthen the control over the 
Islamic banks operations in Bahrain. In these procedures, BMA has emphasised the fact 
that all the terms of the Mudaraba contract should be clear, brief, and precise, so that they 
will not mislead the L4-Hs or let them enter into a deal that they can not realise its results. 
In addition, the Agency also assured that all the risks of such contracts (Mudaraba) are 
borne by the IAHs, except in case where they results due to negligence of the Islamic 
bank, the significance of these risks must be clearly mentioned in all the bank contracts 
(Akbar Al-Khaleej - September 1997). 
Similarly, the Central Bank of Sudan (CBS) made it mandatory for the Islamic banks to 
follow the AAOIFI standards starting from the financial year 1998. Followed by Qatar 
and Jordan, which made it mandatory for the Islamic banks to follow the AAOIFI 
standards starting from the financial year 2002. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
The application of Shari'a to business transactions has resulted in the emergence of a 
number of Islamic banks in some Islamic countries such as Bahrain, Sudan, Malaysia, and 
Iran. Islamic banks are ethically funded organisations established with the mandate to 
carry out their business and financial transactions in strict compliance with Islamic 
Shari'a. Almost every Islamic bank has a board of Shari'a scholars, commonly known as 
its Shari'a Supervisory Board, to review the juristic correctness of the bank's transactions. 
IAH's funds, plus some of the shareholders' equity and other sources of funds (e. g., 
current accounts) usually finance the aggregate investment portfolio or asset pool of an 
Islamic bank. If the aggregate investment portfolio yields a positive return, then the 
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shares of profit are allocated between the parties to the contract according to their 
proportionate shares of their respective investments in the portfolio. If the bank's 
aggregate investment portfolio yields a negative return, then this loss is borne by IAHs 
and shareholders pro rata to their respective investments in this portfolio. However, 
according to the Mudaraba contract, if the loss is due to misconduct or negligence of the 
Mudarib, then the Islamic bank will bear the whole losses. 
Using the IAHs funds, Islamic banks mobilise those funds through investment accounts on 
the basis of a profit-and-loss sharing mechanism in place of the interest based- modes. As 
alternatives to lending funds and charging interest thereon, Islamic banks use various 
instruments of Islamic finance, including partnership or profit-and-loss sharing modes 
(Mudaraba financing), credit based instruments (e. g., Murabaha, Salam and Istisna'a), and 
leasing (Ijarah). 
AAOIFI's work should be seen as complementary to that of the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). In many ways they have similar aims, namely the improvement 
and international harmonisation of financial reporting rules and practices in the interest of 
transparency and comparability in an increasingly global financial marketplace. 
However, IAS/IFRS are not designed to cater for and do not consider the specificities of 
Islamic banks. Hence, some countries made it mandatory for Islamic banks to adopt the 
AAOIFI standards, namely, Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan. 
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Chapter 6 
Development of the Research Hypotheses 
6.1 Introduction 
Sekaran (2000 p. 108) defined a hypothesis as a "logically connected relationship between 
two or more variables expressed in a form of testable statement". He further explains that 
the relationships are conjectured on the basis of the network of associations established in 
the theoretical framework. A matter covered later in this chapter. 
This section presents the logical development of the research hypotheses developed based 
on the literature review of both accounting and Islamic banks that are presented in 
chapters 2 to 5 of the thesis, discussions with the research supervisors and colleagues 
doings research in the same field, as well as by referring to the standards issued by 
AAOIFI. The specificities of the Islamic banks are taken into consideration in the 
development of the hypotheses and the arguments are presented accordingly. 
There are a number of factors affecting the disclosure behavior in the annual reports of a 
company23. In this study three factors are taken into consideration when developing the 
hypotheses; regulatory related factors (for hypothesis one), bank: specific factors (for 
hypotheses two to seven) and country specific factor (for hypothesis eight). 
6.2 Theoretical Framework 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Before the implementation of AAOIF 1 standards, the quantity of information disclosed by 
the Islamic banks in their financial statements varied greatly, depending on the decisions 
and willingness of'each bank's management, SSB and their audit firms24. However, after 
'3 Sec: Marston and Robson (1997), floss in et al. (1995), Courtis (1992). Cooke (1989b), Chow and 
Wong-ßorcn (1987), Watts and Zimmerman (1983) and Firth (1979). 24 Sec for example, Karim (1996) p. 122 and p. 126: and Karim (1995) p. 287 and p. 292. 
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implementation of AAOIFI standards, it is expected that the Islamic banks will disclose at 
least the bare minimum information required by AAOIFI. Indeed, it is also expected that 
some of the banks will even voluntarily disclose more than what is required by AAOIFI. 
There are a number of theories in the literature that have tried to explain the above 
phenomena and practice, such as the agency theory, political cost theory and the signaling 
hypothesis. Mainly, the tenets of agency theory and their association with the extent of 
corporate disclosure are used in developing the hypotheses to be tested in this study. 
6.2.2 Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) call the contract between the owner-manager and 
shareholders an "agency relationship". They define an agency relationship as "a contract 
under which one or more (principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the 
agent". In the manager-shareholder contract, the owner-manager is viewed as the agent 
and the shareholder as the principal (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
From the point of view of the economic theory of the firm, the role of accounting 
standards can be seen in the context of agency theory. Indeed, accounting has 
traditionally been seen as fulfilling a stewardship function as the managers (i. e. the 
stewards) have to be held accountable to the owners (the principals) . and the provision of 
financial information is a means by which this can be achieved. The American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (1973 p. 25) states that "reporting on management's 
stewardship has long been recognised as a principal purpose of financial statements". 
Because the agent and the principal are often assumed to have conflicting interest, the 
stewardship function held by the management is considered to be a difficult task (Morris, 
I987). One of the basic assumptions of the agency theory is that agents have access to 
superior information and the fact that the principals cannot observe the agents' behaviour 
raises concern that the agents will take advantage of this position to maximise their self- 
interest at the expense of the principal (Beaver, 198 1). 
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Hence, this body of theory deals with the agency problem which can be summarised as 
the type of problem that arises from: 
- The divergence of the economic interests of the agent (manager of the firm) from 
those of the principal (investor in the f inn) in whose interests the agent is 
supposed to act; and 
- The existence of information asymmetry between the agent and the principal as 
to what activities the former has undertaken. 
Therefore, the principal will undertake "monitoring" and "bonding" over the activities and 
operations of the agent via setting rules and regulations, internal and external auditing 
and Shari'a Supervisory Board (in the case of Islamic banks). These are called the'agency 
costsi25. Examples of such costs could be auditing costs, the introduction of formal 
internal control systems. and establishing incentives compensation schemes. These 
agency costs will affect the benefits, remunerations and perquisites (a big office, a 
company car, and more expense-account meals ... etc. ) that the principal 
is prepared to 
pay to the agent. Agency costs also include "residual loss", which is the impairment of 
the firm value because bonding and monitoring are only partially successful in reducing 
agency costs'`. 
Hence, the presence of agency cost may explain why managers voluntarily disclose 
information. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that because agency costs are borne by 
managers, therefore. they may be motivated to provide voluntary information to reduce 
such costs. Cooke (1989b) and Craswell and Taylor (1992) suggested that disclosure in 
corporate annual reports is one way of reducing agency costs by facilitating monitoring. 
Since the level of agency costs depends on certain corporate characteristics, we can 
hypothesise that there is a significant association between these characteristics and the 
level of voluntary disclosure. ` 
2 Sec Iiossain et A. (11)95 p. 72), Ng and Koh (1994 p. 31). Cooks (1989 p. 118) and Chow & Wong-Boren 
1987 p. 533). 
`v Residual loss is what is left over Mier the agency costs are reduced by actions such as bonding and 
monitoring. 
- Sec Watson et al. (2002 p, 290). 
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6.2.3 Relevance of Agency Theory to the Islamic banks 
IMF Working Paper dated November 2002 (p. 12) stated that information disclosure is 
more important in an Islamic environment than it is in a conventional system because of 
the profit and loss sharing principle and the implied lack of protection for investment 
depositors which are at the core of Islamic banking. The paper emphasised the fact that 
the depositors in the Islamic banks have more incentives to monitor bank performance 
than conventional depositors because neither capital value nor the returns on investment 
deposits are fixed and guaranteed by Islamic banks. Therefore, by reducing information 
asymmetry inherent in the Mudaraba contracts, a clear and concise disclosure is likely to 
allow depositors more flexibility in choosing a specific bank in which they can allocate 
their funds according to their risk preferences. 
Accordingly, the problem mentioned above is more complicated, as we have a third party 
(i. e. IAHs) who should also have access to the voluntary disclosure 228. Archer et al. (1998 
p. 155) stated that "the relationship between IAHs and the Islamic bank presents a unique 
type of agency problem that is hardly paralleled in the finance and economics literature". 
They argued that the agent wants to keep the IAHs happy in order to maintain the current 
IAHs and encourage the potential IAHs to join the bank. This is true, especially if we 
know that a potential amount of money is coming from those IAHs at a cost lower than 
the cost of shareholders' equity. This is because the bank (as a Mudarib) is entitled to a 
fee which is paid out of the IAHs profit share. Furthermore, a large amount of funds 
come from "current accounts" that have no right to a return 29. 
So, the choice is open to the lAu-is to "vote with their feet" by withdrawing their funds30. 
Because of this . according to Archer et al. (1998) and Al-Deehani et al. (1999), the 
Mudaraba contract has a built in incentive that would urge shareholders or the agent to 
exercise 'vicarious monitoring' on behalf of the IAHs. 
IMF Working Paper dated November 2002 (p. 6) argued that the IAI-ls in Islamic banks do not enjoy the 
same rights as equity holders in conventional banks. but do share the same risks. 
See for example AI-Rajhi hank and Jordan Islamic bank financial statements. '0 Sec Archer et al. (1998 p. 156). 
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However, on the other hand it might be argued that the agent has incentives to favour one 
category (the shareholders) over the other (IAHs) because the former has the: 
a- Right to appoint board of directors. 
b- Right to vote in general assembly meetings. 
c- Right to appoint external auditors and SSB. 
d- Right to enforce monitoring measures on management. 
6.3 The Dependent and Independent Variables31 
6.3.1 Dependent Variable 
Previous researchers defined voluntary disclosure as any disclosure in excess to what is 
required by law or concerned and relevant accounting standards. For example: 
Cooke ( 1992 p. 23 I) considered that any item of information that is not 
required to be disclosed by Commercial Code or Securities and Exchange Law 
is voluntary disclosure. 
Watson et at. (2002 p. 289) defined voluntary disclosure as "disclosures in 
excess of those required by laws, accounting standards or stock exchange 
listing requirement regulations". 
Raffournier (1995 p. 26 I) considered that any disclosure that is not required by 
law is a voluntary disclosure. 
The dependent variable of this study is the "level of voluntary disclosure" before and after 
implementation of AAOWFl standards. 32 
Before the implementation of AAOIIFI standards the Islamic banks were operating under 
a 'semi-regulation' environment. his suggests that although Islamic banks were required 
to adhere to IAS or the national accounting standards of the country in which they 
" The issues related to the ntcasurrment of those. variables are covered in chater 7 of this thsis. 32 All the disclosure in the annual reports will he examined to extract the voluntary disclosure. 
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operate33, in reality those standards provided these banks and their auditors with a wide 
scope of alternative treatments to choose from because those standards do not address the 
specificities of Islamic banks. For example, the disclosure of investments in the financial 
statements of Islamic banks in Bahrain varied according to the interpretation of the IAS 
by the external auditors of each bank. This resulted in a lack of comparability of the 
financial statements prepared by Islamic banks and also made it difficult for the 
researcher to identify exactly what is voluntary disclosure before implementation of 
AAOIFI standards because the IAS and the national standards did not provide a 
watertight benchmark to be used by Islamic banks and their auditors on equal footing. 
This, however, was possible after the implementation of the AAOIFI standards and, 
hence, one can attempt to ascertain what is and is not voluntary disclosure. 
Accordingly, for the purpose of this study, voluntary disclosure before the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards is defined as any disclosure over and above what is 
required by IAS34. And voluntary disclosure after implementation of AAOIFI standards is 
any disclosure over and above what is required by those standards. 
6.3.2 Independent Variables 
From chapter four on 'previous empirical research', we can notice that previous 
researchers have tested a number of independent variables. For the purpose of this study, 
the researcher has chosen some of the variables that are relevant to the case of Islamic 
banks. 
The independent variables examined in this study are divided into two categories. The 
first is lime series which explains what effect AAOIFI standards may have on the level of 
voluntary disclosure. and it consists of one independent variable, namely, the date of 
adoption of AAOIFI standards. The second is cross sectional and is intended to explain 
how Islamic banks differed before and after the implementation of AAOIFI standards, 
and it consists of six batik characteristics independent variables, namely, board 
33 Standard & Pours (2002 P. 5) 
34 Although the extent of compliance with measurement standards in lAS by Islamic banks tends to be 
unclear, when it cones to disclosure standards, the issue of compliance as opposed to non-compliance is 
relatively clearer. 
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composition, ownership concentration, listing status, profitability, use of external 
financing and government ownership, and one country specific characteristic which is the 
market discipline. 
6.3.3 Independent Variables Not Used 
As emphasised above, the researcher has only considered the independent variables that 
are relevant to Islamic banks. In this sub-section, reasons for not using some of the well 
established independent variables in the research literature are explained. 
6.3.3.1 Size of the firm 
The size of the firm35 has been found to be a significant variable in a number of previous 
research studies (for example: Cerf, 1961; Buzby, 1975; Courtis, 1978; Cooke, 1989b; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Size has been considered as an important factor because of 
several reasons, for example, the need to raise capital at the lowest cost (Choi, 1973) and 
closer monitoring by regulatory authorities (Firth, 1979). 
The firm size hypothesis suggests that firms compete with each other in the capital market 
in terms of types of securities offered and the expected returns promised (Foster, 1986) 
and reliance on outside capital (Watts and Zimmerman, 1981). Therefore, firms have 
incentives to provide information that enables them to raise capital at the best available 
terms and conditions (Choi, 1973). 
However, the size variable is not used in this research mainly because most, if not all, of 
the Islamic banks are of small to medium size. Standards and Poor (2002) stated that " by 
both international and regional standards, most Islamic banks are small, even in entirely 
Islamised banking systems like those of Pakistan and Iran". 
3s Usually measured in terms of total assets. 
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6.3.3.2 Size of audit firm 
Appointment of audit firms is one of the devices used by the shareholders to monitor the 
behavior of the management36. A number of researchers37 argued that when agency costs 
are high, the agent is likely to desire engagement with a reputable audit firm (usually one 
of the big four audit firms) to reduce that cost and to alleviate the conflicts of interests 
with the principals. 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) consider that big audit firms have incentives to maintain 
independence from client pressure for limited disclosure because of the economic 
consequences associated with potential damages to brand name (reputation). Hence, they 
encourage their clients to disclose a greater amount of information in their annual reports. 
Another reason why it is expected that companies might engage with big audit firms is 
the argument with that this might be a signal to the market about the quality of the firms 
disclosure (Hossain et al. 1995 ). 
Wallace et. al. (1994) argued that big audit firms that are less dependent on one or a few 
clients are more likely than small audit firms to suggest that more detail be given in the 
annual reports and accounts of their client firms. They further argue that audit clients are 
likely to accede more frequently to advice given by big audit firms than those given by 
small audit firms. 
For the Islamic banks covered in this study, the AAOIFI auditing standard number (4) 
effective from 1 January 2002 requested the external auditors to obtain sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence that provides them with reasonable assurance that the bank has 
complied with Islamic Shari'a rules and principles. Further, the auditing standard number 
(3) effective from 1 January 1999 stated that one of the objectives of financial statements 
of Islamic banks is to enable the external auditor to express an opinion as to whether the 
financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the fatwas, 
36 Watts and Zimmerman (1986) put forward the view that choice of audit firm is a mechanism which helps 
to alleviate conflicts of interest between principal and agents. 
37 See for example Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Schipper (1981). 
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rulings and guidance issued by the SSB of the bank. The phrase used to indicate the 
above is "the financial statements give a true and fair view". 
In Bahrain and Qatar, the Central Bank only allows the big four to audit the banks. In 
Sudan there are no big four firms and the Jordan Islamic Bank is audited by a local audit 
firm since its establishment 38. 
6.4 Mathematical Relationship of Types of Disclosure 
In section 6.3.1 above, we defined voluntary disclosure (VD) before and after 
implementation of AAOIFI standards. Mandatory disclosure (MD) before the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards is any thing disclosed in accordance with the IAS. 
Mandatory disclosure after the implementation of AAOIFI standards is the AAOIFI 
standards themselves. Hence, aggregate disclosure (AD) is the total of voluntary 
disclosure and mandatory disclosure. The following two examples are useful to explain 
the mathematical relationships between the various type of disclosure and also the 
development of the research hypotheses: 
- Example 1: if the level of MD increases (say, after implementation of AAOIFI 
standards), and aggregate disclosure is equal, then the level of VD will decrease 39 
Example 2: if the A MD >A AD (may be because a lot of what was voluntary 
before, has become mandatory now), therefore, the level of VD will decrease (i. e 
there will be a net decrease in VD). 
38 Street and Bryant (2000, p. 310) has not considered the "audit firm size" variable in their study because , with the exception of six companies, the sample companies of the study are audited by the big 5 audit firms 
(now big 4). 
39 Gigler and Hemmer (1998, p. 110) stated that "in the presence of disclosure costs, increasing frequency of 
mandated disclosures can make it optimal to eliminate the manager's voluntary disclosures". 
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6.5 Research Hypotheses 
6.5.1 Implementation of AAOIFI standards (H1) 
Choi (1973 p. 160) defined the term disclosure as the "publication of any economic 
information relating to a business enterprise, quantitative or otherwise, which facilitates 
the making of investment decisions". 
Generally, disclosure of information involves a business in costs, for example, costs of 
information gathering, management supervision and legal fees. In addition, there are the 
costs of training the staff and audit fees if new disclosure standards are to be 
implemented. 
Because the accounting standards (e. g. International Accounting Standards) developed for 
secular business organisations are of limited applicability to Islamic banks (see Karim 
1996), the banking authorities in countries covered by this study i. e. Bahrain, Sudan, 
Qatar and Jordan have decided that all Islamic banks should prepare their financial 
statements based on AAOIFI standards starting from financial year 1998 (for Bahrain and 
Sudan) and 2002 (for Qatar and Jordan). 
A report by the FASB in 200140, which was part of its "Business Reporting Research 
Project", found that many companies in USA are already actively engaged in disclosing 
information that is not required by US GAAP. The study also found that voluntary 
reporting above and beyond regulatory requirements has a significant relationship with a 
company's financial success (e. g. profitability and lower cost of capital). 
The FASB report concludes that the key success forces shaping the future for business 
reporting (e. g. economic, social, political and technological forces) will manifest 
themselves in increasing and changing demands for business information and a larger role 
for voluntary disclosure. 
40 See Lundholm (2001). 
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Street and Bryant (2000 p. 308) stated that in addition to the information companies are 
obliged to disclose, in many instances, voluntarily information beyond what is required 
by accounting standards and listing authorities. 
Watson et al. (2002 p. 289) and Cooke (1992 p. 231) argued that while firms are obliged to 
disclose certain items of information because of statutory regulation, it is often the case 
that those firms voluntarily disclose more information than is required by statute. 
According to Archer et al. (1998) and Al-Deehani et al. (1999), the Islamic bank in its 
capacity as a Mudarib is keen to retain the funds of the IAHs. This is because if the 
aggregate return of the investment portfolio in which the IAHs funds is positive then the 
bank shares in these returns. However, if the aggregate return is negative then (at least 
according to the Mudaraba contract) IAHs bear that risk of loss whilst the bank gets no 
return for its management of the fund although it is likely to face reputation risk. 
Therefore, in order to convince IAHs to continue investing their funds with the bank and 
to attract potential IAHs, although the governance structure of these account holders is 
weak compared to the shareholders, Islamic banks would tend to provide IAHs with 
voluntary disclosure of information that helps them in their economic decisions. The 
assumption suggests that the "signaling hypothesis" did apply to Islamic banks before the 
implementation of AAOIFI's standards. 
However, given that a number of AAOIFI's accounting standards require the disclosure 
of information that helps IAHs in their economic decisions, and on the assumption that 
the new standards issued by AAOIFI will make it mandatory on Islamic banks to disclose 
the information that they had disclosed on voluntary basis, it can be hypothesised that the 
implementation of these standards will result in a net change in the level of mandatory 
disclosure which is more than the net change in the level of aggregate disclosure. As 
such there will be a net decrease in the level of voluntary disclosure. 
HI: After the implementation ofAAOIFI standards, the net change in the 
level of mandatory disclosure is more than the net change in the level of 
aggregate disclosure. Therefore, there will be a net decrease in the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
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6.5.2 Board Composition (H2) 
Board composition is defined by the proportion of outside directors to the total number of 
directors, thereby making a distinction between executive and non-executive (outside) 
directors. 
Based on the agency theory premise, it is argued that non-executive directors are needed 
on the boards to monitor and control the actions of executive directors due to their 
opportunistic behavior. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) believe that the non-executive directors 
acts as a check and balance mechanism in enhancing the board's effectiveness. 
Additionally, outside directors are expected to be decision experts (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), independent and not intimidated by the Chief Executive Officer 
(Weisbach, 1988) and are less aligned to management, and therefore , more inclined to 
encourage the company to disclose more information (Eng and Mak, 2003). 
However, the issue of governance by non-executive directors is whether they know 
enough about the business to make a real tangible contribution or they are executive 
directors who are accepting the desires of their peers. Short (1996, p. 125) argues that the 
addition of non-executive directors on the boards is simply a scheme used by executive 
directors to enhance their own standing by selecting friendly "rubber stamping" non- 
executive directors in order to appear accountable to external parties. This implies that 
executive directors used non-executive directors to perform `perceived' rather than 
' actual' monitoring rules. 
In the case of Islamic banks, given that the Mudaraba contract does not allow rab-al-mal 
(in this case IAHs) to partake in the management of the Mudaraba, one way by which the 
bank can allow IAHs to monitor the management of the Islamic bank, thereby alleviate 
the agency cost of having their funds managed by the banks, is to appoint individual LkHs 
as non-executive members of the board of directors as individuals, but not as rab-al-mal. 
However, this would depend on the culture of corporate governance which each Islamic 
bank adopts. 
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A report by the external credit rating agency Capital Intelligence41 stated that because of 
the importance of IAHs to the continuity of the Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs), those 
institutions are obliged to be transparent to their IAHs, not only with regards to their own 
financial condition as is the case with conventional banks, but also in respect of the 
management of trust money (i. e. IAHs funds). Capital Intelligence further argue that this 
area goes beyond disclosure, where topics such as participation of stakeholders in the 
corporate governance of IFIs and developing effective control and accountability 
mechanism to enhance fiduciary relationships in IFIs become relevant. 
Hence, it can be hypothesised that the banks which take the view that the board of 
directors should include non-executive directors who are IAHs are likely to have a high 
level of voluntary disclosure in their annual reports. This is because these individuals 
would be more inclined to encourage the bank to disclose more information to cater for 
their own interest and the interest of other IAHs. This is in line with the arguments of 
both Weisbach (1988) and Eng and Mak (2003). 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to hypothesise the following: 
H2-1: There is a positive association between the proportion of non-executive 
members on the board and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of the Islamic banks. 
H2-2: There is a positive association between the proportion of non-executive 
members on the board who are IAHs and the level of voluntary disclosure in 
the annual reports of the Islamic banks. 
6.5.3 Ownership Concentration (H3) 
Ownership concentration exists when families or a small number of people have a 
substantial portion of the equity holding and they are board members or have 
representation on the board. In Islamic banks, where families have substantial equity 
holdings, there is generally little physical separation between those who own and those 
41 See Capital Intelligence (2002). 
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who actually manage the bank's operations. This is because major shareholders would be 
expected to have board representation. 
Hence, the capital owners (principal) do not have to rely extensively on public disclosure 
to monitor the activities of the management (agent) since they have greater access to 
internal information and exercising more control over the operations of the bank. 
According to Haniffa and Cooke (2002), in such a situation, the demand for public 
disclosure and reporting will generally be lower. 
In the case of Islamic banks, there are a number of Islamic banks with high ownership 
concentration, and as suggested above, that major shareholders would be expected to have 
board representation and would thus not rely on public disclosures. Hence, high 
concentration would be expected to be associated with less voluntary disclosure. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to hypothesise the following: 
H3: There is a negative association between the ownership concentration42 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the Islamic 
banks. 
6.5.4 Listing Status (H4) 
Cooke (1989a p. 118) stated that it is possible that agency costs may vary according to the 
listing status of the firm. He argued that, for example, an unlisted company with smaller 
number of shareholders may be more successful in monitoring the agents than a listed 
company with a multitude number of shareholders. Hence, listed companies are 
motivated to voluntarily disclose in the annual reports to reduce monitoring costs. 
The companies listed in the stock exchange have to comply with certain rules and 
regulations regarding disclosure of financial information. However, it has been argued 
that those companies will make voluntary disclosures any way because of the following: 
42 Measured as the percentage of ownership in the share capital by the five largest owners. 
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a- Listed companies are induced by the market to disclose more information in order 
to raise capital at a lower cost (Cooke 1992, Leftwich et al. 1981, Firth 1978 and 
Singhvi Desai 1971). 
b- Listed companies receive far greater press coverage, and demands for more 
information are almost inevitable (Firth 1979 p. 274). 
The Islamic banks in Sudan are varied in terms of ownership. One group is wholly 
government owned and has no opportunity to raise equity through the local stock market. 
The second are semi public banks whose equity is evenly split between the government 
and the private sector (51% and 49% respectively). The third are private banks that seek 
to raise new equity through the stock market. In Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan, most of the 
Islamic banks are owned by the private sector and seek the stock market for new capital. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to hypothesise the following: 
H4: There is a positive association between the listing status and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the Islamic banks. 
6.5.5 Profitability (H5) 
Raffournier (1995 p. 263) stated that "the influence of profitability on voluntary disclosure 
is obvious". Indeed, a number of researchers43 argued and tested the relationship between 
profitability and level of voluntary disclosure. Singhvi and Desai (1971) argued that when 
the rate of returns is high, managers are motivated to disclose detailed information in 
order to support the continuance of their positions and remuneration. In the same line, 
Owusu-Ansah (2000) argued that the market for corporate managerial skills uses the 
performance of a company to set management's outside opportunity wage, i. e. a company 
with a good news will experience a raise in the market value of both its shares and 
management. 
43 See for example, Cerf(1961), Singhvi and Desai (1974), Ng and Koh (1994), Raffournier (1995), Watson 
et al. (2002) and 1-Ianiffa & Cooke (2002). 
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Watts and Zimmerman (1986 p. 165) argue that managers of firms whose shares are 
undervalued have an incentive to expend additional resources on financial information to 
signal that fact. Further, it is argued (see for example Ng and Koh, 1994) that more 
profitable companies will be subject to a greater public scrutiny, and will therefore apply 
self regulation mechanisms (such as voluntary disclosure) to try and avoid external 
regulation. 
However, it is important to point out that there are several limitations that we have to 
consider if we want to test the signaling hypothesis on Islamic banks. The following are 
some of those limitations: 
- The problem of signaling by the non-listed banks. 
- What is the definition of good news? 
- The market in which the signaling hypothesis is previously tested is a developed 
market. The market in which the Islamic banks to be tested is emerging or an 
underdeveloped market44. 
- Previous empirical research used the return on the equity as a measure of 
profitability45. This should not necessarily be true in the case Islamic banks. 
In the following paragraphs we will discuss the above limitations in the light of the 
current study. 
One of the main characteristics of Islamic banks is the prohibition against the payment 
and receipt of a fixed or predetermined rate of interest, which is replaced by profit and 
loss sharing (PLS) arrangements where the rate of return on financial assets held in the 
bank is not known and not fixed prior to the undertaking of the transaction. The interest 
free banking is based on the Islamic Shari'a concepts of Musharaka (partnership) and 
Mudaraba (profit sharing). Another characteristic is the requirement to operate through 
Islamic mode of financing, which affects both assets and liabilities sides of bank balance 
sheet. Examples of those modes of financing are the Murabaha for resale of goods on 
44 See IMF working paper number WP/02/192 page 6 dated November 2002. 45 See for example Eng and Mak (2003), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Raffournier (1995) 
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credit, Istisna'a for pre finance of the production of specified items like aircrafts and ships 
and Ijarah which is a form of leasing. 
Before the implementation of AAIOFI accounting standards there were different methods 
of profit recognition which could be applied by the Islamic banks to allocate the profits 
between IAHs and Shareholders 46. Moreover, hardly any information was disclosed about 
the bases of profit allocation between IAHs and shareholders, a lack which prompted 
AAOIFI to issue an accounting standard on the subject47. Archer et al. (1998 p. 164) stated 
that there is evidence suggesting that the management of some Islamic banks have used 
the discretion given them by flexible rules and limited disclosure in order to 'enhance' or 
'smooth' the returns payable to IAHs at the expense of shareholders. 
Unlike the conventional banks where the profitability is usually measured as the return on 
shareholders equity, in an Islamic bank we could have two measures of profitably, and 
they are of equal importance to the bank's performance48, namely the return on 
shareholders equity and the return over IAHs equity. 
A working paper issued by IMF (2002), stated that "particularly in an Islamic 
environment, the expected rate of return on the investment deposits is an important 
consideration in the depositors choice of a particular bank". 
Based on the above arguments, it is expected that Islamic banks with better performance 
in terms of profitably will voluntarily disclose more information to the market. Therefore, 
it seems appropriate to test the following hypotheses: 
HS-1: There is a positive association between the shareholders profitability 49 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the Islamic 
banks. 
46 See Archer and Karim (1997 p. 106). 
47 See Archer and Karim (1997 p. 102). 
48 We could also have return over assets, but this is not tested under this study. 
49 Measured as the shareholders return over the average shareholders equity. 
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H5-2: There is a positive association between the IAHs profitabilitySO and the 
level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the Islamic banks. 
6.5.6 Use of External Financing (H6) 
Gearing describes a firm's capital structure and measures the long term risk implied by 
that structure. Sources of financing can either be internal, from shareholders, or external 
debt holders. A certain amount of gearing is attractive to shareholders, as it should have 
the effect of raising their average real return on investment. However, highly geared 
firms are perceived as risky because the profits will not be able to cover all costs in bad 
years and because the presence of interest payments causes the shareholders' earnings 
stream more volatile. 
Agency theory would predict a positive relationship between gearing and disclosure, 
because of the divergence in interest between the debt holders and the agent, agency costs 
will increase when the firm borrows. To try to restrict agent's behaviour, covenants may 
be introduced into the debt contract, and monitoring may occur. 51 
Raffournier (1995 p. 265) argued that financial disclosure in annual reports can contribute 
to solve monitoring problems between shareholders and creditors, and that these problems 
are more likely to arise in firms making a large use of debt. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Raffournier (1995), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), among others, have observed that agency costs are higher for firms 
with proportionately more debts in their capital structure, suggesting a positive 
association between disclosure and leverage. 
In case of Islamic banks, the IAHs represent the largest source of funds for Islamic 
banks52. AAOIFI (1999) considers those accounts not as a liability nor can they be 
50 Measured as the Unrestricted IAHs return over the average Unrestricted IAHs equity. 
51 See Watson et al. (2002) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
52 See Al-Deehani et al. (1999) and Capital Intelligence (2002). 
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considered as equity funds. Instead, they are classified in the balance sheet of an Islamic 
bank between a liability and equity capital. According to AL-Deehani et al. (1999), the 
IAHs are a new unique type of instrument which has a maturity and gives Islamic banks 
the right to invest funds deposited in these accounts for their holders on the basis of profit 
sharing. 
There are two types of IAHs accounts, namely, restricted and unrestricted. The restricted 
investment accounts are funds placed with the bank for investment purposes specifically 
indicated by the account holder. These funds are managed by the Islamic bank as an 
investment manager based either on a non-participating Mudaraba contract or an agency 
contract "Wakala" (AAOIFI 1999: 54). In accordance with AAOIFI standards, restricted 
investment accounts are treated as off-balance sheet items, and create value for the bank 
via the Mudarib share, but are not considered to be part of the bank's capital. 
The unrestricted investment accounts are funds placed with the bank to be invested at the 
discretion of the bank's management. Payout to the unrestricted "profit sharing 
investment accounts" depends on the profitability of the bank. Holders of investment 
accounts bear the full risk of loss to the magnitude of their accounts if the aggregate 
portfolio investments are negative, unless the bank has been guilt of misconduct or 
negligence (AAOIFI 1999: 54). 
Capital Intelligence (2002) argued that the fact of the IAHs are not considered a liability 
to the Islamic bank has a substantial impact on the risk profile of the Islamic bank i. e the 
risk to the bank as an institution is considerably reduced, because the IAHs are not treated 
equivalent to conventional banks depositors, where the banks are obliged to return the 
principal amount of the deposit to the deposit holders. Consequently, shareholder's 
capital has now to absorb only that part of losses which arise as the share of the Islamic 
bank's own funds in lending and investing. 
At the same time, unrestricted IAHs, despite being partner in profit and loss sharing with 
the Islamic bank, are not treated similarly to the shareholders of the bank. This is because 
the corporate structure of IAHs does not allow them to: 
1. appoint the board of directors. 
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2. vote in the general assembly meeting. 
3. appoint the external auditors or SSB. 
4. right to enforce monitoring measures on the management. 
Much of the accounting disclosure literature discussed in chapters 3 and 4 assumes some 
level of market discipline, so firms have incentives to disclose more and some of those 
incentives are related to the costs of capital, as more disclosure will enhance the 
transparency of the firm and reduce information asymmetry, hence, will reduce the cost 
of capital. But, we don't know to what extent those arguments could apply to Islamic 
banks because those banks are operating in emerging capital markets and they have a 
form of capital structure different than the conventional banks and other firms. 
According to Archer et al. (1998), the Islamic bank in its capacity as a Mudarib is keen to 
retain the funds of the IAHs. This is because if the aggregate return of the investment 
portfolio in which the IAHs funds are invested is positive, then the bank shares in these 
returns. However, if the aggregate return is negative, then (at least according to the 
Mudaraba contract) IAHs bears that risk of loss whilst the bank gets no return for its 
management of the funds, although it is likely to face reputation risk. 
Therefore, as mentioned above53, in order to convince current IAHs to continue investing 
their funds with the bank and to attract potential IAHs, it is expected that the Islamic bank 
would tend to provide the IAHs with voluntary disclosure of information that helps them 
in their economic decisions. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to test the following hypothesis: 
s 54 and the level H6: There is a positive association between the level of IAH 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the Islamic banks. 
53 See discussions under HI. 
54 Measured as the ratio of IAHs funds to total assets. 
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6.5.7 Government Ownership (H7) 
The selection of the ownership structure variable was based on the assumption that the 
depth of information disclosure varies between firms, depending on the percentage of 
government ownership. Raffournier (1995) and Fama and Jensen (1983) pointed out that 
the potential for conflict of interest between principal and agent is greater where share 
ownership is widely spread than is lower spread share ownership. Hence, a wider spread 
in share ownership may have an impact on the depth of information disclosure of annual 
reports of companies (Wallace and Naser, 1995). 
Raffoumier (1995) claims that deviations from wealth-maximising behaviour are more 
likely in firms whose managers hold a small part of the shares; these firms are expected to 
disclose more information than those controlled by large shareholders (like the 
government). Singhvi and Desai (1971) investigated the association between the extent 
of disclosure and the number of stockholders, but this latter variable is more a surrogate 
of size than a measure of ownership diffusion. 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) argues that major shareholders, for example the government, with 
the majority of share ownership55 have exceptional access to firm information and might, 
therefore, not have to depend on information disclosure to oversee and control their 
investment activities. 
On the other hand, Naser et al. (2002) assume that the companies listed on the Amman 
Financial Market56 with an element of (fully/partially) of ownership by the government 
and its agencies would disclose more detailed information than those companies that are 
totally owned by private sector57. 
Chau and Gray (2002) argue that firms with a single or a few number of large owners 
have little motivation to disclose information in excess of mandatory requirement because 
the demand for public disclosure is relatively weak in comparison with firms that have 
wider ownership. 
ss We have a lot of Islamic banks where the government ownership is high, specially in Sudan. 56 The Jordanian stock exchange authority. 57 However, the test results showed that there is a native association between the level of disclosure and the 
government ownership. 
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Out of the 34 Islamic banks in our sample for the year 2002, we have 17 banks (i. e. 50%) 
which are either fully or partially owned by the government. We may, therefore, 
hypothesise that: 
H7: There is a negative association between the government ownership share 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the Islamic 
banks. 
6.5.8 Country Specific Characteristics: Market Discipline (H8) 
Previous research indicates a marked difference in disclosure adequacy from one country 
to another58. They stated many reasons why this may be so, for example: 
a. The dissemination of information by firms is heavily influenced by the particular 
reporting practices of a given country since the audience of interest of each 
country may be unique, or nearly so. 
b. Investment institutions differ from country to country, thus causing different 
information wants and usage. 
c. In some countries the ownership of firm stocks is spreading to the average 
investor, while in others the number of shareholders is kept to a minimum of `firm 
hands'. 
d. The pressure for more adequate disclosure by firms may differ from one country 
to another. The more efficient the capital market, the more adequate the 
disclosure. Further, the presence of international audit firms (e. g. big four) will 
enhance the disclosure practice in the country59 
Kahl and Belkaoui (1981 p. 189) argued that the distribution of ownership among a wide 
group of stockholders may be motivated by the simple idea that the number of firm 
clients and investors is positively related to the number of stockholders. They further 
argued that the wider the distribution of shares in a given society, the higher the incentive 
to disclose more adequate information in the annual reports. 
38 See for example, Street and Bryant (2000), Kahl and Beikaoui (1981), Barrett (1976) and Choi (1973). 
59 See section 6.3.3.2 for a detailed discussion. 
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We can argue that Sudan might be expected to have a weaker market discipline for 
Islamic banks than the other countries covered in the study, because of the greater role of 
the government in the banking sector, as a lot of banks are owned by the government, and 
absence of the large international audit firms (big four). 
We may, therefore, hypothesise that: 
H8: the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the Islamic banks 
operating in Sudan is less than the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of the Islamic banks operating in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan because of 
weaker market discipline. 
6.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter the theoretical framework along with the research dependent and 
independent variables were discussed. The dependent variable represents the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks before and after the 
implementation of the AAOIFI standards. The independent variables were selected after 
reviewing the previous empirical research in the accounting disclosure and the relevance 
of those variables for the case of Islamic banks. 
The independent variables examined in this study are divided into two categories. The 
first is time series (before and after) which explains what effect AAOIFI standards have 
on the level of voluntary disclosure, and it consists of one independent variable, namely, 
the AAOIFI standards. The second is the cross sectional (firm and country level), and is 
intended to explain the effect of certain bank and country characteristics on the level of 
voluntary disclosure, and it consists of six bank characteristics, namely, board 
composition, ownership concentration, listing status, profitability, use of external 
financing and government ownership. The market discipline is used as the variable for the 
country specific characteristic. At the end of the chapter, the research hypotheses are 
developed and tied up with the literature review chapters. The Islamic bank specificities 
are taken into consideration while developing those hypotheses. 
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Chapter 7 
Research Design and Methods 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter t covercd the rescarch process in detail. in which the research was divided into a 
sequence of sta, 2es as follows: 
a. Formulating and clarifying the topic. 
b. Reviewing the relevant literature. 
C. Ucvcloping the research hypotheses. 
d. Deciding on the research design and methods. 
C. Deciding on the data collection techniques and analysing the data collected. 
Chapters 2 to i covered the second stage. and in chapter 6. the researcher discussed the 
development of research hypotheses for this study based on the results of studying the 
previous researches in the area oftiisclosure and taking into consideration the specificities 
of Islamic banking. In this chapter. the research design and methodology undertaken to 
test the hvpxothcses generated in this study is explained. 
7"2 Research Design 
7.2.1 Introduction 
Yin (19<)4 p. 19) stated that research design is a logical sequence that connects empirical 
data to its initial study questions, objectives and ultimately to its conclusion. Sekaran 
(2000 1). 121) stated that the research design consists of a series of rational decision 
making choices. 
Ytn (1 `$ ± p. 45) argued that a food research design should force the researcher to: 
a. articulatc the objectives and questions of the study. 
b. Link objectives and questions to the basic unit of the study a single case. 
multiýlc rases or survcv). 
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c. Identify the critical evidence (e. g. interview) that will support the major 
hypotheses of the study. 
d. Stipulate the relevant techniques for analysing the evidence. 
Figure 7-1 shows the research design of this study as an `onion" with various layers. The 
central point of the design is the data collection and analysis methods. Before reaching 
this central point, there are other important layers of the onion that need to be peeled out. 
The first of these layers is the research objectives and questions. The second considers 
the research approach. The third identifies the research methods to be used and the 
advantages and disadvantages of each method, the fourth layer refers to the time horizon 
applied to this study, and the fifth layer to the data collection techniques. 
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7.2.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
The primary objective of the study is to look to what extent the Islamic banks behave like 
any other firm with regard to their financial disclosure. The following are the other 
objectives of the study: 
a. To extend our knowledge to the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports 
of Islamic banks. 
b. To assess whether there is a relationship between the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic 
banks. 
c. To assess whether there is a relationship between certain bank and country 
characteristics and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Islamic banks. 
d. To identify areas of concern for future researches in the field of financial reporting 
in Islamic banks. 
In order to address the research objectives, the following three main research questions 
need to be answered: 
a- What is the impact of the implementation of AAOIFI standards on the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks? 
b- What is the effect of bank and country specific characteristics on the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks before and after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards? 
c- What are the main findings of the research that could be addressed for future 
research? 
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Development of Hypotheses and Research Design 
Saunders et al. (2000 p. 92) and Yin (1994 p. 3) stated that there are several research 
methods/strategies for doing social science research, which include for example, surveys, 
case studies, experiments, cross sectional and longitudinal studies, histories and analyses 
of archival information. They argued that each of these methods involves a different way 
of collecting and analysing empirical evidence and the fact that what matters is whether 
the method chosen is appropriate for the particular research questions and objectives. In 
the remainder of this section, the researcher will discuss in more detail the surveys and 
case studies and give reasons and the rationale behind using the survey method in this 
study. 
Saunders et al. (2000 p. 87) stated that there are two approaches to research. The 
deductive, where the researcher develops a theory and hypotheses, and then designs a 
research strategy to test the hypotheses. The second approach is the inductive where the 
researcher collects data and develops a theory based on the analysis of the data collected. 
The following table shows the major differences between the deductive and inductive 
approaches to a research: 
Table 7-1 Differences between deduction and induction approaches60 
Deduction emphasises Induction emphasises 
Moving from theory to data Gaining an understanding of the 
meanings human attach to events 
The need to explain causal A close understanding of the research 
relationships between variables context 
The collection of quantitative data The collection of qualitative data 
The necessity to select samples of Less concern with the need to 
sufficient size in order to generalise generalise 
conclusions 
60 Sunders et al. (2000 p. 91). 
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Creswell (1994) suggests that the most important criteria to decide upon which of the 
above two approaches is the nature of the research topic. A topic on which there is a 
wealth of literature from which the researcher can define a theoretical framework and a 
hypothesis lends itself more readily to the deductive approach. 
Also if the researcher is not prepared to indulge in risk, the deductive approach is better 
as it is a lower risk strategy (Saunders et al. 2000 p. 91). Hence, this study has followed 
the deduction approach, because of the above reasons and in addition to the fact that the 
survey method can be used under this approach. 
Yin (1994 p. 6) stated that when the researcher is trying to answer the "what", "who", and 
"where" questions, he will likely favor the survey research strategy. He identified three 
conditions that the researcher should take into consideration when deciding upon the 
research strategy to use. Figure 7-2 displays these three conditions and shows how each 
is related to the five major research strategies in the social science: 
Table 7-2: Relevant situations for different research strategies61 
Strategy Form of research Requires control Focuses on 
question over behavioral contemporary 
events? events? 
Survey Who, what, where, No Yes 
how many, how 
much 
Case study How, why No Yes 
Experiment How, why Yes Yes 
Archival analysis Who, what, where, No Yes/No 
how many, how 
much 
History How, why No No 
61 See Yin (1994 p. 6). 
92 
Chapter 7 Development of Hypotheses and Research Design 
Based on the above arguments and on the results of the literature review of previous 
empirical research in the area of "Voluntary Disclosure in the Annual Reports", for the 
purpose of this study, the researcher will follow the single survey method/strategy. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are some limitations to this study; especially 
the fact that some of the independent variables used are developed under economic, 
financial and political settings different than the ones exist in the countries covered by 
this study i. e. Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan. 
Accordingly, it might be the case that the data collected via the disclosure index prepared 
as a result of the single survey of annual reports of Islamic banks shows that there are no 
variations in the dependent variable (i. e. the level of voluntary disclosure) or the 
variations are not explained by the independent variables covered by the literature. If this 
is the case , the researcher will supplement the secondary data used 
for the survey with 
some primary data i. e. collect more evidence about the reasons behind the variations in 
the dependent variable, via a questionnaire and personal interviews with a sample of 
bank Chief Executive Officers, Chief Financial Officers and external audit firm 
managers. 
7.2.4 Why those countries? 
The reasons for choosing Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan are as follows: 
1. Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan are all countries with emerging capital markets. 
Hence, it is interesting to test whether the theoretical hypotheses (frameworks) 
developed in Western countries are also working in developing market economy. 
2. Bahrain and Sudan were the first two countries (January 1998) that made it 
mandatory to prepare the financial statements of Islamic banks in accordance with 
the AAOIFI's accounting standards. Followed by Qatar and Jordan (January 
2002). 
3. A research opportunity is provided where we can compare cross country 
experience of voluntary disclosure, one with all banks operate according to 
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Islamic Shari'a rules and principles (i. e. Sudan) and another where there is a 
mixture of Islamic banking and traditional banking system and also it is the center 
for Islamic banks and AAOIFI General Secretariat (i. e. Bahrain). And finally, we 
have two odd countries where we have only one or two Islamic banks and a 
number of traditional banks (i. e. Qatar and Jordan). 
7.2.5 Time Horizon 
Saunders et al. (2000 p. 96) and Sekaran (1992 p. 138) stated that the research study may 
be longitudinal or cross-sectional. Longitudinal study is used when the researcher wants 
to measure the change and developments over a period of time. Where as the cross- 
sectional study will measure the results at a particular point of time (i. e. the study of a 
particular phenomenon at a particular point of time). 
This study will apply both approaches. It will use the longitudinal approach for H1i. e. to 
measure the change in the level of disclosure before and after the implementation of 
AAOIFI standards. And it will use the cross-sectional approach for the other hypotheses 
i. e. the effect of bank and country specific characteristics on the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of the years 1997 and 2002 for the banks operating in 
Bahrain and Sudan and in the annual reports of the years 200062 and 2002 for the banks 
operating in Qatar and Jordan. 
7.2.6 Data Collection Techniques 
7.2.6.1 Survey of Annual Reports 
A letter was sent to all the Islamic banks in Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan (see 
appendix 3) requesting annual reports. A list of the banks was obtained from Bahrain 
Monetary Agency (BMA) and Central Bank of Sudan (CBS). The response rate was very 
high for the banks operating in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan may be due to personal 
connections of the researcher with the financial controllers in most of these banks (the 
62 To avoid using two years (i. e. 1997 and 2000), from now on, we will refer to the period before the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards in Qatar and Jordan as 1997. 
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letters were followed by a telephone conversation with the financial controllers). For the 
banks operating in Sudan, the response rate was low may be due to the absence of the 
personal connections and non delivery of the letters. For the banks that did not respond a 
visit was made to the offices of the General Secretariat of AAOIFI in Bahrain to obtain a 
copy of the reports and also via personal contacts in Sudan. 
Appendix (4) shows the list of all the Islamic banks operating in the countries under the 
study. This list is considered to be the population, and in the mean time, the sample size 
of this study. 
7.2.6.2 Variables and Measures Used 
The following sub-sections will discuss the independent and the dependent variables 
considered in this study. We will start by describing the independent variables 
and how they will be measured in this study, followed by a description of the construction 
of the disclosure index, which is the method used to measure the dependent variable. 
a. Independent Variables 
As discussed in details in chapter 6, the independent variables examined in this study are 
divided into two categories. The first is time series which explains what effect AAOIFI 
standards have on the level of voluntary disclosure, and it consists of one independent 
variable (AAOIFI standards). The second is the cross sectional which is intended to 
explain how Islamic banks differed before and after the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards, and it consists of six bank specific characteristics and one country specific 
characteristic independent variables. Table 7-3 shows the operationalisation (method or 
criteria used to measure each) of the independent variables mentioned above. 
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Table 7-3 The operationalisation of the independent variables 
Independent Operationalisation Source of information 
variables 
Cross Sectional: 
AAOIFI Standards 1. FAS (1): General Presentation - Islamic banks annual 
and Disclosure in the Financial reports. 
Statements. - AAOIFI standards 
2. FAS (5): Disclosure of Bases 
for Profit Allocation. 
3. Any standard that has a 
disclosure requirement. 
Time Series: 
Board Composition 1. % of non-executive members on - Annual reports 
the board to the total number of - Questionnaire or 
board members. interview with CFO 
2. % of non-executive members on 
the board who are IAHs to the 
total number of board members 
Ownership % of equity holding by family - Questionnaire or 
Concentration members or small number of interview with CFO 
shareholders63 to the total amount - Stock exchange 
of owners' equity. handbooks and 
publications 
Listing status Listed on the stock exchange vs. Stock exchange 
not listed. handbooks and 
publications 
Profitability 1. Shareholders return over - Annual reports 
shareholders equity. - Interviews with the 
63 Researcher taken the percentage of ownership in the share capital by the five largest owners. 
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Independent Operationalisation Source of information 
variables 
2. Unrestricted IAHs return over CFO and external 
UIAHs equity. auditors. 
Use of External Percentage of the total IAHs funds - Annual reports 
Financing to the total assets. - Questionnaire and/or 
interviews with CFO. 
Government Percentage of shares owned by the - Annual reports. 
Ownership government in each bank. - Questionnaire and/or 
interviews with 
CFO. 
Market Discipline 64 Percentage of government owned - Annual reports. 
Islamic banks to total Islamic - Stock exchange 
banks. - Interviews 
b. Dependent Variable 
The level of voluntary disclosure by Islamic banks is based on the individual scores 
received by each bank through the use of a disclosure index. The following sections 
describe the construction of the disclosure index and how the items in the index are 
scored. 
7.2.6.3 Construction of the Disclosure Index 
The purpose of this study is to test the effect of the implementation of AAOIFI standards 
on the level of disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks via measuring the level of 
aggregate and voluntary disclosure before and after implementation of AAOIFI 
accounting standards, and also to test the effect of certain bank characteristics on the level 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of those banks. 
Before the implementation of AAOIFI standards, mandatory disclosure is defined as all 
of those items requested to be disclosed by IAS. And after the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards, mandatory disclosure is defined as all of those items requested to be disclosed 
64 County specific independent variable. 
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by AAOIFI standards. Thus, any disclosure over and above that is required by IAS (for 
the 'before' case) and AAOIFI (for the 'after' case) is considered to be voluntary. 
Aggregate disclosure is the total of mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
The first step towards measuring the level of disclosure was to construct the disclosure 
index65 (some researchers also call it the `disclosure scoring sheet'). A major task of this 
study is the selection of items to be disclosed in the scoring sheet. The research was not 
limited to the financial statements only, but rather to the entire contents of the annual 
reports. In selecting the items to be included in the sheet, a broad-based approach was 
undertaken. 
This means that selected items of voluntary disclosure will not be aimed to be associated 
to any one particular group of users, but instead, to an array of users who have equal 
rights to the information (see the detailed discussion on this in the "weighted and un- 
weighted method section). The following steps were taken in constructing the list: 
1. The development of the first set of disclosure items was based on a literature 
review of previous empirical researches carried out on the level of disclosure. The 
main research studies referred to were: Cooke (1989b, 1992), Wallace et al. 
(1994), Hossain et al. (1995), Raffournier (1995) and Haniffa & Cooke (2002). 
Due consideration was given to the AAOIFI standards in the development of the 
disclosure index. This was achieved when refining the index items via obtaining 
the opinion from two financial controllers and two external auditors of Islamic 
banks. A disclosure item was included in the disclosure index if it was disclosed 
by at least one bank. 
65 The disclosure index is a measure by which the level of financial reporting of one company can be 
compared with another. It can be used to measure the degree of disclosure of an item of information by 
enterprises within a country and is the ratio of actual scores awarded to the company and the scores which 
that company is expected to earn (See Cooke 1989a p. 115 and Wallace, 1988 p. 450). 
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The disclosure index for the Islamic banks before the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards is shown in Appendix (5)66 . The 
disclosure index is divided into five 
groups. The first group contained the general corporate information e. g. the vision 
and mission statements, member of board of directors, members of executive 
committee, members of audit committee, bank profile, financial highlights ... etc. 
The second group contained the reports issued e. g. the board of director's report, 
the Shari'a Supervisory Board's report and the external auditor's report. The third 
group contained the financial information in the financial statements. The fourth 
group contained the financial information in the notes to the financial statements. 
And the fifth group contained the supplementary financial information 
To be able to prepare a complete and accurate set of mandatory and voluntary 
items that are disclosed in the annual reports of the Islamic banks after 
implementation of AAOIFI (see appendix 6), a checklist of all the disclosures 
required by AAOIFI standards applicable to accounting periods beginning on or 
after 1 January 2002 is prepared67. 
2. The list was refined by asking three practicing Islamic banking accountants to 
verify its validity. The results are then counterchecked by two Islamic bank audit 
managers from the big four external audit firms (i. e. Ernst & Young and Price 
Waterhouse Coopers). 
3. A final list was prepared. 
4. The annual reports of all the Islamic banks in the sample were scored. 
66 A similar approach was used to prepare the disclosure index after implementation of AAOIFI standards, 
except the fact that group five will be removed as this will not be applicable for the period after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards (see appendix 6). 67 Street and Bryant (2000, p. 314) developed a checklist for the IAS-required disclosures to measure the 
dependent variable in their study. 
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7.2.6.4 Weighted and Unweighted Methods 
There are two methods of using the disclosure index approach, weighted68 and 
unweighted. It is noticeable that early researchers used the weighted method (for 
example, Singhvi and Desai 1971, Buzby 1975, and Firth 1979). This method was used 
on the ground that some items are more important to the users than others. The weighting 
was done either by the judgment of the researcher or by sending the list of items in the 
disclosure index to the users of the financial statements e. g. financial and security 
analysts and academics from the universities. 
On the other hand, the recent studies and some of the early ones used the unweighted 
method ( for example, Choi 1973, Kahl & Belkaoui 1981, Chang et al. 1983, Cooke 
1989b, Gray et al. 1995, Hossain et al. 1995 , Haniffa & Cooke 2002, and Alsaeed 2005 ). 
There are many reasons given by those researchers for not giving a weight to items 
disclosed, for example, they argue that each item of disclosure is equally important, and 
to avoid subjectivity because weighting reflects the perception rather than actual 
information needs of the users of financial information. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) 
and Robins and Austin (1986) used both methods, they used the unweighted disclosure 
method to compensate for the limitations of the weighted approach discussed above. It is 
interesting to point out that the empirical results of both methods were the same. 
Chang et al. (1983) criticised the weighted index on the ground that it inherently involves 
subjectivity assigned by respondents when they come from different countries or when 
they have unknown preferences for specific disclosure items. Cooke (1989b) considers 
that the unweighted method is appropriate when the focus of the research is directed to all 
users of corporate annual reports rather than the information needs of any specific group. 
Furthermore, Gray et al. (1995) argued that if there are a large number of items in the 
disclosure index, it may be expected that companies will be ranked in the same way 
irrespective of whether the items are weighted or unweighted. 
68 This method gives different weights to the different disclosure items in the annual reports. Researchers 
used different measurement techniques as highlighted in chapter 4 (review of previous empirical research). 
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Thus, the above discussion suggests that the use of unweighted index method is more 
suitable for this research, since it is not concerned with any specific user group and there 
are a large number of items in the index. 
7.2.6.5 Scoring the Disclosure Items 
Once the list of disclosure items finished, the next step was to develop a scoring scheme. 
In the calculation of the disclosure index, a dichotomous procedure was used69, in which 
an item scores one if it is disclosed in the annual report and zero if not. The approach of 
scoring the banks is additive and equally weighted. The reasons for not using weights in 
scoring the items are already discussed in the sub-section above. 
A methodological problem inherent to the above model comes from the fact that every 
item is not necessarily relevant to all the Islamic banks. Thus, when it is obvious that an 
item is not relevant to a bank, this item will be excluded, to avoid penalizing this bank for 
not disclosing it. To determine whether an item is relevant to a bank is obviously a 
difficult task , which means that the researcher 
has to read the whole annual report and 
know the activity of the bank and which parts of the accounting standards is applicable to 
that type of bank. 
In order to construct the necessary indices for answering the research hypotheses in this 
study, the voluntary disclosure score (VDS) for a bank is calculated as follows: 
ED 
vDS =E di 
i=1 
Where: di =I if the voluntary item is disclosed in the annual report 
0 if the voluntary item is not disclosed 
M :S the maximum number of items which a bank is expected to disclose 
69 See for example, Cooke (1989a p. 115), Raffournier (1995 p. 269), Haniffa & Cooke (2002 p. 331) and 
Alsaeed (2005 p. 315). 
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7.2.6.6 Disclosure Indexes 
Once all the items have been scored, a disclosure index70 was created to measure the 
relative level of disclosure by each bank so as to enable statistical analysis and hypotheses 
testing to be conducted. The index is a ratio of the actual scores awarded to a bank to the 
scores which that bank is expected to earn. This approach ensured that banks were not 
penalised for not disclosing an item if it is deemed to be irrelevant to its activities. 
Consequently, the calculation of the voluntary disclosure index (VDI) was as follows: 
VDI= VDS/ Mv 
where VDS = Voluntary disclosure score for each bank 
My = Maximum voluntary score possible for the individual bank (< m) 
7.3 Data Analysis 
Once the disclosure indices are calculated, the next stage was to analyse the data. The 
first step for data analysis was to get a feeling of the data, so that appropriate statistical 
methods and techniques can be undertaken. This approach included examining the nature 
of the empirical data to be analysed (quantitative and/or qualitative), the underlying 
distribution of the data set (normal or non-normal)", and the nature of the research 
questions. 
The second step was to decide upon the statistical techniques and models to be used to 
test the hypothesis, as follows: 
70 Wallace (1988, p: 450) defined disclosure index as "a measure by which the level of financial reporting of 
an item of information by enterprises within a country and is the ratio of actual scores awarded to the 
company and the scores which that company is expected to earn. " 
71 This will help in the choice of statistical methods to employ i. e. parametric or non-parametric. 
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7.3.1 Effect of AAOIFI standards implementation (H1) 
Descriptive statistics and test of normality of the distribution for the level of 
voluntary disclosure (VDI) before and after the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards were used. The tests of normality using Shapiro Wilk W revealed 
nonnormal distribution for the untransformed level of voluntary disclosure. 
Different types of transformation were done on VDI to normalize its distribution. 
Transformation of the level of voluntary disclosure using normal scores (Van der 
Waerden approach) and ranking resulted to normally distributed data. 
The paired differences of the level of voluntary disclosure after and before the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards were subjected to univariate parametric and 
nonparametric analyses. 
The details of the statistical techniques and methods used to test for the effect of 
AAOIFI standards implementation on the level of voluntary disclosure are 
presented in chapter 8 of this thesis. 
7.3.2 Effect of bank specific characteristics (H2 to H7) 
The effects of bank specific characteristics before and after the implementation of 
AAOIFI standards were considered in the study (i. e., data set in 1997 (before) and 2002 
(after) AAOIFI standards). 
Each of the independent variables related to the bank specific characteristics, namely; 
proportion of non-executive members on the board to the total number of board members, 
proportion of non-executive members on the board who are IAHs to the total number of 
board members, ownership concentration, listing status, shareholders profitability, IAHs 
profitability, use of external financing and government ownership was tested for 
normality using Shapiro-Wilk at 10% level of significance. 72 
72 Due to the small number of sample size (only 34 banks in 2002 and 29 banks in 1997), the researcher 
used 10% level of significance. This is discussed in details in chapter 9. 
103 
Chapter 7 Development of Hypotheses and Research Design 
There are two types of independent variables in this study - continuous and dichotomous 
(nominal). The level of voluntary disclosure is a continuous dependent variable. Most of 
the independent variables considered by the study are continuous except for listing status 
which is nominal with dichotomous responses (1=listed, O=not listed). 
Correlation between the dependent and the independent variables is also calculated. 
Correlation is a bivariate measure of association (strength) of the relationship between 
two variables. There are two types of most commonly used correlation coefficients that 
can be calculated for pairs of continuous variables - parametric Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficient and the nonparametric spearman's rho correlation co-efficient. 
However, when one of the variables is nominal (dichotomous), the continuous variable is 
then recoded to convert it to nominal level of measurement. The Cramer's V correlation 
coefficient was calculated for the dichotomous dummy variable (listing status) after 
performing a Chi-square test of association with the recoded values of the level of 
disclosure (recoded as Low--O to 33.33, Moderate=33.34 to 66.66 and High=66.67 to 
100). 
Cramer's V is the most popular of the chi-square-based measures of nominal association 
because it gives good norming from 0 to I regardless of the table size, when row 
marginals equal column marginals. V equals the square root of the chi-square divided by 
the sample size, n, times m, which is the smaller of (rows - 1) or (columns - 1). Hence, 
the formula is: V= SQRT(X2/nm). 
The application of the bivariate simple linear regression determines the probable form of 
the relationship between an independent variable and the level of voluntary disclosure 
(dependent variable). Simple linear regression estimates the coefficients of the linear 
equation, involving one independent variable that best predicts the value of the level of 
voluntary disclosure (dependent variable). 
Multiple linear regression is an extension of the bivariate simple linear regression that 
involves more than one independent variable (Draper, 1981). The results from multiple 
linear regression analysis provide information on the statistical significance of the 
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independent variables, the strength of association between one or more of the predictors 
and the criterion, and a predictive equation for future use. 
Multiple linear regression method had been used extensively to link the level of voluntary 
disclosure with the independent variables (Cooke, 1998). However, this method was 
applied only upon testing whether several conditions were met such as: (1) variables have 
normal distribution, (2) the error term has a normal distribution with mean of zero errors 
and errors are independent, and, (3) no multicollinearity exists among independent 
variables. 
Shapiro-Wilk W, skewness and kurtosis were calculated and tested to verify the 
fundamental assumption of normality. Only the normal scores of the level of voluntary 
disclosure in 2002 and 1997 were used as dependent variables in the separate multiple 
regression models. 
One of the problems in undertaking multiple regression analysis is that there may be 
multicollinearity among the independent variables. Such a problem is discussed about in 
Haniffa and Cooke's (2002), Cooke's (1992) and Singhvi and Desai's (1971) works. In 
order to identify the extent of the problem, a correlation matrix was run off. 
For this study, the researcher used a model that is frequently used in previous disclosure 
empirical researches (for example, Eng and Mak 2003, Haniffa and Cooke 2002, Hossain 
et. al. 1995, Cooke 1992, and Cooke 1989a), to test for the effect of bank specific 
characteristics on the level of voluntary disclosure. The regression model used to assess 
the extent to which variability in the level of voluntary disclosure is explained by the 
various independent variables. The following is the regression equation: 
YVDI - ß0 + ßlXli + ß2Xzi + ß3X3i + .... + 
ßgXgi + Ei 
where: 
Yvvr = voluntary disclosure index 
ßo = regression intercept 
X1 = proportion of independent non-executive directors to total directors 
X2 = proportion of independent non-executive directors who are IAHs to total directors 
X3 = listing status 
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X4 = profitability (shareholders return over shareholders equity) 
X5 = profitability (UTAHs return over UIAHs equity) 
X6 = ownership concentration 
X7 = level of IAHs 
X8 = market discipline 
EI = the error term / the stochastic disturbance term 
the ih observation 
constants or parameters 
The regression routines are tested using step-wise SPSS. This allowed the researcher to 
see at what stage independent variables are incorporated in the regression equation and 
their importance73. 
7.3.3 Effect of country specific characteristic (H8) 
Descriptive statistics were applied to test for the alternative hypothesis that the level 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the Islamic banks operating in 
Sudan is less than the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the 
Islamic banks operating in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan. 
Inferential statistics were necessary to support the descriptive statistics by parametric and 
nonparametric analyses at a 5% level of significance. The t-test for two independent 
samples was used for the parametric univariate analysis. Test of equality of variances was 
done using Levene's F-test. The Mann-Whitney test was used for the nonparametric 
analysis. See chapter 10 for the details of the tests conducted. 
73 See Cooke (1989a p. 117). 
106 
Chapter 7 Development of Hypotheses and Research Design 
7.4 Concluding Remarks 
This section explained the research procedures for the systematic conduct of this study. 
The approach and methods of analysis are similar to some of previous studies. The study 
uses eight independent variables to show their effects on the change in the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks. 
The elements of the research design were also discussed. The population of the study was 
identified to be all the Islamic banks operating in Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan. The 
data collection methods and statistical techniques used to test the hypotheses are the ones 
previously used in similar empirical researches. 
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Chapter 8 
Effect of AAOIFI Standards Implementation 
On the Level of Voluntary Disclosure: 
Empirical Findings 
8.1 Introduction 
This is the first set of empirical results of univariate and multivariate analyses on level of 
voluntary disclosure. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the implementation of the AAOIFI 
standards was gauged in terms of the decrease in the level of voluntary disclosure (VDI) 
measured by the score indices of all sampled Islamic banks before and after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
In this chapter, the impact of the implementation of AAOIFI standards on the level of 
voluntary disclosure was examined as follows: 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (level of voluntary disclosure) 
were reviewed for the 2002 and 1997 datasets. 
Tests of normality on the level of voluntary disclosure were performed. Different 
types of transformations of the dependent variable were performed to achieve 
normality. 
Univariate analyses for both parametric and non-parametric statistical test on the 
level of voluntary disclosure before and after the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards were conducted and discussed. 
8.2 Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Disclosure Score Indices 
A total of 34 Islamic banks annual reports were considered in the study after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards (i. e. 2002). Of these 34 Islamic banks, only 29 
existed before the implementation of AAOIFI standards (i. e. 1997) whose annual reports 
had been matched to comprise the comparative analyses later in the chapter. The number 
of sample Islamic banks included in the study, despite capturing substantial percentage of 
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target population of Islamic banks74, can be classified to comprise small sample size and 
may be relatively small for most parametric statistical tests. 
However, regardless of the presence of outliers, each and every Islamic bank in the study 
is important in comparing the level of voluntary disclosure before and after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards. Thus, pooling or merging the datasets in 1997 and 
2002 to suit most statistical tests was not considered as this will defeat the purpose of 
determining the impact of the implementation of AAOIFI standards in the two reference 
periods. 
8.2.1. Level of voluntary disclosure after the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards(2002) 
The descriptive statistics for data set for the level of voluntary disclosure in 2002 are 
shown in Table 8.1 a. The data set from the sample of 34 Islamic banks had VDI that 
ranges from a minimum of 11 and a maximum of 84. 
Table 8.1a - Descriptive Statistics: VD12002 Level of voluntary disclosure after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards (2002) 
Mean 43.65 Skewness 0.345 
Standard Error (Mean) 4.142 Standard Error (Skewness) 0.403 
Standard Deviation 24.153 Kurtosis -1.385 
Median 35.50 Standard Error (Kurtosis) 0.788 
Minimum 11 Z-test Skewness Ratio 75 0.856 (Normal based on Skewness) 
Maximum 84 Z-test Kurtosis Ratio76 -1.758 (Normal based on Kurtosis) 
Mode 22,24,33 Shapiro-Wilk W statistic 0.902 
Frequency of Mode 
(Multimodal) 3 Shapiro-Wilk Test p-value 
0.005 (Not Normal since p-value<0.10) 
A mean and median of 43.65 and 35.50 were reported after the implementation of 
AAOIFI standards with smaller variability as measured by the standard deviation of 
24.153. Based on the measures of skewness and kurtosis, the distribution of the dataset 
resembles normal distribution as the Z-test values were within ±1.9677. However, 
inspecting the histogram of VDI in 2002 (Figure 8.1 a) showed the multimodal features of 
74 Sample size represents more than 77% of the banks. 
75 Z-test Skewness Ratio is significant if within ± 1.96 (indicating normality due to skewness) 
76 Z-test Kurtosis Ratio is significant if within ± 1.96 (indicating normality due to kurtosis) 
77 The rule of thumb for normality test based on skewness and normality is ±1.96 (Cooke, 1989a) 
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the data set as well as a lighter tail (negative kurtosis value of -1.385 indicating flatter 
distribution). This is further supported by the significant results (non-normality) of the 
Shapiro Wilk W test of normality when compared with a 10% level of significance. 
Shapiro-Wilk W78 test is a formal test of normality recommended for small and medium 
samples up to n= 2000. Another popular test of normality is called the Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov statistics using Lilliefors Significance Correction but is used for larger sample 
size (n > 2000). Since the study has small sample sizes of 34 and 29 for the years 2002 
and 1997 respectively, the results of the Shapiro Wilk W will be highlighted. The W 
statistic is the ratio of the best estimator of the variance (based on the square of a linear 
combination of the order statistics) to the usual corrected sum of squares estimator of the 
variance. 
Figure 8.1a Histogram of VD12002 Level of Voluntary Disclosure 
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VD12002: Level of Voluntary Disclosure 
The Shapiro Wilk W may be thought of as the correlation between given data and their 
corresponding normal scores, with W=1 when the given data are perfectly normal in 
distribution. 79 When W is significantly smaller than 1, the assumption of normality is not 
78 See NIST (n. d. ). 
79 See Guangbin (n. d) 
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met. That is, a significant W statistic (p-value less than the usual 0.10 level of 
significance) causes the researcher to reject the assumption that the distribution is normal. 
Moreover, the Shapiro-Wilk test does not require specifying the mean and variance in 
advance and it is very powerful to detect the small departure from normality. But it will 
not indicate the source of abnormality80 
The calculated Shapiro-Wilk W statistic = 0.902 for the level of voluntary disclosure after 
the implementation of AAOIFI standards tested significant (indicating non-normality) 
because the calculated p-value = 0.005, is less than the level of significance of 0.10. 
8.2.2. Level of voluntary disclosure before implementation of AAOIFI standards 
Table 8.1b provides the descriptive statistics of level of voluntary disclosure before the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards (VDI1997). 
Table 8.1b -Descriptive Statistics: VD11997 level of voluntary disclosure before the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards (1997) 
Mean 
Standard Error (Mean) 
Standard Deviation 
Median 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mode 
Frequency of Mode 
30.28 Skewness 
3.534 Standard Error (Skewness) 
19.034 Kurtosis 
25.00 Standard Error (Kurtosis) 
9 Z-test Skewness Ratio 
87 Z-test Kurtosis Ratio 
25 Shapiro-Wilk W 
4 Shapiro-Wilk Test p-value 
1.632 (skewed to right) 
0.434 - 
2.914 (peaked) 
0.845 
3.765 (Beyond ± 1.96 - Not Normal) 
3.447 (Beyond ± 1.96 - Not Normal) 
0.841 
0.000 (Not Normal since p-value<0.10) 
It can be seen from the table above that the mean level of voluntary disclosure before the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards (VDI1997) is 30.28 whose range is from a 
minimum of 9 to a maximum of 87 out of a maximum of 100. 
The table also reveals that the level of voluntary disclosure among 29 Islamic banks in 
1997 is not normally distributed as indicated by standard tests on skewness and kurtosis. 
80 See Royston, (1992). 
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The rule of thumb for normality test based on skewness and normality is ±1.96, but the 
VDI in this study was found to have a skewness of 1.632 and a kurtosis of 2.914. This 
means that the data set is positively skewed and its distribution is peaked as drawn in 
histogram in Figure 8.1b. The non-normality conclusion was further supported by the 
Shapiro-Wilk W=0.841 whose p-value of 0.000 is less than the level of significance of 
0.10. 
The distributions of the level of voluntary disclosure before and after the implementation 
of AAOIFI standards indicated non-normality based on the Shapiro Wilk tests of 
normality which rejected the null hypothesis of normal distribution since the calculated p- 
values are less than the level of significance of 0.10. 
Figure 8.1b Histogram of VD11997 Level of Voluntary Disclosure 
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8.3 Transformation of Voluntary Disclosure 
Ioo 
When a variable is found to show non-normality, steps were taken to transform the data 
as exhibited by the level of voluntary disclosure (VDI) before and after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards. Different types of transformation techniques were 
utilized, namely: normal scores of the VDI (Van der Waerden proportion estimation 
formula), log odds ratio of VDI and simple ranking of VDI. These transformation 
Mean - 30.28 
Std. Dev. - 19.034 
N-29 
12- 
10 - 
8- 
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techniques were used based on previously published studies on level of voluntary 
disclosure (Cooke, 1996b). 
The dependent variable (VDI) was transformed by creating rankings based on normal 
scores using the Van der Waerden proportion estimation formula (defined by the formula 
r/(w+l), where w is the sum of the case weights and r is the rank, ranging from 1 to w). 
Ranking refers to simple ranking where the value of the variable is its rank, and the Log 
odds ratio transformation refers to the calculation of the log odds ratio of VDI = (In 
((VDI/100)/(1-(VD1/100)). Tables 8.2a and 8.2b summarize the descriptive statistics and 
tests of normality resulting from the three types of transformation of the level of 
voluntary disclosure, and show the results of the test of normality of the level of voluntary 
disclosure before and after transformation using skewness, kurtosis and Shapiro Wilk W. 
Table 8.2a Descriptive statistics of untransformed and transformed data on level of 
voluntary disclosure (VDI) in 2002. 
Untransformed VDI Transformed VDI 
Original Data 
VD12002 
Normal Scores Simple Using Van der Rankings Log Odds Ratio Waerden 
NVDI2002 RVD12002 LVDI2002 
N 34 34 34 34 
Range 73 3.621 32.500 3.75 
Minimum 11 -1.718 1.500 -2.09 
Maximum 84 1.902 34.000 1.66 
Mean statistic 43.65 0.001 17.500 -0.3080 
Std. Error 4.142 0.157 1.706 0.1943 
Std. Deviation Statistic 24.153 0.918 9.945 1.1330 
Median statistic 35.50 -0.036 17.000 -0.5989 
Skewness Statistic 0.345 0.022 11 0.004 0.228 
Std. Error 0.403 0.403 0.403 0.403 
Z-Test =Skewness/S1a Error 0.856 0.054 0.009 0.566 
Skewness Ratio Remark Normal Normal Normal Normal 
Kurtosis statistic -1.385 -0.544 -1.205 -1.179 
Std. Error 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.788 
Z- Test -Kurtosis/Std Error -1.758 -0.690 -1.529 -1.497 Kurtosis Ratio Remark Normal Normal Normal Normal 
Test of 
Normality W Statistic 
0.902 
__ 
0.987 0.953 0.939 
Using Si 
. 
Prob 
. p-value 
0.005 0.948 0.146 0.059 
Shapiro Wilk 
W Statistic Remark (<0.10 ) Not Normal 
>0.10 
Normal 
>0.10 
Normal 
<0.10 
Not Normal 
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Figure 8.2a Histograms of Untransformed and Transformed Voluntary Disclosure Indices 
after the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (2002). 
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Table 8.2b Descriptive statistics of untransformed and transformed data on level of 
voluntary disclosure (VDI) in 1997. 
Untransformed VDI Transformed VDI 
Normal Scores Simple 
Original Data Using Van der Rankings 
Log Odds Ratio 
Waerden 
VDI1997 NVDII997 Rl'D11997 LVD11997 
N 29 29 29 29 
-- "..... _.. -.. _. _........... ....................... --------- 
_Range-----...... _.. Minimum_ 
78 
9 
3.479 27.500 4.21 
-1.645 1.500 -2.31 
Maximum 87 1.834 29.000 1.90 
Mean Statistic 30.28 0.002 15.000 -0.9353 
Std Error 3.534 0.169 1.577 0.1808 
Std. Deviation Statistic 19.034 0.908 8.494 0.9736 
Median Statistic 25.00 -0.126 13.5000 -1.0986 
Skewness Statistic 1.632 0.032 0.005 1.220 
Std. Error 0.434 0.434 0.434 0.434 
Z-Test = (Skewness/Std. Error) 3.765 0.073 0.011 2.813 
Skewness Ratio Remark Not Normal Normal Normal Not Normal 
Kurtosis Statistic 2.914 -0.559 -1.200 2.185 
Std. Error 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.845 
Z-Test = (Kurtosis /Std. Error) 3.447 -0.662 -1.419 2.585 Kurtosis Ratio Remark Not Normal Normal Normal Not Normal 
Test of Statistic 0.841 0.985 0.952 0.903 
Normality Sig. Prob (p-value) 0.000 0.936 0.203 0.011 Using 
Shapiro Wilk W Remark (<0.10) >0.10 >0.10 (<0.10 ) 
Statistic Not Normal Normal Normal Not Normal 
-, ý oý 
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Figure 8.2b Histograms of Untransformed and Transformed Voluntary Disclosure 
Indices before the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (1997) 
Histogram 
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The distribution of the VD12002 (level of voluntary disclosure after the implementation 
of AAOIFI standards) was normalized upon transformation using normal scores (using 
Van der Waerden formula) and simple rankings. The Shapiro Wilk W statistics for 
normal scores (NVDI2002) and ranks (RVDI2002) had p-values greater than 0.10 (level 
of significance) indicating normality. On the other hand, log odds ratio transformation 
(LVDI2002) did not normalize the distribution of the level of voluntary disclosure in 
2002. Figure 8.2a shows the normal curve superimposed on the resulting histograms for 
the untransformed VD12002 (not normal), normally distributed NVD12002 and 
RVDI2002 and the non-normal LVDI2002. 
The histograms of the untransformed VD11997 (not normal), normally distributed 
NVDI1997 and RVD11997 and the non-normal LVD11997 are summarized in Figure 8.2b 
The calculated p-values of the Shapiro Wilk W statistics for the normal scores of VDI and 
ranked VDI were all greater than 0.10 indicating failure to reject the null hypothesis of 
normality. In contrast, log odds ratio transformation of VDI did not result to normality 
since the calculated p-value was less than the 0.10 level of significance. 
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8.4 Univariate Tests on Level of Voluntary Disclosure Before and After 
the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards 
The level of voluntary disclosure before and after the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards was tested to find out whether there was a decrease in the level of 
disclosure after the implementation of AAOIFI standards (H 1 of the study). 
As the tests of normality indicated non-normality of the data sets for the level of 
voluntary disclosure, both parametric and non-parametric univariate tests will be 
presented in this chapter. 
8.4.1. Univariate Parametric Test on Paired Samples T-Test 
The parametric t-test for paired samples was utilized in this study. The Paired 
Samples t-test procedure compares the means of two variables for a single group. 
It computes the differences between values of the two variables for each case and 
tests whether the average differs from 0. 
For each paired test, the difference between VD12002 and VD11997, two 
quantitative numeric variables (ratio-level of measurement) were derived. The 
assumptions pertaining to this test were all satisfied, which includes: 
Observations for each pair were made under the same conditions. 
Normally distributed mean differences (Shapiro Wilk W's significance 
probability p-value is greater than 0.10). 
Variances of each variable can be equal or unequal. 
Table 8.3 shows the descriptive statistics and Figure 8.3 shows the histogram of 
the distribution of the normally distributed mean differences. 
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Table 8.3 Descriptive Statistics: VD12002-VD11997 Mean difference of the level 
of voluntary disclosure before and after the implementation of AAOIFI 
Mean of Differences 13.5517 Skewness 0.260 
Standard Error (Mean) 3.41165 Standard Error (Skewness) 0.434 
Standard Deviation 18.37231 Kurtosis -0.580 
Median of Differences 9.0000 Standard Error (Kurtosis) 0.845 
Minimum -25.000 Z-test Skewness 0.599 
Maximum 48.000 Remark on Normality due to Skewness (within t 1.96) Normal) 
Mode 5 Z-test Kurtosis -0.686 
Frequency of Mode 3 Remark on Normality due to Kurtosis (within f 1.96) Normal) 
--. _.. _. -.. __..... _... _.. __.. _ Test of Normality Using ... _.... _. _. _.... _.. _.... _-... ....... -_ ...... ............ -.... __. _... _. _.... ---............. _--.... --" 0.159 0.948 Shapiro-Wilk Test p-value Shapiro-Wilk W Statistic >0.10 (normal) 
Figure 8.3 - Histogram of the Difference of VD12002 and VD11997 
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The results of the Paired Samples t-test are summarized in Table 8.4a showing a 
highly significant result at a 1% level of significance (p-value < 0.01). This 
means that while the statistical null hypothesis of no decrease (or increase) in the 
level of voluntary disclosure after the implementation of AAOIFI standards is 
rejected, as there was indeed no decrease, there was in fact an increase in the 
level of voluntary disclosure after the implementation of AAOIFI standards, 
which is the contrary to what the researcher hypothesised. 
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Table 8.4a Univariate parametric test: Paired Samples t-test 
Paired Differences 
Pair 
Lower Upper 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
6(a) 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
Mean Sum of 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
t-test 
statistics df 
value 
2-tailed p- 
value 
(1-tailed 
p-value) 
VD12002 Level of Voluntary 0.000, * 
Disclosure-VDI1997 Level of 13.552 18.372 3.412 6.563 20.540 3.972 28 (0.000... ) 
Voluntary Disclosure 
"" Highly significant results (1% significance level) for two-tailed test indicating differences between level of voluntary disclosure in 2002 and 1997. 
'"" Highly significant (I % significance level) for one-tailed test indicating level of voluntary disclosure in 2002 is greater than those in 1997 
8.4.2. Univariate Nonparametric Test: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test 
The data sets for the level of voluntary disclosure before and after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards are continuous and their distributions are 
non-normal. Moreover, since the distribution of the signs of the differences differ 
and this information is important (see Table 8.4b) and magnitude of the 
difference between pairs is desired, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used in 
this study. 
Table 8.4b Univariate nonparametric test: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Paired Difference Ranks N 
Rank Ranks 
t'D12002 Level of Negative Ranks 9.92 59.50 
Volunlary Disclosure - Positive Ranks 23(b) 16.33 375.50 
VD11997 Level of Tics 
Voluntary Disclosure Total 
0I 
29 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test Statistics 
Z-value (Based on 
Asymp. Sig. 
negative ranks) 
2-tailed p-value 
(1-tailed p-value) 
-3.418 
0.001- 
(0.002***) 
"' Highly significant results (1% significance level) for two-tailed test indicating differences between level of voluntary disclosure in 2002 and 1997. 
"" Highly significant (1% significance level) for one-tailed test indicating level of voluntary disclosure in 2002 is greater than those in 1997 
a VDI2002 Level of Voluntary Disclosure < VD11997 Level of Voluntary Disclosure 
b VD12002 Level of Voluntary Disclosure > VDI1997 Level of Voluntary Disclosure 
c VD12002 Level of Voluntary Disclosure = VDI 1997 Level of Voluntary Disclosure 
The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test, sometimes called the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs test, 
considers information about both the sign of the paired differences and the 
magnitude of the differences between pairs. Because the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank 
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test incorporates more information about the data, it is more powerful than the 
other nonparametric test called sign test. 
At a 1% level of significance, the highly significant results of the Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank test (p-value < 0.01) are similar to those of the Paired Samples t- 
test. Thus, the null hypothesis of no decrease in the level of voluntary disclosure 
after the implementation of AAOIFI standards can not be rejected. Hence, there 
was an increase in the level of voluntary disclosure after the implementation of 
AAOIFI standards. 
8.5 Summary of Results 
Descriptive statistics and test of normality of the distribution for the level of 
voluntary disclosure (VDI) before and after the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards were presented in this chapter. 
The tests of normality using Shapiro Wilk W revealed nonnormal distribution for 
the untransformed level of voluntary disclosure. Different types of 
transformation were done on VDI to normalize its distribution. Transformation of 
the level of voluntary disclosure using normal scores (van der Waerden 
approach) and ranking resulted to normally distributed data. 
The paired differences of the level of voluntary disclosure after and before the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards were subjected to univariate parametric and 
nonparametric analyses to test the null hypothesis of no decrease in VDI in 2002: 
Hol There is no decrease in level of voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of the Islamic banks after the implementation of 
AAOIFI standards. 
Both parametric t-test on related/paired samples (parametric test) and nonparametric 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test yield highly significant results at a 1% level of 
significance, which means that we can not reject the null hypothesis of no 
decrease. In fact, there was an increase in the level of voluntary disclosure after 
the implementation of AAOIFI standards, an unexpected result which will be 
discussed in chapter 11. 
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Chapter 9 
Effect of Bank Specific Characteristics 
On The Level of Voluntary Disclosure: 
Empirical Findings 
9.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter 7 (the research design and methods), the disclosure practices of 
Islamic banks were analysed based on voluntary disclosure indices prepared for each 
bank. In this chapter, the relationships between several bank specific characteristics that 
have been theoretically hypothesised to be associated with voluntary disclosure were 
examined for the two periods before and after the implementation of AAOIFI standards, 
i. e. years 1997 and 2002 respectively. Seven continuous independent variables were 
considered as follows: 
- Proportion of non-executive board members. 
- Proportion of non-executive board members who are IAHs. 
- Ownership concentration. 81 
- Shareholders' profitability. 
82 
- IAHs' profitability. 83 
- Level of IAHs. 
84 
- Percentage of government ownership. 
In addition, one dummy variable was considered, namely the listing status of the Islamic 
banks. 
Descriptive statistics of the independent variables were reviewed. Each of the continuous 
independent variables was tested for normality. Non-normal continuous independent 
variables were subjected to transformation to be able to use them in the correlation and 
regression analyses. Non-parametric and parametric correlation measures were used for 
8' Measured as the % of equity holding by family members or small number of shareholders to the total 
amount of owners' equity. We have taken the % of ownership by the largest 5 owners. 82 Measured as the shareholders return over the average shareholders equity. 
8s Measured as the Unrestricted IAHs return over the average Unrestricted IAHs equity. 
84 Measured as the total IAHs funds over total assets. 
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continuous independent variables. Recoding of the continuous variables was done to be 
able to correlate them with a nominal (dichotomous/dummy) variable. Simple linear 
regression tests were utilized to determine individual independent variables affecting the 
level of voluntary disclosure. Moreover, multiple linear regression models were used 
based on the independent variables that satisfy assumptions of regression. 
9.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables 
Table 9.1 contains five columns of descriptive statistics of each of the untransformed 
independent variables hypothesised to affect the level of voluntary disclosure before and 
after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
Table 9.1 Descriptive statistics of untransformed independent variables before 
(VD11997) and after (VD12002) the implementation of AAOIFI standards 
AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF AAOIFI STANDARDS (2002) 
Descriptive Statistics of Untransformed Data 
Sample Size, n= 34 
Continuous Independent Variables 
IV212002 Board Composition 
- Non-Executive Members 
IV222002 Board Composition 
- IAH Members 
IV302002 Ownership Concentration 
IV512002 Profitabilityl - Shareholders 
IV522002 Profitability2 - IAHs 
IV602002 Level of IAHs 
IV702002 Government Ownership 
Dichotomous (Dummy) Variable 
IV402002 Listing Status 
(I=Listed, O=Not Listed) 
Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
39.95 27.50 35.408 0 100 
30.32 12.00 35.997 0 100 
64.74 69.00 30.331 5 100 
7.80 7.00 13.594 -37 32 
9.29 4.95 16.806 1 98 
32.15 15.50 30.137 1 87 
21.29 0.00 35.580 0 100 
0.65 1.00 0.485 0 I 
BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION OF AAOIFI STANDARDS (1997) 
Sample Size, n= 29 
Continuous Independent Variables 
IV211997 Board Composition 
- Non-Executive Members 
IV221997 Board Composition 
- IAH Members 
IV301997 Ownership Concentration 
IV511997 Profitability] - Shareholders 
IV521997 Profitability2 - IAHs 
IV601997 Level of IAHs 
IV701997 Government Ownership 
Dichotomous (Dummy) Variable 
IV401997 Listing Status 
I (1=Listed, O=Not Listed) 
Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
42.92 33.00 34.539 0 100 
28.24 10.00 36.757 0 100 
60.52 67.00 3 3.321 5 100 
7.24 8.00 15.454 -29 45 
46.55 52.00 29.336 1 91 
20.45 0.00 34.690 0 100 
0.69 1.00 0.471 01 
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The means (point estimates) in 2002 of four independent variables, namely: proportion of 
non-executive board members who are JAHs, ownership concentration, shareholder's 
profitability and percentage of government ownership were higher compared to the means 
in 1997. There are 34 sampled Islamic banks in 2002 and five of these Islamic banks did 
not exist in 1997. Among these five Islamic banks, three of them had no government 
ownership, one had 5% government ownership and the fifth had 90% government 
ownership. 
The values of the means in 2002 for the proportion of non-executive board members and 
the level of IAHs were lower compared to the reported means in 1997. The interpretation 
of the point estimates calculated in Table 9.1 before and after the implementation of 
AAOIFI standards are not associated with any level of confidence. 
Each of the independent variables in the study was tested for normality using Shapiro- 
Wilk (which is recommended for sample sizes between 3 and 2000)85 as summarised in 
Table 9.2. The table shows that only untransformed IV511997 (shareholder's 
profitability) is normally distributed since the p-value of the Shapiro Wilk statistic is 
greater than 0.10 (10% level of significance). The distributions of all other untransformed 
independent variables in the sampled Islamic banks before and after the implementation 
of AAOIFI standards are all non-normal as their calculated significance probabilities (p- 
values) of the Shapiro-Wilk W statistics are less than the 10% level of significance. 
The results of the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality for all untransformed continuous 
independent variables showed non-normal distributions, except for IV511997. Thus, 
transformation by using normal scores (The z scores corresponding to the estimated 
cumulative proportion using Van der Waerden proportion estimation formula) and simple 
ranking were utilized. These two types of transformation were used because the 
transformations for VD12002 and VD11997 resulted to normally distributed variables, 
namely: NVDI2002, RVDI2002, NVD11997 and RVD11997 as shown in Chapter 8. This 
attempt to use similar transformation techniques for both dependent variable and 
continuous independent variables was aimed for multiple regression modeling. It is 
as See NIST (n. d). 
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important for the study to be able to use transformations that lead to normally distributed 
variables. 
Table 9.2 Test of normality of untransformed independent variables in 2002 & 1997 
After the Implementation of Before the Implementation Untransformed AAOIFI Standards - 2002 Untransfornted of AAOIFI Standards - 1997 Independent Independent 
V i Sha iro-Wilk W Sha iro-Wilk ar ables (2002) Variables (1997) W P- W p- 
Statistic value Remark Statistic value Remark 
IV212002 Board 
C i i 0 873 0 001 10 <0.10 
1V211997 Board 
0 895 0 007 <0.10 ompos t on) - Non- . . - Non- . . Executive Members (not normal) Executive Members (not normal) 
IV222002 Board <0.10 IV221997 Board <0.10 Composition2 - IAH 0.779 0.000 Composition2 - IAH 0.753 0.000 Members (not normal) Members (not normal) 
IV302002 Ownership <0.10 IV301997 Ownership <0.10 Concentration -% Shares 0.906 0.007 Concentration -% 0.892 0.006 
of Owners (not normal) Shares of Owners not normal) 
IV402002 Listing Status IV401997 Listing 
1=Listed, O=Not Listed) Dichotomous Variable Status ( 1=Listed, O=Not Dichotomous Variable 
Listed) 
IV512002 Profitability) - <0.10 
IV511997 
X0 . 10 Shareholders 0.923 0.019 Proftabilityl - 0.94 0.102 (not normal) Shareholders normal 
IV522002 Profitability2 - 0 443 000 0 <0.10 IV521997 u IAIIs . . (not normal) 
Profitability2-IAHs NO DATA 
IV602002 L l f IAH 0 838 0 000 <0.10 IV601997 Level of <0.10 eve o s . . (not normal) 
[Alls 0.919 0.028 (not normal) 
IV702002 Government <0.10 IV701997 Government <0.10 
Ownership 0.63 0.000 Ownership 0.626 0.000 (not normal) (not normal) 
9.3 Transforming Independent Variables 
Table 9.3 shows the results of the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality for all untransformed 
and transformed continuous independent variables in the 2002 dataset. Normality was 
achieved by data transformation for five continuous independent variables using normal 
scores (Van der Waerden proportion estimation formula) and for two independent 
continuous variables using simple ranking. 
86 The data for 1997 were not available, because before implementation of AAOIFI accounting 
standards, there were different methods of profit recognition which could be applied by the 
Islamic banks to allocate the profits between shareholders and IAHs, and one can hardly find 
any information disclosed about the bases of profit allocation between shareholders and IAHs, a 
lack which prompted AAOIFI to address this issue in one of its accounting standards. 
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Table 9.3 Tests of normality of untransformed independent variables and transformed 
independent variables (normal scores using Van der Waerden and Ranking) at a 10% level 
of significance for 2002 Data 
f AAOIFI i S ha iro-Wilk 
W 
on o After the Implementat 
Standards (2002) W Sig. Remark 
Statistic df -value 
IV212002 Board Compositionl - Non-Executive Members 0.873 34 0.00095** not normal 
NIV212002 NORMAL of IV212002 using VW 0.954 34 0.16346ns normal 
RIV212002 RANK of IV212002 0.933 34 0.03832* not normal 
IV222002 Board Composition2 - IAH Members 0.779 34 0.00001** not normal 
NIV222002 NORMAL ofIV222002 using VW 0.876 34 0.00111** not normal 
RIV222002 RANK of IV222002 0.859 34 0.00045** not normal 
IV302002 Ownership Concentration -% Shares of Owners 0.906 34 0.00656** not normal 
NIV302002 NORMAL of IV302002 using VW 0.952 34 0.13691°S normal 
RIV302002 RANK of IV302002 0.928 34 0.0282* not normal 
IV402002 Listing Status ( 1=Listed, O=Not Listed) Dummy Variable 
1V512002 Profitabilityl - Shareholders 0.923 34 0.0191* not normal 
NIV512002 NORMAL of IV512002 using VW 0.995 34 0.999721 s normal 
RIV512002 RANK of 1V512002 0.956 34 0.19138"5 normal 
IV522002 Profitability2 - IAHs 0.443 34 0.00000** not normal 
NIV522002 NORMAL of IV522002 using VW 0.982 34 0.82668ns normal 
RIV522002 RANK of IV522002 0.950 34 0.12547ns normal 
IV602002 Level oflAHs 0.838 34 0.00015** not normal 
NIV602002 NORMAL of IV602002 using VW 0.976 34 0.63125°S normal 
RIV602002 RANK of IV602002 0.947 34 0.09871s not normal 
IV702002 Government Ownership 0.630 34 0.00000** not normal 
NIV702002 NORMAL of IV702002 using VW 0.786 34 0.00001 ** not normal 
RIV702002 RANK of IV702002 0.773 34 0.00001** not normal 
'" -significant at 1% *- significant at 5% s- significant at 10% ns - not significant at 10% 
Figure 9.1 Histogram and test of normality of untransformed and transformed IV212002. 
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Figure 9.1 shows the results of the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality and histograms of non- 
normal untransformed IV212002 (proportion of non-executive board members) and 
transformed variables - NIV212002 and RIV212002. Normality was achieved for 
NIV212002 which is transformed IV212002 using normal scores (Van der Waerden). The 
Shapiro Wilk test statistic had a p-value of 0.16346 which greater than 0.10 indicating 
normality. The shape of the histograms also indicates the normally distributed 
NIV212002 which resembles a bell-shape normal curve. 
For the proportion of non-executive board members who are IAHs, the untransformed 
IV222002, has a non-normal distribution. Its histogram together with the histograms of 
transformed variables - NIV222002 (normal scores) and RIV222002 (simple ranks), with 
the results of the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality are shown in Figure 9.2. The calculated 
Shapiro Wilk test statistics had p-values less than 0.10 for the untransformed IV222002, 
transformed NIV222002 and RIV222002 which indicates non-normality. Moreover, the 
shapes of the histograms do not resemble the bell-shape normal curve. It can also be 
noted that this is due to the presence of many non-missing zero values in the 
untransformed IV222002. Thirteen out of 34 Islamic banks in 2002 had no non-executive 
board members who are IAHs which represents around 38.2%. These non-missing zero 
values are important to the overall objectives of this study. Therefore, they cannot be 
isolated or deleted. 
Figure 9.2 Histogram and test of normality of untransformed and transformed IV222002. 
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The histograms for the non-normal untransformed IV302002 (ownership concentration) 
and transformed variables - NIV302002 and RIV302002, as well as the results of the 
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality are shown in Figure 9.3. Transformation using normal 
scores (NIV302002) normalised the distribution of ownership concentration, while 
transformation using simple ranks (RIV302002) did not. 
Figure 9.3 Histogram and test of normality of untransformed and transformed IV302002. 
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Both transformations of the IV512002 (shareholder's profitability) using normal scores 
(NIV512002) and simple ranking (NIV512002) resulted to normality based on the shape 
of the histograms and Shapiro Wilk test of normality as shown in Figure 9.4. 
Figure 9.4 Histogram and test of normality of untransformed and transformed IV512002. 
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Normality was also achieved from the transformation of IV522002 (IAHs profitability) 
using normal scores (NIV522002) and simple ranking (NIV522002) which resulted to 
normality as shown in Figure 9.5. 
Figure 9.5 Histogram and test of normality of untransformed and transformed IV522002. 
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Non-normal untransformed independent variable level of IAHs (IV602002) was only 
normally distributed when transformation using normal scores (NIV602002) was done. 
Transformation using simple ranking (RIV602002) did not result to normality. These 
results are drawn in the histograms and Shapiro Wilk test of normality in Figure 9.6. 
Figure 9.6 Histogram and test of normality of untransformed and transformed IV602002. 
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Government ownership, (untransformed IV702002), has a non-normal distribution as 
seen in its histogram shown in Figure 9.7. The histogram has a skew to the right showing 
many Islamic banks having less government ownership. 
Similar shapes were derived for histograms of transformed variables - NIV702002 
(normal scores) and RIV702002 (simple ranks). Moreover, the results of the Shapiro- 
Wilk test of normality had test statistics with p-values less than 0.10 (indicating non- 
normality) for the untransformed IV702002 and transformed NIV702002 and 
RIV702002. This is due to the presence of many non-missing zero values in the 
untransformed IV702002 where 18 out of 34 Islamic banks (52.9%) had no government 
ownership (100% private ownership). 
Figure 9.7 Histogram and test of normality of untransformed and transformed IV702002. 
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The histogram of the dichotomous independent variable of listing status (IV402002) is 
shown in Figure 9.8. It shows that 22 Islamic banks in 2002 are listed in the stock exchange 
commissions. This represents 64.71 % of the 34 Islamic banks in 2002. 
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Figure 9.8 Histogram of Untransformed Dichotomous Independent Variable IV402002. 
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Table 9.4 shows the results of the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality for all untransformed 
and transformed continuous independent variables in the 1997 dataset. Normality was 
achieved for four independent variables using normal scores (Van der Waerden formula) 
and for three independent variables using simple ranking. 
It should be noted that normally distributed shareholders' profitability (IV511997) was 
transformed for batch processing purposes only. As expected the transformation of this 
normally distributed variable using normal scores and simple ranking resulted to normally 
distributed variables NIV511997 and RIV511997. 
Table 9.4 Tests of normality of untransformed independent variables and transformed 
independent variables (normal scores using Van der Waerden and ranking) at a 10% level 
of significance for 1997 Data 
B f h I l i f AAOIFI S hapiro-Wilk W e ore t e mp ementat on o 
Standards (1997) W Sig. 
Statistic df -value Remark 
IV211997 Board Compositionl - Non-Executive Members 0.895 29 0.00743** not normal 
NIV211997 NORMAL of IV211997 using VW 0.972 29 0.6017605 normal 
RIV211997 RANK of IV211997 0.945 29 0.1355705 normal 
IV221997 Board Composition2 - IAH Members 0.753 29 0.00001** not normal 
NIV221997 NORMAL of IV221997 using VW 0.833 29 0.00035** not normal 
RIV221997 RANK of IV221997 0.822 29 0.00021** not normal 
IV301997 Ownership Concentration -% Shares of Owners 0.892 29 0.00632** not normal 
NIV301997 NORMAL of IV301997 using VW 0.952 29 0.200760$ normal 
RIV301997 RANK of IV301997 0.929 29 0.05215s not normal 
IV401997 Listing Status ( 1=Listed, O=Not Listed) Dummy Variable 
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IV511997 Profitabilityl -Shareholders 0.940 29 0.10193°S normal 
NIV511997 NORMAL of IV511997 using VW 0.993 29 0.99926' normal 
RIV511997 RANK of IV511997 0.956 29 0.26637n s normal 
IV521997 Profitability2 - IAHs No Data 
IV601997 Level oflAHs 0.919 29 0.02836* not normal 
NIV601997 NORMAL of IV601997 using VW 0.987 29 0.96619°S normal 
RIV601997 RANK of IV601997 0.951 29 0.19376°S normal 
IV701997 Government Ownership 0.626 29 0.00000** not normal 
NIV701997 NORMAL of IV701997 using VW 0.759 29 0.00002** not normal 
RIV701997 RANK of IV701997 0.750 29 0.00001** not normal 
** - significant at 1% *- significant at 5% s- significant at 10% ns - not significant at 10% 
Figure 9.9 shows the results of the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality and histograms of non- 
normal untransformed 1V211997 (proportion of non-executive board members) and 
normally distributed transformed variables - NIV211997 and RIV211997. The shape of 
the histograms also indicates the normally distributed NIV211997 and RIV211997 which 
both resembles the bell-shape normal curves. 
Figure 9.9 Histogram and test of normality of untransformed and transformed IV211997. 
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The proportion of non-executive board members who are IAHs (untransformed 
IV221997) has a non-normal distribution. Its histogram does not resemble a bell shaped 
normal curve as seen in Figure 9.10. Similar flat histograms of the transformed variables 
- NIV221997 (normal scores) and RIV221997 (simple ranks), were derived. NIV221997 
and RIV221997 had calculated Shapiro Wilk test p-values of less than 0.10 which 
indicates non-normality. This is due to the presence of many non-missing zero values in 
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the untransformed IV221997 where 13 out of the 29 Islamic banks (44.8%) had no non- 
executive board members who are IAHs in 1997. 
Figure 9.10 Histogram and test of normality of untransformed and transformed IV221997. 
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The histograms for the non-normal untransformed IV301997 (ownership concentration) 
and transformed variables - NIV301997 and RIV301997, as well as the results of the 
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality are shown in Figure 9.11. Transformation using normal 
scores (NIV301997) normalised the distribution of ownership concentration while 
transformation using simple ranking (RIV301997) did not. Only the histogram of the 
normal scores NIV301997 resembles a bell-shaped normal curve, unlike the flatter 
histograms of IV301997 and RIV301997. 
Figure 9.11 Histogram and test of normality of untransformed and transformed IV301997. 
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Both transformations of the normal IV511997 (shareholder's profitability) using normal 
scores (NIV511997) and simple ranking (NIV511997) resulted to normality based on the 
shape of the histograms and Shapiro Wilk test as shown in Figure 9.12. 
Figure 9.12 Histogram and test of normality of untransformed and transformed 
IV511997. 
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Non-normal untransformed independent variable IV601997 (level of IAHs) was 
transformed using normal scores (NIV601997) and using simple ranking (RIV601997). 
Both transformations resulted to normally distributed variables based on the results drawn 
in the histograms and Shapiro Wilk test of normality in Figure 9.13. 
Figure 9.13 Histogram and test of normality of untransformed and transformed 
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Government ownership, (untransformed IV701997), has a non-normal distribution with as 
seen in its histogram shown in Figure 9.14. The histogram has a skew to the right showing 
many Islamic banks having less government ownership. Similar shapes are shown in the 
histograms of transformed variables - NIV701997 (normal scores) and RIV701997 (ranks). 
Moreover, the results of the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality had test statistics with p-values 
less than 0.10 (indicating non-normality) for the untransformed IV701997 and transformed 
NIV701997 and RIV701997. This is due to the presence of many non-missing zero values 
in the untransformed IV701997. More than half (55.2%) i. e. 16 out of the 29, of the Islamic 
banks had no government ownership (100% private ownership). 
Figure 9.14 Histogram and test of normality of untransformed and transformed IV701997. 
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The histogram of the dichotomous/dummy independent variable of listing status 
(IV401997) is shown in Figure 9.15 showing 20 Islamic banks in 1997 were listed in the 
stock exchange commissions. This represents 68.97% of the 29 Islamic banks in 1997. 
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Figure 9.15 Histogram of Untransformed Independent Variable IV401997. 
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Transformations using normal scores (Van der Waerden proportion estimation formula) 
resulted to five normally distributed transformed continuous independent variables for the 
2002 dataset (71.43%) and four normally distributed transformed continuous independent 
variables for the 1997 data set (66.67%). On the other hand, transformations using simple 
ranking normalised tests resulted in a smaller number of transformed continuous 
independent variables, i. e., two in 2002 dataset (28.57%) and two in 1997 dataset (33.33%). 
Since it is the purpose of this study to perform correlation and regression tests, 
transformation using normal scores will be highlighted in the remaining sections of this 
chapter. 
9.4 Bivariate Tests: The Determinants of Level of Voluntary Disclosure 
Before and After the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards 
There are two types of independent variables in this study - continuous and dichotomous 
(nominal). The level of voluntary disclosure is a continuous dependent variable. Most of the 
independent variables considered by the study are continuous except for listing status which 
is nominal with dichotomous responses (1=listed, 0=not listed). 
Correlation is a bivariate measure of association (strength) of the relationship between two 
variables. There are two types of most commonly used correlation coefficients that can be 
calculated for pairs of continuous variables - parametric Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficient (r) and the nonparametric Spearman's correlation co-efficient (rho). 
However, when one of the variables is nominal (dichotomous), the continuous variable is 
134 
Chapter 9 Data Analysis and Conclusions 
then recoded to convert it to nominal level of measurement. Furthermore, Cramer's V can 
be calculated. 
Cramer's V87 is the most popular of the chi-square-based measures of nominal association 
because it gives good norming from 0 to 1 regardless of the table size, when row marginals 
equal column marginals. V equals the square root of the chi-square divided by the sample 
size, n, times m, which is the smaller of (rows - 1) or (columns - 1). Hence, the formula is: 
V= SQRT(X'/nm). 
The Cramer's V correlation coefficient was calculated for the dichotomous dummy variable 
(listing status) after performing a Chi-square test of association with the recoded values of 
the level of disclosure (recoded as Low--O to 33.33, Moderate=33.34 to 66.66 and 
High=66.67 to 100). 
The summary of the univariate tests on the correlation coefficients of the untransformed 
and (transformed) normal scores of the level of voluntary disclosure and the independent 
variables are presented in Tables 9.5 to 9.15. 
In addition to the sign (positive/negative) of the correlation coefficient, the verbal 
designation of the numeric value of a correlation coefficient can be described in words, as 
shown in the following table: 
Verbal Designation Chart of Absolute Value of Correlation Coefficient". 
Correlation Absolute Value Size Verbal Designation 
0 No relationship / No association 
0.01-0.10 Very weak 
0.11-0.25 Weak 
0.26-0.50 Moderate 
0.51-0.75 Strong 
0.76-0.99 Very strong 
I Perfect association 
8' Liebetrau, Albert M. (1983). Measures of association. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences Series No. 32, pages 15-16. 
88 Adopted from Losh (2002). 
i 
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9.4.1 Level of voluntary disclosure and proportion of non-executive board 
members 
The study tested the null hypotheses that there is no association between the proportion of 
non-executive members on the board and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of Islamic banks. 
After the implementation of AAOIFI standards, the bivariate analysis of 34 sample 
Islamic banks in 2002 shown in Table 9.5 reported a positive moderate Spearman's 
correlation coefficient (rho=0.2685) between untransformed VD12002 and untransformed 
1V212002. A positive weak Pearson correlation coefficient (r = 0.2295) between 
NVDI2002 and normally distributed (transformed) NIV212002 was obtained. Both of 
these correlation coefficients are positive and are significant at a 10% level of 
significance thereby prompting us to reject the null hypothesis of no association. Thus, 
based on the 2002 dataset, there is an association (which is positive) between the 
proportion of non-executive members on the board and the level of voluntary disclosure 
in the annual reports of Islamic banks. 
Table 9.5 Correlation coefficients of untransformed and transformed (normal 
scores) of the level of voluntary disclosure with proportion of non-executive board 
members before and after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
After the Im lementation of AAOIFI Standards 2002), n=34 
Spearman's rho 
Untransformed Correlation Transformed 
Pearson Correlation 
Coefficient 
Continuous Coefficient Continuous 
Independent Variable VD12002 Level of 
Independent Variable NVD12002 NORMAL of 
Voluntary Disclosure VD12002 using VW 
IV212002 Board 
Compositionl - Non- 
0.268s NIV212002 NORMAL 0.229s 
Executive Members (p-value-0.063) of IV212002 using VW (p-value=0.096) 
Before the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (1997), n=29 
Spearman's rho 
Untransformed Correlation 
Pearson Correlation 
Continuous Independent Coefficient Transformed Continuous 
Coefficient 
Variable VDI1997 Level of 
Independent Variable 
NVD11997 NORMAL of 
Voluntary Disclosure VD11997 using VW 
IV211997 Board 
Compositionl - Non- 
0.342* NIV211997 NORMAL 0.303' 
Executive Members (p-value=0.035) of IV211997 using VW (p-value=0.055) 
- Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
S -Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed). 
Ns - Correlation is not significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed). 
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The test of significance of the transformed variables summarised in Table 9.5 reveals that 
before the implementation of AAOIFI standards the level of voluntary disclosure among 
Islamic banks in 1997 had moderate positive association with the proportion of non- 
executive members on the board at a 10% level of significance. Positive moderate 
correlation coefficients of rho = 0.342` (significant at 5% level of significance) and 
r=0.303` (significant at 10% level of significance) were calculated. Thus, based on the 
1997 dataset, there is an association (which is positive) between the proportion of non- 
executive members on the board and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of Islamic banks. 
Few previous empirical studies tested the relationship between the proportion of non- 
executive members on board and the level of voluntary disclosure. For example, Chen 
and Jaggi (2000) found that there is a positive relationship between the proportion of non- 
executive directors on board and the level of financial disclosure by the companies in 
Hong Kong. However, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found that the level of voluntary 
disclosure in by Malaysian companies is not positively related to the number of 
independent non-executive directors on board. 
9.4.2 Level of voluntary disclosure and proportion of non-executive board 
members who are IAHs 
The test of significance of the association between the proportion of non-executive board 
members who are IAHs and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Islamic banks revealed that the association was not significant at all for both before and 
after the implementation of AAOIFI standards (as seen in table 9.6). Very weak positive 
correlation coefficients were obtained in 2002 (r=0.045"S, rho=0.047"S). Thus, we were 
not able to reject the null hypotheses that there is no association between the proportion 
of non-executive boards members who are IAHs and the level of voluntary disclosure in 
the annual reports of Islamic banks. Similar results were obtained for 1997. 
ý 
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Table 9.6 Correlation coefficients of untransformed and transformed (normal 
scores) of the level of voluntary disclosure with proportion of non-executive board 
members who are IAHs before and after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
After the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (2002), n=34 
Spearman's rho Pearson Correlation 
Untransformed Correlation Transformed Coefficient 
Continuous Coefficient Continuous 
Independent Variable VD12002 Level of 
Independent Variable NVDI2002 NORMAL of 
Voluntary Disclosure VD12002 using VW 
IV222002 Board 0 045 
NIV222002 0.047 °' 
Composition2 - IAHs . (p-value=0.4) 
NORMAL of (p_value=0.395) 
Members IV222002 using VW 
Before the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (1997), n=29 
Spearman's rho Pearson Correlation 
Untransformed Correlation Transformed Coefficient 
Continuous Coefficient Continuous 
Independent Variable VD11997 Level of 
Independent Variable NVD11997 NORMAL of 
Voluntary Disclosure VDI1997 using VW 
IV221997 Board 0.043 NIV221997 NORMAL 0.065 Composition2 - IAHs (p-value=0.413) of IV221997 using VW (p-value=0.368) Members 
ns - Correlation is not significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed). 
9.4.3 Level of voluntary disclosure and ownership concentration 
Table 9.7 shows that the ownership concentration within Islamic banks is not associated 
with the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports after the implementation of 
AAOIFI standards. Very weak negative correlation coefficients for IV302002 and 
VD12002 (r=-0.072°S) and for NIV302002 and NVDI2002 (rho=-0.041°S) were obtained. 
Both of them are not significant at a 10% level of significance. 
Table 9.7 also shows that before the implementation of AAOIFI standards, the level of 
voluntary disclosure is associated with ownership concentration. Moderate negative 
correlation coefficients for IV301997 and VD11997 (r=-0.2915) and for NIV301997 and 
NVD11997 (rho=-0.2675) were obtained. These are both significant at a 10% level of 
significance. 
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Table 9.7 Correlation coefficients of untransformed and transformed (normal 
scores) of the level of voluntary disclosure with ownership concentration before and 
after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
After the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (2002), n=34 
Spearman's rho Untransformed Correlation Transformed 
Pearson Correlation 
Continuous 
I d d 
Coefficient Continuous 
Coefficient 
n epen ent 
Variable VD12002 Level of Independent Variable NVDI2002 NORMAL of 
Voluntary Disclosure VD12002 using VW 
IV302002 
Ownership -0.072 
NIV302002 
-0.041"5 Concentration -% (p-value=0.342) 
NORMAL of (p-value=0.41) 
Shares of Owners 
IV302002 using VW 
Before the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (1997), n=29 
Spearman's rho 
Untransformed Correlation Pearson Correlation 
Continuous Coefficient 
Transformed Coefficient 
Continuous Independent 
Variable VD11997 Level of Independent Variable NVDI1997 NORMAL of 
Voluntary Disclosure VD11997 using VW 
IV301997 Ownership 
Concentration -% -0.291 
s NIV301997 NORMAL -0.267' 
Shares of Owners 
(p-value=0.063) of IV301997 using VW (p-value=0.080) 
s- Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed). 
Ns - Correlation is not significant at the 0.10 level (I-tailed). 
The results of this study for the year 2002 concerning the relationship between the level 
of voluntary disclosure and the ownership concentration are not consistent with the 
theoretical hypothesis and the results of some of previous empirical researches, for 
example, Singhvi and Desai (1974) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002), reasons and 
explanations for this are discussed in chapter 11. However, the results are consistent with 
a number of studies conducted in "developing" or "less developed" countries, for 
example, Chen and Jaggi (2000), Naser et al. (2002), Chau and Gray (2002) and Alsaeed 
(2005). 
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9.4.4 Level of voluntary disclosure and listing status 
Data Analysis and Conclusions 
Table 9.8 shows that listing status of Islamic banks in their country's Stock Exchange 
Commissions is not associated with the bank's level of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports before and after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
Table 9.8 Nominal correlation coefficients for Listing Status (IV402002 and 
IV401997) with categorized values of level of voluntary disclosure. 
IV402002 - Listing Status 
(b) 
Nominal Approx. 
2002 Correlation Value Sig. Remarks Coefficient (p-value) 
CATVDI2002 
- Categorized VDI2002 Cramer's V 0.280 0.264 
Not 
Significant 
(a) 
N of Valid Cases 34 
IV401997 - Listing Status 
(b) 
Nominal Approx. 
1997 Correlation Value Sig. Remarks Coefficient ( value) 
CATVDI1997 
- Categorized VD11997 Cramer's V 0.220 0.496 
Not 
Significant 
(a) 
N of Valid Cases 29 
(a) Categorised VD12002 (CATVDI2002) or Categorised VDII997 (CATVDI1997) values were recoded from 
original values of VD12002 or VD11997 using: 
ILow = Lowest to 33.33, 
2Moderate= 33.34 to 66.66, 
3High = 66.67 and Above 
(b) IV402002 -Listing Status (I =Listed, O=Not Listed) 
As described earlier, the continuous dependent variables of the level of voluntary 
disclosure - VD12002 and VD11997, were recoded as nominal variables - CATVDI2002 
and CATVDI1997 using 1Low=Lowest to 33.33,2Moderate=33.34 to 66.66, 
3High=66.67 and above. The calculated values of Cramer's V are 0.280"S (moderate 
correlation) in 2002 and 0.220"s (weak correlation) in 1997. The Cramer's V correlation 
coefficients showed not significant results at a 10% level of significance before and after 
the implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
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The results of this study regarding the relationship between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and the listing status are not consistent with the theoretical hypothesis and the 
results of most of previous empirical researches which found positive relationship, for 
example, Singhvi and Desai (1974), Firth (1979), Cooke (1989a), Cooke (1992), Frost 
and Pownal (1994), Raffournier (1995), Hossain et al. (1995), Ahmed and Courtis 
(1999), and Hamid (2004). Reasons and explanations for this are discussed in 
chapter 11. 
9.4.5 Level of voluntary disclosure and shareholders' profitability 
The summary results of the test of significance of the Spearman's correlation coefficient 
in Table 9.9 shows that before the implementation of AAOIFI standards, the shareholders 
profitability was positively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of Islamic banks. 
The calculated Spearman's correlation coefficient (rho=0.33*, moderate 
correlation) was significant at a 5% level of significance. Using the transformed 
variables NIV511997 and NVDI2002, the calculated Pearson correlation coefficient 
(r=0.311 S, moderate correlation) was significant at a 10% level of significance. 
However, for the period after the implementation of AAOIFI standards in 2002, the 
calculated Spearman's correlation coefficient (rho=0.139"S, weak correlation) for 
IV51202 and VD12002 and the Pearson correlation coefficient (r=0.163"5, weak 
correlation) for NIV51202 and NVDI2002 are both not significant at a 10% level of 
significance. Thus, there is neither an association between the normal scores of level of 
voluntary disclosure in 2002 and the normal scores of shareholders' profitability nor the 
untransformed shareholders' profitability. 
Table 9.9 Correlation coefficients of untransformed and transformed (normal 
scores) of the level of voluntary disclosure with shareholders' profitability before 
and after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
After the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (2002), n=34 
Spearman's rho 
Untransformed Correlation Transformed 
Pearson Correlation 
Continuous Coefficient Continuous 
Coefficient 
Independent Variable VD12002 Level of Independent Variable NVDI2002 NORMAL of 
Voluntary Disclosure VD12002 using VW 
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IV512002 
Profitability) - 0.13905 
NIV512002 
163°' 0 
Shareholders (p-value=0.216) NORMAL of . (p-value=0.179) 
IV512002 using VW 
Before the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (1997), n=29 
Spearman's rho 
Untransformed Correlation 
Pearson Correlation 
Continuous Coefficient Continuous nt 
Coefficient 
Independent Variable VD11997 Level of 
Independent Variable NVDI1997 NORMAL of 
Voluntary Disclosure VD11997 using VW 
IV511997 Profitabilityl 0.33* NIV511997 NORMAL 0.3115 
- Shareholders (p-value-0.040) of IV511997 using VW (p-value=0.050) 
*- Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
S- Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed). 
Ns - Correlation is not significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed). 
The results of testing for the relationship of shareholders profitability with the 
level of voluntary disclosure thought it is not consistent with the theoretical 
hypothesis, but it is consistent with some of the previous studies empirical results, 
because those studies gave mixed results. For example, Cerf (1961), Singhvi and 
Desai (1974), Ng and Koh (1994), Raffournier (1995), Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
and Naser et al. (2002)89 found that there is a positive relationship between the 
profitability and the level of disclosure. On the other hand, there are some 
researches that found that there is no significant relationship between the level of 
voluntary disclosure and the profitability, for example, Ahmed and Courtis 
(1999), Naser et al. (2002)90, Hamid (2004) and Alsaeed (2005). 
9.4.6 Level of voluntary disclosure and IAHs profitability 
Table 9.10 shows that for the 2002 data set91 (after the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards) there was a significant negative moderate correlation (based on Spearman's 
rho=-0.377) between IAHs profitability and the level of voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of Islamic banks. The calculated Pearson correlation coefficient 
(r=-0.2535, negative moderate correlation) is significant at 10% level of 
confidence. Reasons and explanations for this are discussed in chapter 11. 
89 Used "profit margin" to measure profitability. 90 Used "return on equity" to measure profitability. 91 There is no data on IAHs profitability in the 1997 data set. 
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Table 9.10 Correlation coefficients of untransformed and transformed (normal 
scores) of the level of voluntary disclosure with IAHs profitability after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
After the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (2002), n=34 
Spearman's rho Pearson Correlation Corr 
Untransformed Correlation Transformed Coefficient 
Continuous Coefficient Continuous 
Independent Variable VDI2002 Level of Independent Variable NVDI2002 NORMAL of 
Voluntary Disclosure VD12002 using VW 
IV522002 -0 377* 
NIV522002 
-0.2535 
Profitability2 - IAHs 
. (p-value 0.014) 
NORMAL of 
IV522002 using VW 
(p-value=0.074) 
*- Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
S -Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed). 
Ns - Correlation is not significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed). 
9.4.7 Level of voluntary disclosure and the level of IAHs 
The level of IAHs and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Islamic banks are positively associated at a 10% (even at a 5%) level of significance 
before (1997) and after (2002) the implementation of AAOIFI standards. Moderate 
positive values of the correlation coefficient (Spearman's rho) of the untransformed 
variables were calculated as shown in Table 9.11 with rho=0.338 in 1997 and rho=0.389 
in 2002. Moderate positive values of the Pearson correlation coefficient were calculated 
as r=0.320` in 1997 (for NVD11997 and NIV601997) and r=0.367` in 2002 (for 
NVDI2002 and NIV602002). 
Table 9.11 Correlation coefficients of untransformed and transformed (normal 
scores) of the level of voluntary disclosure with level of IAHs before and after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
After the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (2002), n=34 
Spearman's rho Pearson Correlation 
Untransformed Correlation Transformed Coefficient 
Continuous Coefficient Continuous 
Independent Variable VD12002 Level of 
Independent Variable NVDI2002 NORMAL of 
Voluntary Disclosure VD12002 using VW 
IV602002 Level of 
IAHs 
NIV602002 
0389* NORMAL of 
0.367* 
(p-value=0.012) 
IV602002 using VW 
(p-valuc=0.016) 
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Before the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (1997), n=29 
Spearman's rho 
Correlation Pearson Correlation Untransformed Transformed Coefficient 
Continuous Coefficient Continuous 
Independent Variable VD11997 Level of 
Independent Variable NVD1l997 NORMAL of 
Voluntary Disclosure VD11997 using VW 
IV601997 Level of IAH 
0.338* NIV601997 NORMAL 0.320* 
(p-value=0.036) of IV601997 using VW (p-value=0.045) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (I-tailed). 
9.4.8 Level of voluntary disclosure and government ownership 
Table 9.12 shows that at a 10% (even at a 5%) level of significance, the government 
ownership among Islamic banks (untransformed and normal scores) and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks (untransformed and 
normal scores) are negatively associated. Inspection of the Spearman's correlation 
coefficient (rho) revealed moderate negative correlation values of rho = -0.333` in 2002 
and rho=-0.323* in 1997 (both significant at 5% level of significance). Moderate negative 
Pearson correlation coefficient values of r= -0.303* in 2002 and rho = -0.337` in 1997 
and are significant at 5% level of significance. 
Table 9.12 Correlation coefficients of untransformed and transformed (normal 
scores) of the level of voluntary disclosure with proportion of non-executive IAH 
board members before and after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
After the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (2002), n=34 
Spearman's rho Correlation Pearson Corr 
Untransformed Correlation Transformed Coefficient n Continuous Coefficient Continuous 
Independent Variable VD12002 Level of Independent Variable NVD12002 NORMAL of 
Voluntary Disclosure VD12002 using VW 
IV702002 
Government 
Ownership 
NIV702002 
-0.333* NORMAL of -0.303* (p-value=0.027) IV702002 using VW 
(p-value=0.041) 
Before the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (1997), n=29 
Untransformed Spearman's rho Transformed 
Continuous Correlation Continuous Pearson Correlation 
Independent Variable Coefficient Independent Variable Coefficient 
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VDI1997 Level of NVDI1997 NORMAL of 
Voluntary Disclosure VD11997 using VW 
IV701997 Government -0.323* NIV701997 NORMAL -0.337* Ownership (p-value=0.044) of IV701997 using VW (p-value=0.037) 
*- Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (I-tailed). 
The previous section showed the results derived from the test of the significance of the 
Spearman's correlation coefficient, rho (for all untransformed continuous independent 
variables with the untransformed level of voluntary disclosure), Pearson correlation 
coefficient r (for all normal scores of continuous independent variables with the normal 
scores of level of voluntary disclosure), and the Cramer's V correlation coefficient for the 
dichotomous variable. The results of the values and test of significance of the correlation 
coefficients using Spearman's rho and using Pearson r were almost similar in terms of 
verbal interpretation. 
9.5 Correlations Among Independent Variables 
It is the aim of this study to fit a reasonable multiple regression model of the level of 
voluntary disclosure with the normally distributed continuous independent variables and 
the dichotomous independent variable. One of the important restrictions in multiple 
regression analysis is having no multicollinearity among the independent variables. The 
rule of thumb for checking the problem of multicollinearity is when the correlation is 
>0.780 (Gujarati, 1995). 
Table 9.13 shows the Spearman correlation matrices among untransformed independent 
variables before and after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. Highlighted 
correlation values represent correlation coefficients which are significant at 10% level of 
significance (at least). 
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Table 9.13 Spearman correlation coefficient matrices of untransformed continuous 
independent variables before and after implementation of AAOIFI Standards. 
After the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards 2002 
1V60200 
16212001 1V222002 1V302002 IV512002 1V522002 1 1V702002 
Untransformed Continuous Non- 
Independent Variable Executive 1AH Board Ownership Shareholders' IAH Level of Government 
Board Members Concentration Profitability Profitability IAH Ownership 
Members 
IV212002 Non-Executive Board 
Members 1.000 
16222002 IAH Board Members 0.118°5 1.000 
JV302002 Ownership Concentration -0.021 
n5 -0.484** 1.000 
1V512002 Shareholders' Profitability 0.1185 0.370* -0.086ns 1.000 
IV5220021AHProfitability -0.112°S -0.038ns 0.316* 0.116°5 
1.000 
IV602002 Levelof1AH -0.094°$ -0.011°S -0.240' 0.187°s -0.343* 1.000 
1V702002 Government Ownership 0.100°5 -0.317* 0.480** -0.176°s 0.340* -0.309* 1.000 
Before the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards 1997 
IV211997 16221997 IV301997 1V511997 /6521997 11'601997 1V701997 
Untransformed Continuous Non- 
Independent Variable Executive JÄH Board Ownership Shareholders' IAH Level of Government 
Board Members Concentration Profi lability Profitability IAH Ownership 
Members 
1V211997 Non-Executive Board 1 000 No Data Members . 
Il'2219971AH Board Members -0.035°$ 1.000 
No Data 
IV301997 Ownership Concentration 0.042°S -0.549** 1.000 No Data 
115119975/iancho/der. s'l'r, tfi, thilt, r -0.038°5 0.283' -0237°$ 
1.000 No Data 
IV521997IAHProfitability No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data 
/! 601997 Level of1.411 -(1.064°' 0.113"' 0.138 0.251' No Data 1.000 
IV701997 Government Ownership 0.121°S -0.207°S 0.404* -0.304' No Data -0.079°5 1.000 
"- Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (I -tailed). 
'" - Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (I-tailed). 
S- Spearman's rho Correlation Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level (I-tailed). 
Ns - Speannan's rho Correlation Coefficient is not significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed). 
Table 9.14 shows the Pearson correlation matrices among transformed independent 
variables before and after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. Highlighted 
correlation values represent correlation coefficients which are significant at 10% level of 
significance (at least). 
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Table 9.14 Pearson correlation coefficient matrices of normal scores of continuous 
independent variables (using Van der Waerden Approach) before and after 
implementation of AAOIFI Standards. 
After the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (2002) 
Transformed Continuous NIV212002 NIV222002 N11302002 NIV512002 N1V522002 NIV602002 N11702002 
Independent Variable Using Non- 
Normal Scores (Van der Executive JAH Board Ownership Shareholders' IAH Level of Government 
Waerden Approach) Board Members Concentration Profitability 
Profitability IAH Ownership 
Members 
NIV212002 NORMAL of 
IV212002 using VW 
NIV222002 NORMAL of "4 
IV222002 using I'W 
0.181 1 
N16302002 NORMAL of 
_0 0I, 
ns -0.495** X302002 using VW . 
NIV512002 NORMAL of 0 15°S 0361 * -0.10515 1 111512002 using VW 
N1V522002 NORMAL of 092"' -0 0.017"5 0.274° 0.11 
ns I 
1V522002 using VW . 
NIV602002 NORMAL of 117 n, -0 -0.03 qns -0 181 
n' 0 217ns -0.319* 1 IV602002 using VW . 
NIV702002 NORMAL of 072 ns 0 -0.31* 0.473** -0.169"' 0323* -0.299* 
I 
1V702002 using I'W . 
Before the Implementation of AAOIFI Standards (1997) 
Transformed Continuous N11211997 N11221997 
Nll'301997 N11151199- 1V521997 \/160/997 NIV701997 
Independent Variable Using Non- 
Normal Scores (Van der Executive IAN Board Ownership 
Shareholder' IAH level of Government 
Wurden Approach) Board 
Members Concentration Profttabilgc Profitability fAll Ownership 
Members 
N1V211997 NORMAL of 1 No Data 
IV 2/ 1997 using VW 
NIG221997 NORMAL of 018' 0 1 No Data /2221997 using VW . 
NIV301997 NORMAL of 039ns 0 -0.554** 1 
No Data 
1V301997 usin VW . 
ß'11'511997 NOR, 114L of 0 (1117°' 0.274' IL28? 
s I No Data 
11 11/9 9- usntL 1 11 
IV521997IAHProfitability No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data 
\71(111997 NORM, IL of 
' -0 07°s 
0.078°' -0.139°' 
0 223°' No Data I 
11 601997 using VH' . 
N1V701997 NORMAL of 116 ns 0 -0.226°5 
0.408* -0.303' No 
Data -0.058ns X701997 using VW . 
"- Pearson Correlation Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (]-tailed). 
'" - Pearson Correlation Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
S -Pearson Correlation Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed)- 
Ns - Pearson Correlation Coefficient is not significant at the 0.10 level (1-tailed). 
The proportion of non-executive board members in 1997 and 2002 (variables IV211997 
and IV212002) did not result to significant correlation coefficients with other independent 
variables based on the Spearman correlation matrix in Tables 9.13 as well as the Pearson 
correlation coefficients in and 9.14. 
The results of the independent variables with significant correlations with other 
independent variables are summarised next. 
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9.5.1 Proportion of non-executive board members who are IAHs with other 
independent variables 
The proportion of non-executive board members who are IAHs (IV222002) has a 
negative moderate correlation with ownership concentration (IV302002) with rho= - 
0.484**, a positive moderate correlation with shareholders' profitability (IV512002) with 
rho= 0.370`, and a negative moderate correlation with government ownership (IV702002) 
with rho= -0.317*. On the other hand, the dataset for 1997 shows that the proportion of 
non-executive board members who are IAHs (IV221997) has a significant negative strong 
correlation with the ownership concentration (IV301997) with rho= -0.549** , and a 
positive moderate correlation with the shareholders' profitability (IV511997) with rho = 
0.2835. 
Based on the Pearson correlation matrix in Table 9.14 for 2002 dataset, the normal scores 
of proportion of non-executive board members who are IAHs (NIV222002) has a 
negative moderate correlation with the normal scores of ownership concentration 
(NIV302002) with r= -0.495", a positive moderate correlation with normal scores of 
shareholders' profitability (NIV512002) with r= 0.361', and a negative moderate 
correlation with normal scores of government ownership (NIV702002) with r= -0.31 
`. 
On the other hand, the dataset for 1997 shows that the normal scores of proportion of 
non-executive IAH board members (IV221997) has significant negative strong 
correlation with normal scores of ownership concentration (IV301997) with r= -0.554" 
and positive moderate correlation with normal scores of shareholders' profitability 
(IV511997) with r=0.2745. 
9.5.2 Ownership concentration with other independent variables 
Based on the Spearman correlation matrix in Table 9.13 for 2002 dataset, the ownership 
concentration (IV302002) has a positive moderate correlation with IAHs profitability 
(P1522002) with rho = 0.316`, a negative weak correlation with the level of IAH 
(IV602002) with rho = -0.2405, and a highly significant positive moderate correlation 
(rho= 0.480**) with government ownership (IV702002). On the other hand, the dataset for 
1997 shows that the ownership concentration (IV301997) has a significant positive 
moderate correlation with government ownership (IV701997) with rho= 0.404'. 
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Based on the Pearson correlation matrix in Table 9.14 for 2002 dataset, the normal scores 
of ownership concentration (NIV302002) has a positive moderate correlation with normal 
scores of IAHs profitability (NIV522002) with r=0.2745, and a highly significant 
positive moderate correlation with normal scores of government ownership (NIV702002) 
with r=0.473**. On the other hand, the dataset for 1997 shows that the normal scores of 
ownership concentration (NIV301997) has a significant negative moderate correlation 
with the normal scores of shareholders' profitability (NIV511997) with r= -0.2825. 
Furthermore, NIV301997 also has a significant positive moderate correlation with the 
normal scores of government ownership (NIV701997) with r=0.408*. 
9.5.3 Shareholders' profitability with other independent variables 
Based on the Spearman correlation matrix in Table 9.13 for 1997 dataset, the 
shareholders' profitability (IV511997) has a positive weak correlation with level of IAHs 
(1V601997) with rho= 0.251s, and a significant negative moderate correlation with 
government ownership (IV701997) with rho= -0.3045. Both correlation coefficients are 
significant at 10% level of significance. Based on the Pearson correlation matrix in Table 
9.14 for 1997 dataset shows that the normal scores of shareholders' profitability 
(NIV511997) has significant negative moderate correlation with the normal scores of 
government ownership (NIV701997) with r= -0.3035. 
9.5.4 IAHs' profitability with other independent variables 
Based on the Spearman correlation matrix in Table 9.13 for 2002 dataset, the IAHs' 
profitability (IV522002) has a negative moderate correlation with level of IAHs 
(IV602002) with rho= -0.343`, and a positive moderate correlation (rho= 0.340) with 
government ownership (IV702002). Both correlation coefficients are significant at 10% 
level of significance. 
Based on the Pearson correlation matrix in Table 9.14 for 2002 dataset shows that the 
normal scores of IAHs' profitability (NIV522002) has significant negative moderate 
correlation with the normal scores of level of IAHs (NIV602002) with r= -0.319* and has 
significant positive moderate correlation with the normal scores of government ownership 
(N1V702002) with r= 0.323*. 
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9.5.5 Level of IAHs with other independent variables 
Data Analysis and Conclusions 
Based on the Spearman correlation matrix in Table 9.13 for 2002 dataset, the level of 
IAHs (IV602002) has a negative moderate correlation with government ownership 
(P1702002) with rho= -0.309*. 
Based on the Pearson correlation matrix in Table 9.14 for 2002 dataset, the normal scores 
of level of IAHs (NIV602002) has a negative moderate correlation with the normal scores 
of government ownership (NIV702002) with r= -0.299*. 
9.5.6 Listing status (dichotomous variable) with categorized independent variables 
The examination of the Spearman and Pearson correlation matrices of the continuous 
independent variables did not show any correlation coefficient greater than 0.780 which 
implies no problem of multicollinearity. 
To determine the association between listing status (a dichotomous variable) with each of 
the continuous independent variables, the latter variables are recoded from their original 
values as 1Low=Lowest to 33.33,2Moderate=33.34 to 66.66,3High=66.67 and above. 
The Cramer's V correlation coefficient was then calculated and the results are 
summarised in Table 9.15. 
Only the Cramer's V correlation coefficient (V=0.410) of categorized values of the 
government ownership in 1997 (CATIV1997) showed significant association with the 
listing status (IV401997) at a 10% level of significance. The association can be 
considered as a moderate association. 
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Table 9.15 Nominal correlation coefficients for Listing Status (IV402002 and 
IV401997) with categorized values of other variables. 
2002 IV402002 - Listing Status (b) 
Categorized Variables Nominal Approx. Correlation Value Sig. Remarks 
(a) Coefficient (-value) 
CATIV212002 
- Categorized IV212002 Cramer's V 0.260 0.317 Not Significant 
CATIV222002 
- Categorized IV222002 Cramer's V 0.226 0.418 Not Significant 
CATIV302002 -Categorized 
1V302002 Cramer's V 0.087 0.880 Not Significant 
CATIV512002 
- Categorized IV512002 Crater's V (b) (b) (b) 
CATI V522002 
- Categorized IV522002 Cramer's V 0.129 0.453 Not Significant 
CATIV602002 
- Categorized IV602002 Cramer's V 0.096 0.854 Not Significant 
CATIV702002 
- Categorized 1V702002 Cramer's V 0.185 0.560 Not Significant 
CA TVDI2002 
- Categorized VDI2002 Cramer's V 0.280 0.264 Not Significant 
N of Valid Cases 34 
1997 IV401997 - Listing Status (b) 
Categorized Variables Nominal Approx. 
Correlation Value Sig. Remarks (a) Coefficient (-value) 
CATIV211997 
- Categorized IV211997 Cramer's V 0.141 0.749 Not Significant 
CATIV221997 
- Categorized IV221997 Cramer's V 0.383 0.120 Not Significant 
CATIV301997 
- Categorized IV301997 Cramer's V 0.210 0.528 Not Significant 
CATIV511997 
- Categorized IV511997 Cramer's V 0.183 0.326 Not Significant 
CATIV521997 
- Categorized IV521997 Cramer's V No Data No Data 
CATI V601997 
- Categorized IV601997 Cramer's V 0.250 0.405 Not Significant 
CATIV701997 
- Categorized 1V701997 Cramer's V 0.410 0.087 Sig at 10% 
CATVD11997 
- Categorized VD11997 Cramer's V 0.220 0.496 Not Significant 
N of Valid Cases 29 
(a) All Categorized Variables were recoded from original values using: 
ILow =Lowest to 33.33, 
2Moderate=33.34 to 66.66, 
3High =66.67 and Above 
(b) No statistics are computed because CATIV512002 Category IV512002 is a constant. 
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9.6 Simple Linear Regression of the Level of Voluntary Disclosure 
The previous section showed the correlation analysis with nonparametric tests for the 
derived correlation coefficients which determined the strength of the relationship or 
association between any two variables. The probable form of the relationship between the 
variables is addressed by the statistical technique called regression analysis (Neter et al. 
1990). 
In this study, the application of the simple linear regression estimates the coefficients of 
the linear equation, involving one independent variable that best predicts the value of the 
level of voluntary disclosure (dependent variable). Simple linear regression is also called 
bivariate regression as it involves one dependent variable and one independent variable 
(Neter et al. 1990). 
The derived simple linear regression model is also subjected to a univariate F-test 
(ANOVA) testing the significance of the regression model as a whole. If the significance 
probability is less than 0.10, then the model is considered significantly better than would 
be expected by chance and we reject the null hypothesis of no linear relationship of the 
dependent variable to the independent variable. 
The application of regression analysis requires several assumptions to be tested that 
include normality. The distribution of the untransformed dependent variable (level of 
voluntary disclosure, VDI) before and after the implementation of AAOIFI standards was 
shown non-normal in Chapter 8. It was also found that normal scores of the level of 
voluntary disclosure resulted to normally distributed variables. The distributions of the 
independent variables before and after the implementation of AAOIFI standards were 
mostly non-normal as seen in Table 9.2. Different transformations of the continuous 
independent variables using normal scores and simple ranks are summarised in Table 9.3. 
Based on all preliminary test of normality (Shapiro W and histograms) of the dependent 
variables, only the normal scores of the level of voluntary disclosure (NVDI2002 and 
NVDI1997) were found to be useful in the regression analyses. There is only one 
normally distributed continuous independent variable IV511997. The useful forms of the 
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other continuous independent variables were the transformed variables using normal 
scores (Van der Waerden proportion estimation formula). 
The regression coefficient, b, is the average amount of the level of voluntary disclosure 
when the independent increases one unit. Put another way, the b coefficient is the slope of 
the regression line: the larger the b, the steeper the slope, the more the dependent changes 
for each unit change in the independent. The b coefficient is the un-standardised simple 
regression coefficient for the case of one independent variable. The regression 
coefficients and the significance of the F-test of the simple linear regression model at a 
10% level of significance (enclosed in parenthesis) are summarised for untransformed 
and transformed VDI in Tables 9.16 and 9.17. Significant simple linear regression models 
have ANOVA p-values of at least 0.10. 
Table 9.16 Summary of simple linear regression models of the level of voluntary 
disclosure (NVDI2002) and various independent variables. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE DEPENDENT VARIABLE : NVDI2002-Normal Scores of VDI 
Sample Size, n= 34 
Regression 
Coefficient 
ANOVA of SLR 
Model Remark 
Continuous Independent Variables 
(Transformed) 
NIV212002 Board Composition 
- Non-Executive Members 
0.2358"' F=1.774 "' Not Significant 
NIV222002 Board Composition 
- Non-Executive IAH Members 
0.0519"' Fß. 0718 "' Not Significant 
NIV302002 Ownership Concentration -0.0419 F=0.0529 ns Not Significant 
NIV512002 Profitabilityl - Shareholders 0.1619 "' F=0.8734'' Not Significant 
NIV522002 Profitability2 - IAHs -0.2539 " F=2.1877 
"S Not Significant 
NIV602002 Level of IAHs 0.3707* F=4.9886* Significant at 5% 
NIV702002 Government Ownership -0.3554' F=3.2306' Significant at 10% 
Nominal (Dummy) Independent 
Variable 
IV42002 Listing Status -0.3571 n' F=1.1817"s Not Significant 
'- Regression coefficient is significant at the 0.05 
s- Regression coefficient is significant at the 0.10 
ns - Regression coefficient is not significant at 0.10 
Table 9.16 summarises the results of the significance of each of the simple linear 
regression models in 2002. The only significant result on the test of ANOVA at 5% level 
of significance was the simple linear regression between NIV602002 and NVDI2002. 
This shows that the normal scores of the level of IAHs significantly determine the normal 
scores of the level of voluntary disclosure. 
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The simple linear regression model of NVDI2002 and NIV602002 has a coefficient of 
determination (R2 = 0.1346) and an Adjusted R2 = 0.1078. Variation in this model that is 
explained by the normal scores of the level of IAH is 10.78% and the other 89.22% are 
due to error. The simple linear regression equation (1) with a Y-intercept is given by: 
ilý YNVDI2002 - -0.000816 + 0.3707XN1V602002 +E 
With residual statistics given as: 
Residuals Statisticsa 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 543979 . 704335 . 
001388 . 3370817 
34 
Residual -2.30305 1.5072844 . 0000000 . 8537342 34 
Std. Predicted Value -1.618 2.085 . 000 1.000 34 
Std. Residual -2.656 1.739 . 000 . 985 34 
a. Dependent Variable: NVDI2002 NORMAL of VD12002 using VW 
The assumption of normally distributed residuals is satisfied in this significant model as 
shown in Figure 9.16. 
Figure 9.16 Histogram of the Regression Standardised Residuals Sum 
Histogram of Simple Linear Regression Standardized 
Residuals (with N1V602002) 
Dependent Variable: NORMAL of VD12002 using VW 
7- 
6- 
3_ 
15 
4- 
1 
2- 
1 --I 
0 
Mean = -3.47E-17 
Std. Dav. = 0.985 
N =34 
-2 -1 01 
Regression Standardized Residual 
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The simple linear regression of the non-normal NIV702002 (Government Ownership) and 
NVDI2002 was found significant at 10% level of significance. The model has a 
coefficient of determination (R2 = 0.0917) and an Adjusted R2 = 0.0633. Variation in this 
model that is explained by the normal scores of the government ownership is 6.33% and 
the other 93.67% are due to error. The simple linear regression equation (2) with a Y- 
intercept is given by: 
ý2J YNVDI2002 ---2 0.01775 - 0.3553997XNIV702002 +E 
With residual statistics given as: 
Residuals Statisticsa 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 543501 . 
234014 . 001388 . 2779491 34 
Residual -1.95247 1.7845893 . 
0000000 
. 
8747745 34 
Std. Predicted Value -1.960 . 
837 . 000 1.000 34 
Std. Residual -2.198 2.009 . 
000 
. 985 34 
a" Dependent Variable: NVDI2002 NORMAL of VD12002 using VW 
The assumption of normally distributed residuals is satisfied in this significant model as 
shown in Figure 9.17. 
Figure 9.17 Histogram of the Regression Standardised Residuals 
Histogram of Simple Linear Regression Standardized 
Residuals (with N1V702002) 
Dependent Variable: NORMAL of VD12002 using VW 
7ý 
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Although most of the relationships were not significant, the regression coefficients show 
that in most of the cases the sign was in the expected direction, except for the IAHs' 
profitability and listing status which had negative signs when positive signs were 
expected. 
Table 9.17 summarises the results of the significance of each of the simple linear 
regression models in 1997. None of these simple linear regression models for the 1997 
dataset had significant ANOVA at 10% level of significance. Although the relationships 
were not significant, the regression coefficients show that in all of the cases the signs 
were in the expected direction. 
Table 9.17 Summary of simple linear regression models of the level of voluntary 
disclosure (NVD11997) and various independent variables. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE : NVDI1997-Normal Scores of 
VDI 
Sample Size, n= 29 
Regression 
Coefficient 
ANOVA of SLR 
Model Remark 
Continuous Independent Variables 
(Transformed) 
NIV211997 Board Composition 
- Non-Executive Members 
0.3062 ns F=2.7252 ns Not Significant 
NIV221997 Board Composition 
- Non-Executive IAH Members 
ns 0.0737 ns F=0.1152 Not Significant 
NIV301997 Ownership Concentration 
-0.2751 
ns F=2.0785 ns Not Significant 
NIV521997 Profitability2 - IAHs No Data No Data No Data 
NIV601997 Level of IAHs 0.3208 "s F=3.0883 ns Not Significant 
NIV701997 Government Ownership -0.4037 
ns F=3.452 ns Not Significant 
Continuous Independent Variables 
Untransformed 
IV511997 Profitabilityl - Shareholders 0.0166 "s F=2.350 ns Not Significant 
Nominal (Dummy) Independent Variable 
IV41997 Listing Status 0.1961 ns F=0.2818 ns Not Significant 
ns - Regression coefficient is not significant at 0.10 
The simple linear regression models are limited in the individual contribution of the 
independent variable regressed with the normal scores of the level of voluntary disclosure 
separately. Multivariate approach of determining the combination of independent 
variables that affect the level of voluntary disclosure is discussed in details in the next 
section. 
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9.7 Multivariate Analysis: Multiple Linear Regression of the Level of 
Voluntary Disclosure 
Multiple linear regression is an extension of the bivariate simple linear regression that 
involves more than one independent variable (Draper, 1981). The results from multiple 
linear regression analysis provide information on the statistical significance of the 
independent variables, the strength of association between one or more of the predictors 
and the criterion, and a predictive equation for future use. 
Multiple linear regression method had been used extensively to link the level of voluntary 
disclosure with the independent variables using the ordinary least squares estimation 
(Cooke, 1998). However, this method was applied only upon testing several conditions 
were met including (1) variables have normal distribution, (2) the error term has a normal 
distribution with mean of zero and are independent, and, (3) no multicollinearity among 
independent variables. 
Shapiro-Wilk W, skewness and kurtosis were calculated and tested to verify the 
fundamental assumption of normality in earlier sections. Only the normal scores of the 
level of voluntary disclosure in 2002 and 1997 were used as dependent variables in the 
separate multiple regression models. 
The dichotomous independent variable (listing status) which is a dummy variable can be 
used in the fitted multiple linear regression model. Among the continuous independent 
variables, only the untransformed profitability of shareholders (P/511997) is normally 
distributed. 
Most of the transformed form of the other continuous variables using normal scores (Van 
der Waerden proportion estimation formula) were normalised except for the normal 
scores of the proportion of non-executive board members who are IAHs (NIV221997 and 
NIV222002) and the normal scores of the government ownership (NIV701997 and 
NIV702002). This is due to the presence of many non-missing zero values representing 
lack of non-executive board members who are IAHs, and lack of government ownership 
(i. e. 100% private ownership) in these Islamic banks. 
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All multiple regression models generated in this study included Y-intercept constants and 
the listing status (dichotomous independent variable). 
Two groups of multiple regression models were generated depending on the independent 
variables entered into the model: 
- Model A: using only normally distributed continuous variables, and 
- Model B: using all normalised continuous independent variables 
It is the intent of the researcher to fit a full model (where all independent variables or all 
normally distributed variables are entered in the model) as well as applying stepwise 
procedure of variable selection to arrive at a reduced model. 
Stepwise procedure92 selects the most correlated independent variable first, remove the 
variance in the dependent variable, then select the second independent variable which 
most correlates with the remaining variance in the dependent variable, and so on until 
selection of an additional independent variable does not increase the R-squared by a 
significant amount (0.10 in our case). While stepwise regression uses a meaningful 
criterion for selecting variables, it does not assure that the selected variables will not 
display high multicollinearity (high inter-correlation). 
While it is the intent of the researcher to find more determinants or independent variables 
that can determine the level of voluntary disclosure, the researcher derived the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics to determine if multicollinearity was a problem among 
derived equations. All multiple linear regression models derived in the study had VIF 
statistics well below the level (5), which is the level when multicollinearity is regarded as 
a problem (Neter et al. 1983, p. 392). This supplements earlier results of no 
multicollinearity in section 9.5 where correlation values among the independent variables 
were all less than 0.780 (Gujarati, 1995) as summarised in Tables 9.13 and 9.14. 
The regression coefficient, b, is the average amount by which the dependent variable 
increases when the independent variable increases one unit and other independent 
variables are held constant. In other words, the b coefficient is the slope of the regression 
92 See Schroeder et al. (1986). 
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line: the larger the b, the steeper the slope, the more the dependent variable changes for 
each unit change in the independent variable. The b coefficient is the unstandardised 
simple regression coefficient for the case of one independent variable. 
When there are two or more independent variables, the b coefficient is a partial 
regression coefficient, though it is common simply to call it a "regression coefficient. " 
Thus, b coefficient or partial regression coefficient may be conceived as the "potential 
influence" of the independent variable on the dependent variable. 
The results of the t-tests are used to assess the significance of individual b coefficients 
specifically testing the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient is zero. A common 
rule of thumb is to drop from the equation all variables not significant at the 0.10 level or 
better. Note that restricted variance of the independent variable in the particular sample at 
hand can be a cause of a finding of no significance. Like all significance tests, the t-test 
assumes randomly sampled data. T-tests are not used for dummy variables, even though 
SPSS and other statistical packages output them. Significant t-test results indicate whether 
the independent variable is a significant parameter in the model. 
R2, also called multiple correlation or the coefficient of multiple determination, is the 
percent of the variance in the dependent variable explained uniquely or jointly by the 
independent variables. R-squared can also be interpreted as the proportionate reduction in 
error in estimating the dependent variable when knowing the independent variables. That 
is, R2 reflects the number of errors made when using the regression model to guess the 
value of the dependent variable, in ratio to the total errors made when using only the 
dependent's mean as the basis for estimating all cases. In summary, R2 is I minus 
regression error as a percent of total error and will be 0 when regression error is as large 
as it would be if one simply guessed the mean for all cases of the dependent variable. 
F test93: The F test is used to test the significance of R, which is the same as testing the 
significance of R2, which is the same as testing the significance of the regression model as 
a whole. If probability(F) < 0.10, then the model is considered significantly better than 
would be expected by chance and we reject the null hypothesis of no linear relationship of 
y (dependent variable) to the independent variables. F is a function of R2, the number of 
independent variables, and the number of cases. F is computed with k and (n -k- 1) 
93 See Schroeder et at. (1986). 
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degrees of freedom, where k= number of terms in the equation not counting the constant. 
F= [R2/k]/[(1 - R2 )/(n -k- 1)]. 
The Adjusted R2 statistics94 is an alternative to R2 that is adjusted for the number of 
parameters in the model. Adjusted R2 are adjustments of R2 when one has a large number 
of independent variables. It is possible that R2 will become artificially high simply 
because some independent variables' chance variations "explain" small parts of the 
variance of the dependent variable. At the extreme, when there are as many independent 
variables as cases in the sample, R2 will always be 1.0. The adjustment to the formula 
arbitrarily lowers R2 as p, the number of independent variables, increases. Some authors 
conceive of Adjusted R2 as the percent of variance "explained in a replication, after 
subtracting out the contribution of chance. " When used for the case of a few independent 
variables, R2 and Adjusted R2 will be close. When there are a great many independent 
variables, Adjusted R2 may be noticeably lower. The greater the number of independent 
variables, the more the researcher is expected to report the adjusted coefficient. This 
study has seven independent variables so the Adjusted R2 have more meaningful 
interpretation. 
9.7.1 Full model and reduced model after the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards (2002) 
9.7.1A Normally distributed continuous independent variables in multiple 
regression model 
Table 9.18a shows the results of multiple regression coefficients and their significance for 
normally distributed normal scores of the independent variables and a dichotomous 
variable using SPSS. The table is a summary of the multiple regression analysis where all 
normally distributed independent variables and dummy variable were entered in the 
equation (the "Full Model") as well as the "Reduced Model". Statistics like R2 and 
Adjusted R2 were also reported to determine the "goodness-of-fit" of the models. 
The full model (A) for the 2002 data (after the implementation of AAOIFI standards) for 
the normal scores of the level of voluntary disclosure NIVI2002 was derived with one 
94 The Adjusted R2 statistic is calculated as ADJRSQ =I- [((n - ! )(1 - R'))/(n - p)] 
where is is the number of observations used in fitting the model, and p is the number of parameters in the model. and i is an indicator variable that is I if the model includes an intercept, and 0 otherwise. 
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significant independent variable, NIVI602002. The model is not significant at 10% level 
of significance since the F-test p-value=0.2722 is greater than 0.10. This means that the 
null hypothesis of no linear relationship between the NVDI2002 and the independent 
variables entered in the multiple regression model cannot be rejected. Thus, the full 
model (A) derived by entering all normally distributed independent variables and a 
dichotomous independent variable cannot be used, so a reduced model using stepwise 
procedure for variable selection was performed next. 
Table 9.18a Regression Analyses of the determinants of the normal scores of level of 
voluntary disclosure (NVDI2002) - Full Model and Reduced Model using All 
Normally Distributed Independent Variables and Stepwise Regression 
FULL MODEL 2002A REDUCED MODEL 2002A 
Sample Size, n= 34 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE : 
NVDI2002-Normal Scores of VDI 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE : 
NVD12002-Normal Scores of VDI 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Regression Coefficient 
t-test 
value 
Remark 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Nest 
value 
Remark 
Continuous Independent Variables (T ransformed) 
NIV212002 Board Composition- 
Non-Executive Members 
0.25078 0.1830 Not Significant 0.28381 0.0961 Significant 
at 10% 
NIV302002 Ownership 
Concentration 0.07145 0.7217 
Not Significant 
NIV512002 Profitabilityl - 
Shareholders 0.07432 0.6846 
Not Significant - - - 
NIV522002 Profitahility2 - IAHs -0.14605 0.4709 
Not Significant - - - 
NIV602002 Level of IAHs 0.34647 0.0878 
Significant 
at 10% 0.40324 0.0186 
Significant 
at 5% 
Nominal (Dummy) Independent Var iable 
IV42002 Listing Status -0.01963 0.9579 Not Significant - - - 
Intercept 0.01109 0.9690 Not Significant -0.00375 0.9794 
Not 
Significant 
Model Statistics Statistic p-value Remark Statistic p-value Remark 
Significance of ANOVA Model (F- 
value) 1.34 0.2722 
Not Significant 4.118 0.0259 
Significant 
at S% 
R-Square 0.2301 0.2099 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0590 0.1590 
The reduced model (A) for 2002 is shown in Table 9.18a with the significant multiple 
regression coefficients and their significance for transformed variables. The reduced 
model (A) for 2002 derived in the study by stepwise regression includes a Y-intercept (- 
0.00375), regression coefficients for the independent variables (i. e., the normal scores of 
the proportion of non-executive board members (NIV212002) and normal scores of the 
Level of IAHs (NIV602002) ) and an error term denoted by e. The reduced model (A) in 
2002 is summarised by the following equation: 
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YNVDI2002A = -0" 
003 75 + 0.28381 XNIV212002 + 0.40324 XNIV602002 +9 
The reduced model YNVDI2002A has significant ANOVA results at 5% level of 
significance as expected from the stepwise regression approach. The calculated Adjusted 
R2 is 0.1590. This means that 15.90 percent of the variance in the dependent variable 
(NVDI2002) is explained uniquely or jointly by the independent variables - NIV212002 
and NIV602002. 
9.7.1B All continuous independent variables (normal or not) in multiple regression 
model 
Table 9.18b shows the results of multiple regression coefficients and their significance for 
all independent variables (both continuous and dichotomous variable) using SPSS. 
Table 9.18b Regression Analyses of the determinants of the normal scores of level of 
voluntary disclosure (NVDI2002) - Full Model and Reduced Model using All 
Independent Variables and Stepwise Regression. 
FULL MODEL 2002B REDUCED MODEL 2002B 
Sample Size, n= 34 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE : DEPENDENT VARIABLE : 
NVDI2002-Normal Scores of VDI NVDI2002-Normal Scores of VDI 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Regression t-lest Remark Regression t-test Remark Coefficient value Coefficient io-value 
Continuous Independent Variables (T ransformed) 
NIV212002 Board Composition- 0.28320 0.1426 Not Significant 0 28381 0961 0 Significant Non-Executive Members . . at 10% 
NIV222002 Board Composition- 0 00474 9848 0 Not Significant Non-Executive IAH Members . . 
NIV302002 Ownership 
Concentration 0.19272 0.4475 Not Significant - - 
NIV512002 Profitabilityl - 03542 0 0 8569 Not Significant Shareholders . . 
NIV522002 Profitability2 - IAHs -0.09631 0.6454 Not Significant - - - 
NIV602002 Level of IAHs 0.31768 0.1305 Not Significant 0 40324 0.0186 Significant . at5% 
NIV702002 Government Ownership -0.32750 0.1899 
Not Significant 
Nominal (Dummy) Independent Var iable 
IV42002 Listing Status 0.02551 0.9468 Not Significant - - - 
Intercept 
-0.00179 0.9951 Not Significant -0.00375 0.9794 Not Significant 
Model Statistics Statistic p-value Remark Statistic p-value Remark 
Significance of ANOVA Mode! (F- 1.235 0.320 Not Significant 4 118 0.0259 Significant value . at 5% 
R-Square 0.2833 0.2099 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0540 
1 
0.1590, 
1 
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The table is a summary of the multiple regression analysis where all independent 
variables (normal or not) were entered in the equation to derive a full model (B) and a 
reduced model (B) for 2002 using stepwise regression. The Y-intercept constant was 
included in each model. Statistics like R2 and Adjusted R2 were also reported to determine 
the "goodness-of-fit" of derived models. 
The derived full model (B) for 2002 is not useful since its F-test with a p-value of 0.320 is 
not significant at 10% level of significance thereby failing to reject the null hypothesis of 
no linear relationship between NVDI2002 and the eight independent variables. 
On the other hand, the resulting reduced model (B) derived from the stepwise regression 
approach (considering all eight independent variables) is similar to the reduced model (A) 
which attempted to fit a dichotomous independent variable and all normally distributed 
continuous independent variables only. 
Reduced Model B (2002): 
YNVDI2002B = -0.003 75 
+ 0.28381 XNIV212002 + 0.40324 X NI v602002 + 13 
Reduced Model A (2002): 
YNVDI2002A = -0.00375 + 0.28381 
XNIV212002 + 0.40324 XN1v602002 +E 
Thus, the final reduced model in 2002 includes a regression constant (-0.00375), 
regression coefficients for two independent variables - normal scores of the proportion of 
non-executive board members (NIV212002) and normal scores of the level of IAHs 
(NIV602002). 
Final Reduced Model (2002): 
YNVDI2002A = -0.00375 + 0.28381 
XNIV212002 + 0.40324 XNIV602002 +E 
The final reduced model for 2002 has an Adjusted R2 of 0.1590. The model has normally 
distributed independent variables, no multicollinearity problem and has the following 
residual statistics: 
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Residuals Statisticsa 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 958309 . 578277 . 
001388 . 4205498 
34 
Residual -2.24760 1.4035794 . 0000000 . 
8158578 34 
Std. Predicted Value -2.282 1.372 . 000 1.000 
34 
Std. Residual -2.670 1.667 . 000 . 
969 34 
a. Dependent Variable: NVDI2002 NORMAL of VD12002 using VW 
The assumption of normally distributed residuals is satisfied in this significant model as 
shown in Figure 9.18. 
Figure 9.18 Histogram and Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardised Residuals 
of YNVD12002- 
Histogram of Residuals for Reduced Model (Stepwise Variable 
Selection) 
Dependent Variable: NORMAL of VDI2002 using VW 
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9.7.2 Full model and reduced model before the implementation of 
AAOIFI standards (1997) 
9.7.2A Normally distributed continuous independent variables in multiple 
regression model 
Table 9.19a shows the results of multiple regression coefficients (and their significance) 
for normally distributed profitability of shareholders variable (IV511997), normally 
distributed normal scores of the other continuous independent variables and a 
dichotomous variable using SPSS. 
The table summarises the results of the multiple regression analysis when normally 
distributed independent variables and dummy variable were entered in the equation 
towards a "Full Model" and also a "Reduced Model: using Stepwise variable selection. 
The Y-intercept constant was included in each model. Statistics like R2 and Adjusted R2 
were also reported to determine the "goodness-of-fit" of the models. 
The full model for the 1997 data (before the implementation of AAOIFI standards) for the 
normal scores of the level of voluntary disclosure NVDI1997 was derived but the model 
is not significant at 10% level of confidence. The full model in the 1997 dataset had only 
significant independent variable (NIV211997) and cannot be used based on the not 
significant ANOVA (F-test) results of the model. 
The reduced model in 1997 is shown in Table 9.19a with the significant multiple 
regression coefficients and their significance for transformed variables by stepwise 
regression. The reduced model for 1997 derived in the study includes a Y-intercept 
(-0.00122), the normal scores of the proportion of non-executive board members 
(NIV211997) and normal scores of Level of IAH (NIV601997). The Adjusted R2 is 
0.1481. 
The reduced model, YNVDI1997A, has significant ANOVA results at 5% level of 
significance as expected from the iterative stepwise regression approach and is given by 
the following equation with two independent variables: 
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Reduced Model A (1997): 
YNVDI1997A = -0.00122 + 0.33050 
XNIV211997 + 0.34371 X NIV601997 + 
Table 9.19a Regression Analyses of the Determinants of the level of voluntary 
disclosure (NVDI1997) - Full Model and Reduced Model using All Normally 
Distributed Independent Variables and Stepwise Regression. 
FULL MODEL 1997A REDUCED MODEL 1997A 
Sample Size, n= 29 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE : 
WDI1997-Normal Scores of VDI 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE : 
NVD11997-Normal Scores of VDI 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Regression 
Coe wient 
Nest 
value 
Remark Regression Coefficient 
t-test 
value 
Remark 
Continuous Independent Variables (Transformed) 
NIV211997 Board Composition- 
Non-Executive Members 0.33123 0.0776 
Significant 
at 10% 
0.33050 0.0730 Significant 
at 10% 
NIV301997 Ownership 
Concentration -0.19538 0.3255 Not Significant - 
NIV601997 Level of IAHs 0.28705 0.1285 Not Significant 0.34371 0.0604 Significant 
at 10% 
Continuous Independent Variables (Untransformed) 
IV511997 Profitability] - 
Shareholders 0.00979 
I 
0.3889 Not Significant 
L- 
- 
Nominal (Dummy) Independent Variable 
IV401997 Listing Status -0.01151 0.9798 Not 
Significant - - - 
Intercept -0.06670 0.8226 Not Significant -0.00122 0.9938 Not Significant 
Model Statistics Statistic p-value Remark Statistic p-value Remark 
Significance of ANOVA Model (F- 
value) 1.86 0.1401 
Not Significant 3,43 0.0475 Significant at 5% 
R-Square 0.2883 0.2089 
Adjusted R-Square 0.1336 0.1481 
The model has an Adjusted R2 of 0.1481. The model has no multicollinearity problem and 
normally distributed independent variables and residuals as seen in the following table: 
Residuals Statisticsa 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 622261 . 907261 . 002006 . 4152103 29 Residual 
-1.45808 1.9366459 . 0000000 . 
8079916 29 
Std. Predicted Value -1,503 2.180 . 000 1.000 29 Std. Residual -1.739 2.310 . 000 . 964 29 
a. Dependent Variable: NVD11997 NORMAL of VD11997 using VW 
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The assumption of normally distributed residuals is satisfied in this significant model as 
shown in Figure 9.19. 
Figure 9.19 Histogram and Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardised Residuals 
Of YNVD11997A" 
Histogram of Reduced Model (Stepwise Variable Selection with 
All Normally Distributed Continuous Independent Variables) 
Dependent Variable: NORMAL of VD11997 using VW 
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9.7.2B All continuous independent (normal or not) in multiple regression model 
Table 9.19b Regression Analyses of the Determinants of the level of voluntary 
disclosure (NVDI1997) - Full Model and Reduced Model using All Independent 
Variables and Stepwise Regression. 
FULL MODEL 1997B REDUCED MODEL 1997B 
Sample Size, n= 29 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE : DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 
NVD11997-Normal Scores of VDI NVD11997-Normal Scores of VDI 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Regression t-test Remark 
Regression t-test Remark Coefficient value Coefficient value 
Continuous Independent Variables (Transformed) 
NIV211997 Board Composition- 36342 0 0.0521 Significant 0 37162 0.0345 Significant Non-Executive Members . at 10% . at 5% 
NIV222002 Board Composition- 
-0 12242 0.6366 Not Significant - - - Non-Executive IAH Members . 
NIV301997 Ownership 
Concentration -0.15265 0.5220 
Not Significant - - 
NIV601997 Level of IAHs 0.31137 0.0976 
Significant 0.32569 0.0577 Significant 
at 10% at 10% 
NIV702002 Government Ownership I -0.40646 0.1333 
Not Significant -0.43236 0.0376 
Signti5fi% cant 
Continuous Independent Variables (Untransformed) 
IV511997 Profitability] - Shareholders 0.00712 0.5268 
Not Significant - - - 
Nominal (Dummy) Independent Variable 
IV401997 Listing Status -0.20346 0.6350 
Not Significant - - - 
Intercept 0.10706 0.7545 Not Significant 0.01704 0.9078 Not Significant 
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Model Statistics statistic p-value Remark Statistic p-value Remark 
Significance of ANO VA Model (F- 
value) 1.829 
0.1343 Not Significant 4.233 0.0150 
Significant at 
5% 
R-Square 0.3787 0.3369 
Adjusted R-Square 0.1716 0.2573 
The reduced model, YNVDI1997B, has significant ANOVA results at 5% level of 
significance as expected from the iterative stepwise regression approach and is given by 
the following equation with three independent variables: 
Reduced Model B (1997): 
YNVDI1997B = 0.01704 + 0.37162 XNIV211997 + 0.32569 XNIV601997 - 0.43236 
XNIV701997 + 
The model has an Adjusted R2 of 0.2573. The model has normally distributed independent 
variables, no multicollinearity problem and has the following residual statistics: 
Residuals Statisticsa 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -. 781907 1.078569 . 
002006 . 
5272528 29 
Residual -1.75296 1.6454144 . 0000000 . 
7397665 29 
Std. Predicted Value -1.487 2.042 . 
000 1.000 29 
Std. Residual -2.239 2.102 . 
000 . 
945 29 
a. Dependent Variable: NVD11997 NORMAL of VD11997 using VW 
The assumption of normally distributed residuals is satisfied in this significant model as 
shown in Figure 9.20. 
Figure 9.20 Histogram and Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardised Residuals 
of YNVDI1997B" 
Histogram of Residuals for Reduced Model (Stepwise Variable 
Selection with All Independent Variables) 
Normal P. P Plot of Repression Standardized Residual 
Dependent Variable: NORMAL of VDI1997 using VW Dependent Variable: NORMAL of VDI1997 using VW 
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Comparing the results of the full models derived in 2002 and 1997 did not reveal a 
significantly large significant number of independent variables that can explain the level 
of voluntary disclosure. 
The reduced models derived for the 1997 and 2002 datasets using normally distributed 
continuous independent variables have both included two variables - the normal scores of 
proportion of non-executive board members and the normal scores of the level of IAHs. 
However, when all continuous independent variables (regardless of normality) were 
considered in the Stepwise variable selection towards a reduced model, the normal scores 
for government ownership was included in the 1997 model. This model, YNVDI1997B, had 
an Adjusted R2 = 0.2573 which is larger than the Adjusted R2 (=0.1481) of the reduce 
model (YNVDI1997A) with all normally distributed continuous independent variables. A 
larger Adjusted R2 (0.2573) is preferred since it can account for the source of the variation 
in the dependent variable (normal scores of the level voluntary disclosure) as explained 
collectively by all of the independent variables in the model. 
Thus the final reduce model for 1997 with three independent variables (namely - normal 
scores of proportion of non-executive board members, normal scores of level of IAH and 
normal scores of government ownership) is given as: 
Final Reduced Model (1997): 
YNVDI1997B = 0.01704 + 0.37162 XNIV211997 + 0.32569 XNIV601997 - 0.43236 XNIV701997 +E 
9.8 Summary of the Results 
This chapter reports the results of the empirical findings on the relationship between the 
level of voluntary disclosure and seven independent variables before (1997) and after 
(2002) the implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
Descriptive statistics were utilized in addition to the bivariate and multivariate tests and 
analyses. The overall results shown in Tables 9.18a and 9.18b showed two transformed 
continuous independent variables associated with the normal scores of level of voluntary 
disclosure (NVDI2002), namely - normal scores of the proportion of non-executive board 
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members (XNIV212002) and the normal scores of the level of IAHs (XN[v602002)" The 
relationship can be written in general reduced multiple linear regression equation95 
2002 (after the implementation of AAOIFI standards) as: 
YNVD12002 96 = ßo + ONIV212002 XNIV212002 + 13NIV602002 X NIV602002 +9 
Where: YNVDI2002 
ßo 
ßNIV212002, ßNIV602002 
XNIV212002 
XNIV602002 
c 
The dependent variable, 
normal scores of the level of voluntary 
disclosure (NVDI2002) using Van der 
Waerden proportion estimation formula 
Y-Intercept 
Regression Coefficients 
Independent variable, NIV212002 which 
refers to transformed values of IV212002 (the 
proportion of non-executive board members), 
i. e., the normal scores of IV212002 using Van 
der Waerden proportion estimation formula 
Independent variable, NIV602002 which 
refers to transformed values of IV602002 (the 
level of IAH), i. e., the normal scores of 
IV602002 using Van der Waerden proportion 
estimation formula 
Error term 
for 
The overall results shown in Tables 9.19a and 9.19b showed three transformed 
continuous independent variables associated with the normal scores of the level of 
voluntary disclosure (NVD11997), namely, normal scores of the proportion of non- 
executive board members (XNIV211997), the normal scores of the level of IAHs (XNIV601997) 
and the normal scores of the government ownership (XNIV701997)" The relationship can be 
written in general reduced multiple linear regression equation97 for 1997 as: 
95 where ß0 is the constant or intercept, ßNIV212002 , 
BNIV602002 are the regression coefficients for the 
corresponding independent variables X NIV212002 and X NIV602002, and E is the error term reflected in the 
residuals 
96 In numerical terms, it is : YNVD12002 = -0.00375 + 0.28381 XNlv2120o2 + 0.40324 X NIV602002 +E 
97 where ßo is the constant or intercept, ßNIV212002 , 
ßNiv6o2oo2 and 8NIV702002 are the regression coefficients for 
the corresponding independent variables X Niv212o02, X N1V602002 and X NIV702002 , and 
6 is the error term 
reflected in the residuals 
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YNVD1199798 - ß0 + ßNIV211997 XNIV211997 + ßN1V601997 XNIV601997 + ßNIV701997 XNIV701997 +E 
where: YNVD11997 
ßo 
ßNIV211997, 
ßNIV601997, 
ßNIV701997 
XNIV211997 
XNIV601997 
XNIV701997 
Independent variable, NIV211997 which refers to 
transformed values of IV211997 (the proportion 
of non-executive board members), i. e., the normal 
scores of IV211997 using Van der Waerden 
proportion estimation formula 
Independent variable, NIV601997 which refers to 
transformed values of IV601997 (the level of 
IAH), i. e., the normal scores of IV601997 using 
Van der Waerden proportion estimation formula 
Independent variable, NIV701997 which refers to 
transformed values of IV701997 (the government 
ownership), i. e., the normal scores of IV701997 
using Van der Waerden proportion estimation 
formula 
E Error term 
Regression Coefficients 
The dependent variable, 
normal scores of the level of voluntary disclosure 
(NVD11997) using Van der Waerden proportion 
estimation formula 
Y-Intercept 
98 In numerical terms, it is : 
YNVD11997 
- -0.01704 + 0.37162 XNIV211997 + 0.32569 X N1V601997 - 0.43236 X N1V701997 + 
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Chapter 10 
Effect of Country Specific Characteristics 
On the Level of Voluntary Disclosure: 
Empirical Findings 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the evaluation of the voluntary disclosure of 
the country groups of Sudan against the combined group of Bahrain, Qatar and 
Jordan. As discussed in chapter 6, the level of financial disclosure in the firms of 
a country is affected by a number of factors, of which is the market discipline. 
And we have taken the 'government ownership' as the proxy for the market 
discipline in the countries under study. This is based on the argument that the 
level of involvement of the government in the operations and decision making 
process of those firms will affect the level of voluntary disclosure made by those 
firms. Kahl and Belkaoui (1981 p. 189) argued that the wider the distribution of shares in 
a given society, the higher the incentive to disclose more adequate information in the 
annual reports. 
We further argued, in chapter 6, that Sudan might be expected to have a weaker market 
discipline for Islamic banks than the other countries covered in the study, because of the 
greater role of the government in the banking sector, as a lot of banks are owned by the 
government (see table 10.1) and absence of the large international audit firms (big four). 
Therefore, this chapter aims to answer the null hypothesis that the level of 
voluntary disclosure among Islamic banks operating in Sudan is not less than the 
Islamic banks operating in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan. 
Table 10.1 shows that the number of Islamic banks in Sudan with at least 50% 
government ownership was 13.79% in 1997 and 14.7% in 2002. Sudan Islamic 
banks had higher government ownership compared to the Islamic banks in 
Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan of 0% in 1997 and 2.94% in 2002 respectively. 
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Table 10.1 Group statistics of Islamic banks before and after implementation of 
AAOIFI standards based on their percentage of government ownership. 
After Implementation of Before Implementation Country Government Ownership AAOIFI Standards of AAOIFI St andards 
Group 
(016) in Islamic Banks (2002) (1997) 
(Sudan or B+Q+J) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
I Al I Private Owned 10 29.41 9 31.03 
2More Private Owned 3 8.82 2 6.90 1 Bahrain, 
Qatar & 
3Equal Private & Government 
- - - - Owned 
Jordan 
4MoreGovernment Owned 1 2.94 - - 
5AIlGovernment Owned - - - - 
Total 14 41.18 11 37.93 
IAll Private Owned 8 23.53 7 24.14 
2More Private Owned 7 20.59 7 24.14 
2 Sudan 
3Equal Private & Government 
- - - - Owned 
4MoreGovernment Owned 2 5.88 - - 
5AllGovernment Owned 3 8.82 4 13.79 
Total 20 58.82 18 62.07 
lAll Private Owned 18 52.94 16 55.17 
2More Private Owned 10 29.41 9 31.03 
All Islamic 3Equal Private & Government 
Banks Owned 
4MoreGovernment Owned 3 8.82 - - 
5AIlGovernment Owned 3 8.82 4 13.79 
Total 34 100.00 29 100.00 
Legend: 
lAlt Private Owned refers to 0% Government Ownership 
More Private Owned refers to Government Ownership greater than 0% but less than 50% 
3Equal Private & Government Owned refers to 50% Government Ownership 
More Government Owned refers to Government Ownership greater than 50% but less than 100% 
5A11 Government Owned refers to 100% Government Ownership 
10.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Thirty-four (34) Islamic banks from Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan and Sudan were covered in 
the study after the implementation of AAOIFI standards while only 29 of those 34 Islamic 
banks existed in 1997. Table 10.2 shows the country group descriptive statistics of those 
banks before and after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. The table describes 
point estimates of the mean and median as well as the 95% confidence interval for the 
mean level of voluntary disclosure among Islamic banks in Sudan to be less than the 
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reported voluntary disclosure among Islamic banks operating in Bahrain, Qatar and 
Jordan. 
Table 10.2 Country group statistics of all Islamic banks before and after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
Variable of COUNTRY GROUP 
N Mean 
Interest Sudan vs. B+Q+J 
VD12002 Level of 
Voluntary Disclosure 
after implementing 
AAOIFI standards 
VD11997 Level of 
Voluntary Disclosure 
before implementing 
AAOIFI standards 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error Median 
Mean 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan 14 69.64 10.952 2.927 72 [63.32,75.97] 
Sudan 20 25.45 9.202 2.058 24 [21.14,29.76] 
Total 34 
Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan 11 43.45 24.246 7.310 40 [27.17,59.74] 
Sudan 18 22.22 8.356 1.970 24.5 [18.07,26.38] 
Total 29 
The results of the test of normality of the distribution of the level of voluntary disclosure 
among the country groups (Islamic banks in Sudan versus the Islamic banks operating in 
Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan) before (1997) and after (2002) the implementation of AAOIFI 
standards are summarised in Table 10.3. All tested highly significant indicating normality 
based on the Shapiro Wilk W test (all p-values > 0.05 level of significance). Similar 
results were derived from the test of normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov with Liliefors 
Significance Correction. 
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Table 10.3 Test of normality of level of voluntary disclosure by country group using 
Shapiro-Wilk W and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Liliefors Significance Correction) 
before and after implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Shapiro-Wilk W Using Liliefors 
Variable of COUNTRY GROUP 
Significance Correction 
B+Q+J Sudan vs I . nterest W Sig. K-S Sig. 
df df 
Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
VD12002 Level of Jordan Qatar Bahrain 0.950 14 
0.568 0.157 14 
>0.20 
, , Voluntary (Normal) 
(Normal) 
Disclosure after 
implementing Sudan 0.938 20 
0.220 
0.163 20 
>0.15 
AAOIFI standards 
(Normal) (Normal) 
VD11997 Level of Jordan Qatar Bahrain 0.941 11 
0.526 0.202 11 
>0.20 
, , 
Voluntary (Normal) (Normal) 
Disclosure before 
implementing 
Sudan 0.931 18 
0.203 
0.143 18 
>0.20 
AAOIFI standards 
(Normal) (Normal) 
10.3 Univariate Parametric Test on Two Independent Groups 
This section presents the parametric analysis for the null hypothesis that the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the Islamic banks operating in 
Sudan is not less than the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
the Islamic banks operating in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan. 
The parametric test for the mean levels of voluntary disclosure after the implementation 
of the AAOIFI standards among country groups uses the t-test statistic that assumes equal 
variances are presented in Table 10.4. The results of the Levene's test of equality of 
variances was not significant since the p-value for the F-test (0.524) is not less than 0.05, 
indicating that the variances are assumed equal. Moreover, the two independent samples' 
null hypothesis is rejected since the two-tailed p-value of 0.00 < 0.01 as well as the one- 
tailed p-value (where 2-tailed p-value when multiplied by 2 is still 0.00 and less than 
0.01). This highly significant result means that there is a difference between the mean 
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country groups and also that the average VDI in Sudan is less than those in Bahrain, 
Qatar and Jordan. 
Similarly, before the implementation of the AAOIFI standards in 1997, the result of the 
parametric t-test of independent samples is highly significant at a 1% level of significance 
with the assumption of unequal variances. The Levene's test of equal variances was 
rejected at a 1% level of significance since the F-test's p-value (0.007) is less than 0.01. 
Table 10.4 Univariate Parametric Analysis: Independent Samples T-Test between 
Country Groups - Sudan vs. Group of Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan. 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Parametric t-test for Equality of Means 
Variable of 
Equality of Variances 
interest 
Variance 
Sig. 95% Confidence 
Assumption 
Sig. Prob t-test Prob. (2- 
Std. . Interval of the 
Mean Error 
F-value a ( statistic df tailed) b () Difference Difference Difference 
Lower Upper 
VD12002 Equal 
Level of variances 0.416 0.524ns 12.746 32 0.000** 44.193 3.467 37.130 . 416 
Voluntary assumed 
Disclosure Equal 
after 
variances 
implementing 12.352 24.87 0.000** 44.193 3.578 36.822 51.564 
AAOIFI not 
assumed 
VD11997 Equal 
Level of variances 
8.644 
. 007** 3.430 27 0.002** 21.232 6.191 8.529 33.935 
Voluntary assumed 
Disclosure Equal 
before variances 
implementing 2.804 11.47 0.017* 21.232 7.571 4.651 37.814 
not 
AAOIFI 
assumed 
** refers to highly significant results at a 1% level of significance indicating rejection of null hypothesis 
* refers to significant results at a 5% level of significance or rejection of null hypothesis 
ns refers to not significant results or fail to reject null hypothesis 
(a) Levene's F-test of equal variances has null hypothesis of equal variance (homoscedasticity) 
(b) Independent samples t-test has null hypothesis that group mean VDI of Sudan is equal to those of group mean VDI of 
Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan. 
Thus, the results of the independent samples t-test before and after the implementation of 
AAOIFI standards in Table 10.4 revealed highly significant results at a 1% level of 
significance indicating that the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
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the Islamic banks operating in Sudan is less than the level of voluntary disclosure 
in the annual reports of the Islamic banks operating in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan. 
In the following sections the nonparametric equivalent of the parametric t-test is 
also explored due to small sample sizes in the study. 
10.4 Univariate Non-Parametric Test on Two Independent Groups 
The non-parametric analysis results were also performed to test the null hypothesis that 
the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the Islamic banks 
operating in Sudan is not less than the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports of the Islamic banks operating in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan. This is due 
to the small sample size of the study. 
The Mann-Whitney test requires only that the observations be a random sample and that 
values can be ordered. These assumptions are less restrictive than those of the two-sample 
t-test for means which requires that the observations be selected from normally 
distributed populations with equal variances (an approximate test for the case of unequal 
variances are done). 
Table 10.5 shows that the mean rank of 10.50 for the level of voluntary disclosure in 
Sudan is less than the mean rank of the group of Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan which is 
27.50. 
Table 10.5 Ranks of level of voluntary disclosure of Islamic banks by country groups 
Variable of Interest 
COUNTRY GROUP Sam of 
Sudan vs. B+Q+J N Mean Rank Ranks 
VD12002 Level of Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan 14 27.50 385.00 
Voluntary Disclosure after Sudan 20 10.50 210.00 
implementing AAOIFI Total 
34 
VD11997 Level of Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan 11 20.64 227.00 
Voluntary Disclosure before Sudan 18 11.56 208.00 
implementing AAOIFI Total 29 
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Table 10.5 further supports the descriptive results of earlier tables 10.2 and 10.4 that 
Sudan has lower mean rank compared to the mean rank of group of Bahrain, Qatar and 
Jordan. Table 10.6 shows the results of the nonparametric test on level of voluntary 
disclosure between two independent country groups - Sudan and the group of Bahrain, 
Qatar and Jordan. The p-values calculated are less than 0.01 which indicates rejecting the 
null hypothesis that the level of voluntary disclosure of Islamic banks operating in 
Sudan is not less than the Islamic banks in Bahrain Jordan and Qatar. 
Thus, the highly significant results of the univariate nonparametric Mann- 
Whitney test statistic before and after the implementation of AAOIFI standards 
show that the level of voluntary disclosure in Sudan is less than those of the 
Islamic banks in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan. 
Table 10.6 Univariate Nonparametric Test: Mann-Whitney Test Statistic 
for All Sampled Islamic Banks 
VD12002 VDI1997 
Nonparametric Test Level of Voluntary Level of Voluntary 
Disclosure after Disclosure before 
implementing AAOIFI implementing AAOIFI 
Mann-Whitney U 0.000 37.000 
Wilcoxon W 210.000 208.000 
Z -4.905 -2.794 
p-value: Asymp. Sig. Prob. (2-tailed) 0.000** 0.005** 
p-value: Exact Sig. Prob. ]2*(1-tailed Sig. )] 0.000**(a) 0.004**(a) 
"* refers to highly significant results at a 1% level of significance indicating rejection of null hypothesis 
refers to significant results at a 5% level of significance or rejection of null hypothesis 
ns refers to not significant resuhs or fail to reject null hypothesis 
a Not corrected for ties. 
b Grouping Variable: COUNTRY GROUP Sudan vs. B+Q+J 
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10.5 Concluding Remarks 
Descriptive statistics about the level of voluntary disclosure among Islamic banks in 
Sudan as well as the group of Islamic banks in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan were presented. 
Point and interval estimates showed that the level of voluntary disclosure among Islamic 
banks in Sudan were less than Islamic banks operating in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan. 
Inferential statistics were necessary to support the descriptive statistics by parametric and 
nonparametric analyses at a 5% level of significance. The t-test for two independent 
samples was used for the parametric univariate analysis. Test of equality of variances was 
done using Levene's F-test. The Mann-Whitney test was used for the nonparametric 
analysis. 
Both parametric t-test on two independent samples (parametric test) and Mann-Whitney 
test (nonparametric test) yield significant results rejecting the null hypothesis, 
Ho8 The level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the 
Islamic banks operating in Sudan is not less than the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the Islamic banks 
operating in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan. 
Thus, these significant results of the univariate analyses before and after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards show that the level of voluntary disclosure 
in Sudan is less than those of the Islamic banks in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan. 
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Summary, Conclusions and Implications 
11.1 Introduction 
Information disclosed in the annual reports of firms is either mandatory or 
voluntary, and the level of both types of disclosure depends on a number of 
factors, such as legal, environmental, social, geographical .... etc. Researchers 
have tried to understand why management voluntarily disclose information by 
considering the potential benefits they may gain from this extra disclosure. To do 
so, theoretical frameworks have been developed to try and explain this 
phenomenon or practice. 
This study focuses on voluntary disclosure (financial and others) in the annual 
reports of Islamic banks, and attempts to examine whether the theoretical 
frameworks developed in the literature to explain annual reports disclosures can 
be applied to the specific case of Islamic banks. 
Islamic banking represents a radical departure from conventional banking 
practices. Islamic banks use various types of financing modes that comply with 
Islamic Shari'a rules and principles, such as Mudaraba, Murabaha, Ijarah, Ijarah 
Muntahia Bittamleek, Salam and Istisna'a. Yet, the IASs/IFRSs and other 
national accounting standards applied in the countries in which Islamic banks 
operate do not take into consideration the specificities of Islamic banks. Hence, 
the AAOIFI was established to develop a set of accounting standards, among 
others, that take the specificities of Islamic banks and other Islamic financial 
institutions into consideration. 99 
99 See for example, Karim (1996) p. 117-118 and Karim (1993) p. 287. 
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This chapter summarises the empirical findings presented in Chapters 8,9 and 10 
with respect to the research problems, questions and hypotheses stated in 
chapters 1 and 6. In addition the results of the analysis of items of voluntary 
information disclosed and relationships with company-specific and country- 
specific variables will be summarised and discussed. 
The implications of the findings for policy making, and recommendations made 
to help improve voluntary disclosure by Islamic banks, are also presented. 
Lastly, the limitations of the study and recommendations for future research will 
be identified. 
11.2 Research Objectives and Significance 
The primary objective of the study is to examine to what extent Islamic banks 
behave like any other firm with regard to their disclosure policies and practices. 
Other objectives include the assessment of whether there is a relationship 
between the implementation of AAOIFI standards and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks, in addition to the assessment of 
whether there is a relationship between certain bank and country characteristics 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks. 
The reason for considering only voluntary disclosure is because it is expected 
that Islamic banks in countries where AAOIFI standards have been made 
mandatory will meet substantially all of the AAOIFI standards requirements, 
specially the banks which are operating in Bahrain as it has a strong regulatory 
authority and a fairly strong accounting profession to enforce compliance. 
The present study differs from other empirical studies conducted in the field of 
voluntary disclosure in two respects. Firstly, it adds to the existing knowledge in 
the literature by addressing the specificities of Islamic banking. Secondly, it 
includes additional company-specific variables that have not been considered in 
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previous studies on the level of disclosure such as the AAOIFI standards and 
level of IAHs'oo 
The significance of the study comes from the fact that it is the first empirical 
study on disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks operating in a major 
centre of Islamic banking (i. e. Bahrain). Furthermore, a study of this type would 
be of particular relevance to the accounting policy makers (e. g. AAOIFI) and the 
regulatory agencies because it would help them to: 
Understand the disclosure behaviour of Islamic banks and why they adopt 
certain disclosure policies and strategies. 
Develop a coherent and acceptable set of mandatory disclosure 
requirements. 
11.3 Theoretical Framework 
Before the implementation of AAOIFI standards, the quantity of information 
disclosed by the Islamic banks in their financial statements varied greatly, 
depending on the decisions and attitude of each bank's management, SSB and 
their audit firms101. However, after implementation of AAOIFI standards, it is 
expected that Islamic banks will disclose at least the bare minimum information 
required by AAOIFI. Indeed, it is also expected that some of the banks will even 
voluntarily disclose more than what is required by AAOIFI. 
Disclosure is more important in an Islamic banking environment than it is in a 
conventional system because of the profit and loss sharing principle which is at 
the core of Islamic banking. IAHs in Islamic banks are expected to have more 
incentives to monitor the bank's performance than conventional depositors 
because neither their capital value nor the returns on investment deposits are 
fixed and guaranteed by Islamic banks. 
loo Measured as the proportion of total IAHs fund to the total assets. 101 See for example, Karim (1996) p. 122 and p. 126; and Karim (1995) p. 287 and p. 292. 
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Hence, by reducing information asymmetry inherent in the Mudaraba contracts, 
adequate disclosure is likely to allow IAHs more flexibility in choosing a 
specific bank in which they can allocate their funds according to their risk 
preferences. 
Therefore, we have an additional principal (i. e. IAHs), in addition to the 
conventional principal (i. e. shareholders), who have an interest in the voluntary 
disclosure. Archer and Karim (1998) have pointed out that the agent (i. e. 
management) has an incentive to keep the IAHs happy in order to maintain the 
current IAHs and encourage potential IAHs to join the bank. 
This is true; especially if we consider that a potential amount of money is coming 
from those IAHs102. Archer and Karim (2005 p. 21) argued that even the 
principal (shareholders) is willing to sacrifice part or all of his mudarib share in 
the short term in order to compensate IAHs for an inadequate level of return in 
which their assets are invested, as this would have the effect of encouraging the 
IAHs to continue investing their funds with the bank, because such continuity is 
in the interest of the shareholders. 
11.4 Research Hypotheses 
There are a number of factors affecting the disclosure behavior in the annual 
reports of a firm. In this study three factors are taken into consideration when 
developing the hypotheses; regulatory related factors (for hypothesis one), bank 
specific factors (for hypotheses two to seven), and country specific factors (for 
hypothesis eight). 
To date, the existing literature on the subject of disclosure by Islamic banks is 
very limited. Therefore, the research literature from which the research 
hypotheses were drawn is predominately that concerning conventional 
accounting, especially, from developed countries such as North America and 
102 Unrestricted IAHs funds represent 60% or more of the funding side of many of the Islamic banks 
balance sheet (Archer and Karim 2005, p. 21). 
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Europe. However, the specificities of the Islamic banks are taken into 
consideration in the development of the hypotheses and the arguments are 
presented accordingly. 
The alternative hypotheses developed and tested in this study are as follows: 
Ht After the implementation of AAOIFI standards, the net change in the 
level of mandatory disclosure is more than the net change in the level of 
aggregate disclosure. Therefore, there will be a net decrease in the level 
of voluntary disclosure. 
H2-1 There is a positive association between the proportion of non-executive 
members on the board and the level of voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of Islamic banks. 
H2-2 There is a positive association between the proportion of non-executive 
members on the board who are IAHs and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks. 
H3 There is a negative association between the ownership concentration 103 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic 
banks. 
Hi There is a positive association between the listing status and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks. 
Hs-i There is a positive association between the shareholders' profitability 104 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic 
banks. 
103 Measured as the percentage of ownership in the share capital by the five largest owners. 104 Measured as the shareholders return over the average shareholders equity. 
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Hs-2 There is a positive association between the IAHs profitability10S and the 
level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks. 
H6 There is a positive association between the level of IAHs106 and the level 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks. 
H7 There is a negative association between the government ownership share 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic 
banks. 
H8 The level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the Islamic 
banks operating in Sudan is less than the level of voluntary disclosure in 
the annual reports of the Islamic banks operating in Bahrain, Qatar and 
Jordan, because of a weaker market discipline. 
11.5 Research Design and Methods 
The first stage of the research was to undertake a review of the relevant 
literature. This helped to provide a theoretical framework for the study and 
served the function of discovering the findings and results of previous empirical 
research in the area of this study, establishing what theories are relevant and 
assisted in deciding upon the appropriate research design and methods to be used 
for this study. 
The second stage was to conduct a survey of the Islamic banks understudy. A 
letter was sent to all the Islamic banks operating in Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar and 
Jordan requesting annual reports for the years 1997 (2000 for Qatar and 
Jordan 107) and 2002. The response rate was high, as replies were received from 29 
out of 36 banks (81%) for 1997 and 34 out of 43 banks (77%) for 2002. 
'05 Measured as the Unrestricted IAHs return over the average Unrestricted IAHs equity. 
106 Measured as the ratio of IAHs funds to total assets. 
107 For the remaining of this chapter we will refer to it as 1997. 
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The third stage was the preparation of the disclosure index (some researchers 
also call it the `disclosure scoring sheet'), for both years 1997 and 2002. 
Once the list of disclosure items was completed, the next stage was to develop a 
scoring scheme. In the calculation of the disclosure index, a dichotomous 
procedure was used, in which an item scores one if it is disclosed in the annual 
report and zero if it is not. The approach of scoring the banks is additive and 
equally weighted. The reasons for not using weights in scoring the items were 
already discussed in detail in chapter 7. 
The fifth stage was to score the annual reports of all the Islamic banks in the 
sample, and the final stage was to undertake the statistical analyses and comment 
on the results. 
11.6 Findings and Implications 
The statistical techniques used and the results of testing the hypotheses are 
discussed in detail in chapters 8,9 and 10. Table 11.1 summarises the statistical 
techniques used and the test results for the years 1997 and 2002. This section will 
discuss the main findings and comment on the results. 
11.6.1 General findings 
The general findings of the study can be summarised in the following points: 
1. For the time-series analysis, apart from Sudan108 where the level of 
voluntary disclosure before and after implementing AAOIFI standards was 
much the same, the level of voluntary disclosure increased significantly 
after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. 
ioa Sudan banks represent about 60% of the total sample in the study. 
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Chapter 11 Data Analysis and Conclusions 
The increase in voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of the Islamic banks 
operating in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan might be attributed to the following 
reasons: 
Increase in the Rating agencies and IAS/IFRS disclosure 
requirements during the period from 1997 to 2002. 
Change in the information environment, especially in Bahrain, such 
that banks were more forthcoming with voluntary disclosure than 
previously. 
The users of the financial statements became more sophisticated. 
Preparations for the new future initiatives, for example, Basel II. 
"Peer pressure". For example, in Bahrain we found that there are 
certain banks that want to be leaders in transparency and voluntary 
disclosure, such as Al Shamel bank, Bahrain Islamic bank and Al 
Baraka Islamic bank. Hence, those banks are putting pressure over 
the others to voluntarily disclose more information. 
2. For the cross-sectional analysis, we have 5 out of 8 (2 out of 7 for the year 
1997) unexpected answers for the test results of the relationship between 
the bank's specific characteristics and the level of voluntary disclosure. As 
hypothesised by the researcher, there was positive association between 
board composition (proportion of non-executive directors), IAHs 
profitability, level of IAHs and the level of voluntary disclosure, and there 
was a negative association between the government ownership and the 
level of voluntary disclosure. 
For the cases where the researcher was not able to reject the null 
hypotheses, for example, board composition (proportion of non-executive 
directors who are IAHs) and listing status, the test results showed that the 
relationship between those independent variables and the level of 
voluntary disclosure was in the expected direction109 
109 Except in the case of IAHs profitability, the sign was negative where as the researcher expected a 
positive sign (see table 9.10 and section 11.6.2). 
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3. The level of voluntary disclosure in Sudan was significantly lower than 
that in the three other countries (Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan) both before 
and (even more) after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. This 
appears to be associated with the influence of government ownership and 
weaker market discipline in Sudan. 
The above implies that several of the factors influencing voluntary disclosure 
of Islamic banks in the countries being studied are different from those 
influencing the voluntary disclosure of firms in the countries covered in 
previous studies. Apart from those in Sudan, the Islamic banks in the study 
appear to have become much more `disclosure minded' in their financial 
reporting policies and practices between 1997 and 2002, but this cannot be 
attributed to the factors previously cited in studies of voluntary disclosure. 
4. The results of this study show that there are significant differences in the 
banks' disclosure practices and non-compliance even with the mandatory 
disclosure requirements. This provides evidence for AAOIFI to co-operate 
and work more closely with the regulators (Central Banks), stock 
exchanges, rating agencies and accounting professional bodies (e. g. 
Bahrain Accountants Association and Sudanese Council of Chartered 
Accountants) to have all of its standards fully implemented as mandatory. 
The adoption of AAOIFI standards means that there are comparable 
financial statements, reliable and useful information that can help users of 
the financial statements, for example the IAHs, to make well-founded 
decisions. Comparable financial statements allow users to identify and 
analyse the bank's performance over a period of time and in comparison 
with other banks. 
It is in the interest of those bodies, especially the regulators, to set 
policies and roles that promote comparability and relevance of the 
information disclosed in the annual reports of Islamic banks. 
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5. It is surprising that the results of the study show that there were some 
banks in Bahrain which were not in full compliance with AAOIFI 
standards, as well as having low voluntary disclosure scores. It is 
surprising, because the Bahrain market is seen as a fairly developed one, 
with the Bahrain Monetary Agency and Bahrain Stock Exchange closely 
monitoring and controlling the activities of the Islamic banks. Bahrain is 
considered as a major centre for Islamic banks, in addition to the fact that 
AAOIFI is located in Bahrain. Hence, the results of this study will be of a 
special concern to the Bahrain Monetary Agency and Bahrain Stock 
Exchange authorities. 
6. The results of this study may also suggest that there is a weak market 
discipline and an underdeveloped information environment110 in the 
countries covered by the study. This is because of the following: 
There is little, if any, pressure by users of the annual reports for 
management of the Islamic banks to provide more disclosure as 
evidenced by the low index scores of all the banks in Sudan and 
some of the banks in Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan. This may also 
partially be attributed to the attitude of information users in those 
countries, especially the IAHs, rating agencies and the financial 
analysts. It shows that they are not very active in exerting pressure 
over the bank's management to disclose more. 
There are less incentives for the IAHs to exercise market discipline, 
because of the availability of the Profit Equalisation Reserves 
(PER)M, as those IAHs would not see that there is a need to 
withdraw their fund (i. e. vote with their feet) as long as they 
110 Both of these issues should be of a concern to the banking supervisory authorities, as per Pillar 3 of Basel II (BCBS (2001) and Lopez (2003). 
111 PER is an amount appropriated by the Islamic bank out of the mudaraba income, before allocating the 
mudarib share, in order to maintain a certain level of return on investment for IAHs and increase owners 
equity (AAOIFI, 1999). 
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receive a smoothed rate of return on their investments that is 
commensurate with the market rate' 2. 
The ability of the IAHs and the shareholders to monitor the bank's 
performance is reduced because of the existence of the Investment 
Risk Reserve (IRR)11s Archer and Karim (2005) argued that this 
negatively affects market discipline. 
11.6.2 Specific Findings 
In addition to the general findings discussed above, there are more specific 
findings related to some of the hypotheses tested in the study, and these findings 
are presented and discussed in this section. It is worth mentioning at this stage 
that for the hypotheses where the test results are not as expected or predicted by 
the researcher, the researcher sent a questionnaire (see appendix 7) and 
conducted personal interviews with five of the concerned officials of Islamic 
banks in Bahrain, an official in BMA and one audit manager 
114 to discuss and 
find out possible explanations for the results. The following are the specific 
findings: 
1. Given that a number of AAOIFI's standards require the disclosure of information 
that helps users of the Islamic banks' annual reports in their economic decisions, 
and on the assumption that the new standards issued by AAOIFI will make it 
mandatory for those banks to disclose the information that they had disclosed on a 
voluntary basis, the researcher hypothesised that the implementation of these 
standards would result in a net change in the level of mandatory disclosure which 
is more than the net change in the level of aggregate disclosure. As such, there 
would be a net decrease in the level of voluntary disclosure. 
112 As argued by Archer and Karim (2005). 
13 IRR is an amount appropriated by the Islamic bank out of the income of IAHs, after allocating the 
mudarib share, in order to cater against future losses for IAHs (AAOIFI 1999). 
114 Questionnaire sent to and meetings held with: one G. M, one DGM, three Financial Controllers, one 
Executive Director in BMA, and one Senior Audit Manager of big four. 
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One of the interesting results of the study is to find out that after the 
implementation of AAOIFI standards, the level of voluntary disclosure in 
the annual reports of Islamic banks has increased, rather than decreased as 
predicted by the researcher. This might indicate that there are banks trying 
to be `market leaders' with regard to voluntary disclosure, i. e. although 
some of the voluntary disclosures became mandatory according to 
AAOIFI's standards compliance with which was made compulsory by the 
Bahrain Monetary Agency, those banks are making even more voluntary 
disclosures than previously. 
From the data collected on voluntary disclosure, some of the banks whose 
voluntary disclosure level increased after implementation of AAOIFI 
standards are as follows: 
- Bahrain Islamic Bank's voluntary disclosure score115 (VDS) 
has 
increased from 45% in 1997 to 84% in 2002. 
- First Islamic Investment Bank's116 
VDS has increased from 28% in 
1997 to 76% in 2002. 
- Al-Baraka Islamic Bank's VDS has increased from 58% in 1997 to 
76% in 2002. 
- Qatar International Islamic Bank's VDS has increased from 40% 
in 
2000 to 82% in 2002. 
- Jordan Islamic Bank's VDS 
has increased from 45% in 2000 to 73% 
in 2002. 
It could also be that one of the reasons for the increase in voluntary 
disclosure after implementation of AAOIFI standards is the 
15 VDS is measured as the ratio of the actual scores awarded to a bank to the maximum score which that 
bank is expected to earn. 
116 Name changed to "Arcapita bank" on March 15,2005. 
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implementation of IAS/IFRS 117 by some of the Islamic banks to 
complement information not required by AAOIFI. Indeed, Ernst and 
Young of Bahrain tend to follow this practice with the banks it audits, and 
all the above mentioned banks (except Jordan Islamic Bank) are audited 
by Ernst and Young. 
2. Results indicate that while there is a positive association between the level 
of voluntary disclosure and the proportion of non-executive board 
members, there is no significant association between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and the proportion of non-executive board members who are 
IAHs. 
The result suggests that having IAHs on the board does not enhance the 
disclosure practices of Islamic banks. Thus, it does not serve the purpose 
of the board of directors posited by agency theory, which is to monitor and 
control the actions of executive directors and to act as a check and balance 
mechanism in enhancing the board's effectiveness and hence banks' 
transparency and quality of disclosure. 
This may be118 in consistent with Short's (1996) argument that the addition 
of non-executive directors who are IAHs on the board is simply a scheme 
used by executive directors to enhance their own standing by selecting 
friendly "rubber stamping" IAHs as non-executive directors in order to 
appear accountable to this important group of people to the bank. 
On the other hand, we can argue that IAHs do perform monitoring and 
control role by using the information provided to them by the management 
on a regular basis for each board meeting. So arguably, they are not 
dependent on the annual report's disclosure in order to carry out this role. 
We can further argue that the other IAHs can rely on the 'vicarious 
"' For example, IAS 33 "Earrings Per Share" and "Provisions, Contingeat Liabilities and Contingent 
Assets". 
"$ We say "may be" because Short's argument is directed towards non-executives in general and 
this study also found that there is an association between the proportion of non-executive directors and the 
level of voluntary disclosure. 
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monitoringi119 by the IAHs on board (or even by the shareholders or their 
representatives on board) because it is assumed that they are sharing the 
same interests in the bank's operations. For example, they face the same 
portfolio investment risk as the funds of the Unrestricted IAHs and the 
shareholders are commingled and invested in the same investment 
portfolio. 
This could also be due to the fact that as long as IAHs' income is 
smoothed by the existence of PER and their capital protected by the 
existence of IRR120 (Archer and Karim, 2005), they would be careless 
about the adequacy of disclosure or whether IAHs' are appropriately 
represented on the board or not. 
It should be noted that the significance results of the correlations among 
independent variables in chapter 9 (table 9.13) showed that proportion of non- 
executive members on the board who are IAHs is negatively correlated with the 
ownership concentration, positively correlated with shareholders' profitability and 
negatively correlated with government ownership. This might indicate that banks 
owned by a small number of shareholders or by family members, are not 
encouraged to have IAHs representation on the board, a point that has to be 
considered by the policy makers and regulators when taking decisions related to 
the corporate governance in Islamic banking. 
This issue (i. e. the relationship between proportion of non-executive board 
members who are IAHs and the level of voluntary disclosure) was raised 
in the questionnaire and interviews conducted to find out why Islamic 
banks behaved differently to what is predicted by the researcher. The 
following possible reasons are presented: 
- There is a general lack of understanding of good governance practices 
which underpin the tone and the internal management culture needed for 
adequate disclosure. 
119 See Archer et al. (1998, p. 164). 
120 As discussed in sub-section 11.6.1 of this chapter. 
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- The non-executives chosen to be on board are not those with 
knowledge of leading practices in area of corporate governance. 
- Many members of the board (including the non-executives and IAHs) 
have a family business background and not necessarily the skills to 
understand the risks of the changing financial services environment. 
3. The results of testing the relationship between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and ownership concentration (table 9.7) indicate that for 2002 
there is a very weak negative relationship but it is not significant at 10% 
level of significance, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis. On the other 
hand, the results for 1997 indicate that there is a moderate negative 
relationship, and it is significant at 10% level of significance, so the null 
121 hypothesis is rejected. 
This difference between the years is not surprising if we take into 
consideration the replies we received on the questionnaire and interviews 
conducted for this purpose (see below). 
For Islamic banks covered in this study, we assumed that ownership 
concentration exists when families or a small number of people (in our 
case we have taken a percentage of ownership by the largest 5 owners) 
have a substantial portion of the equity holding and they are board 
members or have representatives on board. 
It is usually the case with Islamic banks that most of the shares are owned 
by 5 or less owners. In our study we found that in 2002, for 67% of the 
banks the share capital is owned by 5 or less owners122. This applies to the 
121 Note that at 5% level of significance, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
122 In most of the cases, they represent 100% of the share capital, and in the remaining cases they represent 
a majority. 
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banks with public (government) ownership and the ones with private 
ownership. 
The results of the above test were raised in the questionnaire and 
interviews conducted to find out why Islamic banks behaved differently 
(in 2002) to what is predicted by the researcher. The following possible 
reasons are presented: 
The level of voluntary disclosure is low anyhow, because the 
capital market in those countries is less developed and market participants 
are not very sophisticated. 
- Islamic banks are depending more on the funds received from the 
IAHs rather than the shareholders (equity). 
- In many instances, owners are generally not demanding, and do not 
know what to expect in the form of disclosure as key stakeholders. 
4. The results of testing the relationship between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and listing status indicate that there is a positive relationship in 
1997 and a negative relationship in 2002, but both are not significant, so 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
The result was not surprising to the researcher, for the following reasons: 
- Listed companies are induced by the market to disclose more 
information in order to raise capital at a lower cost. However, this 
is not true in our case, as more than 60% of the banks in our sample 
for 2002 are owned by 5 or less owners, which means that they are 
not depending on the capital market to raise more funds in the form 
of share capital; rather, they raise funds in the form of investment 
accounts from IAHs. 
Lack of a sophisticated market and market players, due to the lack 
of education to interpret the disclosures made. 
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- Little press coverage of the results of operations of Islamic banks. 
Little interest from the financial analysts and rating agencies. The 
example of the Faisal Islamic Bank (now Al Shamel bank) of 
Bahrain suggests that if rating agencies are more active, there will 
be more disclosure by the management of the banks. In 1997, the 
Bank has produced a whole set of supplementary financial 
statements prepared according to AAOIFI standards, because 
Capital Intelligence has qualified its rating 123. 
5. The results of testing the relationship between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and shareholders' profitability (return on shareholders' equity) 
indicate that there is a positive relationship and it was significant in year 
1997. However, in year 2002 it was not significant, so we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis. 
This difference between the years is all the more surprising if we take into 
consideration the fact that the return on shareholders' equity was better in 
2002 compared to 1997, and thus there was "good news" by the 
management to spread to the shareholders and the market as a whole, a 
result that is in conflict with the 'information hypothesis' and 'signaling 
hypothesis' which posits that successful firms have an incentive to make 
disclosures. 
6. The results of testing the relationship between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and IAHs profitability (return on equity of IAH) indicate that 
there is a statistically significant negative association at the 10% level of 
123 This case came out of the market pressure, which indicates that there is a market discipline (to certain 
extent) in Bahrain, and it seems to have eventually influenced the banking regulator (i. e. BMA) to adopt the 
AAOIFI standards. 
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significance for the year 2002 (there were no data for 1997)124, so the null 
hypothesis was rejected (see Table 9.10). 
The results for profitability tests (points 5 and 6 above) are surprising and 
are not consistent with several of previous researches on profitability, for 
example, Cerf (1961), Singhvi and Desai (1968), Ng and Koh (1994), 
Raffournier (1995), and Haniffa and Cooke (2002). This issue is raised in 
the questionnaire prepared and the interviews conducted to find out why 
Islamic banks behaved differently from what is predicted by the 
researcher. The following possible reasons were presented: 
- Weak information environment because of the absence125 of the 
typical information intermediaries, such as rating agencies, financial 
analysts and financial journalists. 
- Weak capital market and dependency of Islamic banks on the funds 
received from IAHs rather than from shareholders. 
- Most of the IAHs are unsophisticated, naive and do not care much 
about the level of profitability, but rather wish to be sure that their 
funds are invested in modes that comply with Shari'a rules and 
principles. Hence, the disclosure of the SSB report is more important 
to them than any other item in the annual report. 
- Usually, the return is good to both shareholders and IAHs compared 
to market rate of return. Archer et al. (1998) stated that there is 
evidence suggesting that the management of some Islamic banks have 
used the discretion given them by flexible rules and limited 
124 The data for 1997 were not available, because before implementation of AAOIFI accounting 
standards, there were different methods of profit recognition which could be applied by the 
Islamic banks to allocate the profits between shareholders and IAHs, and one can hardly find 
any information disclosed about the bases of profit allocation between shareholders and IAHs, 
a lack which prompted AAOIFI to address this issue in one of its accounting standards. 
125 Even in countries where they are present (e. g. Bahrain), they are not very active. 
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disclosure, in order to 'enhance' or 'smooth' the returns payable to 
IAHs at the expense of shareholders. However, it is worth mentioning 
here that the data collected show that in most of the cases the return 
on the shareholders' equity was much higher than the return on the 
IAHs' equity, and in some cases it was higher by 10 times. 
7. The results of testing the relationship between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and the proportion of IAHs funds to total financing 126 indicate 
that there is a positive relationship and it was significant in years 2002 and 
1997, so the null hypothesis was rejected. 
This is an important finding as it supports the argument made by Al- 
Deehani et al. (1999) and Archer et al. (1998) that the Islamic bank in its 
capacity as a Mudarib is keen to retain the funds of the IAHs and 
encourage new IAHs to invest in the bank. This is because if the 
aggregate return of the investment portfolio in which the IAHs funds are 
invested is positive, then the bank shares in this return. The bank even 
sometimes may take the higher share (as pointed out above). 
Despite the fact that the IAHs are partners with the shareholders in profit 
sharing and are the largest source of funds in many Islamic banks, they are 
not treated similarly to the shareholders. For example, they are not 
allowed to vote in the general assembly meetings or to approve or 
disapprove proposals from the board of directors (or the board's 
chairman), or to appoint or re-appoint the board of directors, the external 
auditors and SSB. 
However, this raises the problems with the provisions of the mudaraba 
contract which states that IAHs may not interfere in the management of 
their funds, and the violation of this condition can nullify the contract. 
Hence, Archer and Karim (2005) argued that in this case, the only possible 
means by which the IAHs can express their dissatisfaction with the bank's 
126 Measured as the percentage of the total IAHs funds to the total assets/funds. 
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performance is to exercise their right to terminate their contractual 
relationship with the bank and "vote with their feet" by withdrawing their 
funds. To avoid this action by the IAHs in the future, there is a need that 
the banking authorities should try to find out means and methods to tackle 
127 this issue. 
8. The results of testing the relationship between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and government ownership share indicate that there is a 
negative relationship and it was significant in years 2002 and 1997, so the 
null hypothesis was rejected. 
9. The test results shows that level of voluntary disclosure by the banks 
operating in Sudan is less than those operating in Bahrain, Qatar and 
Jordan. This might be attributed to the following reasons: 
Several banks in Sudan are either totally or partially owned by the 
government. By contrast, in Bahrain we have only two banks 
partially owned by the government in 2002, one with 75% ownership 
and the other with only 7%, and in fact they scored high in voluntary 
disclosure, 82% and 72% respectively. 
Absence of international auditing firms (big four). The data shows 
that the level of voluntary disclosure by the banks audited by the 
Chamber of General Audit of Sudan are almost the same as the level 
of voluntary disclosure by the banks audited by private local firms, 
and in both cases the level of disclosure was low. 
The capital markets in the group of Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan are 
more efficient than Sudan, although all of them are emerging capital 
markets. 
- Rating agencies and financial analysts are not active in Sudan, 
whereas in Bahrain, for example, they are active to some extent. 
127 This might be a good area for future research. 
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Unlike Bahrain, banks in Sudan have many branches, hence, 
implementing the AAOIFI disclosure standards and having extra 
voluntary disclosure entails higher costs in terms of money, 
additional work and training courses for the concerned staff in those 
banks. 
11.6.3 Overall Conclusions 
This study has sought to establish whether agency theory (and to some extent, the 
signaling hypothesis) can explain the voluntary disclosure practices of Islamic 
banks operating in a number of emerging market countries. The hypotheses set 
out in chapter six were tested to see if certain bank- and country-specific factors 
suggested by these theories were associated with the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Evidence of statistically significant association are considered as 
evidence in support of an agency theory of disclosure. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) was concerned with whether the level of voluntary disclosure 
decreased or increased after the implementation of AAOIFI standards. Based on 
the theory, the hypothesis predicts a decrease in the level of voluntary disclosure, 
given that much of what was voluntarily disclosed before, is now considered 
mandatory. The result of the analysis does not support this hypothesis. 
Hypotheses H2 to H5 were concerned with the relationship between a number of 
bank-specific characteristics and the level of voluntary disclosure in the banks' 
annual reports. Based on agency theory, the hypotheses predict positive 
associations (negative in the case of ownership concentration). The test results 
do not support most of those hypotheses, except H2-1 (proportion of non- 
executive board member) and H 5-1 (shareholders profitability) for 1997 only. 
Hypothesis H6 was concerned with the relationship between the proportion of 
unrestricted IAHs in the capital structure (use of external financing) and the level 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual report. Based on agency theory, the 
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hypothesis predicts a positive association. Support for this hypothesis was found 
from the statistical analysis. 
Hypothesis H7 was concerned with the relationship between the government's 
ownership share and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual report. Based 
on agency theory, the hypothesis predicts a negative association. Support for this 
hypothesis was found from the statistical analysis. 
Hypothesis H8 was concerned with the comparison of the level of disclosure 
between two groups of countries, namely: Bahrain, Qatar and Jordan as the first 
group and Sudan as the second. The results of the statistical tests showed that 
the level of disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks operating in the first 
group is more than the ones operating in the second. 
As discussed above, the study results have some policy implications for the 
banking regulators and supervisors in the countries covered in the study. The 
study results show that a majority of the hypotheses were not supported, which 
means that there is some evidence to conclude that agency theory can not explain 
the voluntary disclosure policies and practices reflected in the annual reports of 
Islamic banks operating in Bahrain, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan. 
Furthermore, the study results have implications for the central banks as 
regulators of Islamic banks. For example, there is a need to make considerable 
improvements in transparency through effective enforcement of AAOIFI's 
financial reporting standards, in addition to introducing commonly accepted 
regulatory and supervisory guidelines and best practices that cater for the 
specificities of Islamic banking. 
11.7 Limitations of the Study 
Although it is believed that this study has achieved its objectives and was able to 
answer the research questions, it is not without its limitations, which will be 
discussed in this section. 
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The main limitations of this study are as follows: 
1. This study focused only on voluntary disclosure in the Islamic banks 
annual reports. It does not necessarily cover the universal set of 
information disclosed by the bank's management via other means of 
communication, such as interim reports, prospectuses, financial press 
releases, web sites... etc. 
However, annual reports contain a very wide and comprehensive range of 
information which is intended for a wide range of information user groups. 
Furthermore, using annual reports as the unit of analysis facilitates 
comparison across the banks covered in the study, they are all required by 
their banking authorities to issue audited annual reports on a yearly basis, 
which will not be affected by specific events that need to be reported 
immediately by the concerned banks. 
2. As mentioned above, the focus of the study was on the provision of 
information in annual reports which should help a wide range of users to 
make necessary decisions. Perhaps, an approach that identified a specific 
user groups, such as IAHs or rating agencies, and then established a 
decision-model for that particular group may have a more intuitive appeal. 
However, such an approach is very difficult to operationalise 
satisfactorily, especially in the countries covered under this study. It might 
be achieved by undertaking a questionnaire of user preferences for 
information - such an approach is expected to reduce the subjectivity in 
the choice of variables. 
3. Unlike most of the previous studies on disclosure, this study covered 
voluntary disclosure by banks (financial services industry) in emerging 
market countries, since those countries and banks possesses many 
characteristics which differ from other countries and firms, and the 
findings need to be interpreted in the context of differences with other 
countries. In the research design of this study, this issue was taken into 
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consideration and the researcher supplemented the secondary data used for 
the survey with some primary data, i. e. he collected more evidence about 
the reasons behind the variations in the dependent variable, via a 
questionnaire and personal interviews with a number of officials in 
Islamic banks, regulation authorities and external audit firms. 
4. The disclosure score for a bank used in this study is additive and 
unweighted. Support for such an approach came from many researchers, 
for example, Choi (1973), Kahl & Belkaoui (1981), Cooke (1989b), Gray 
et al. (1995), Hossain et al. (1995), Haniffa & Cooke (2002) and Alsaeed 
(2005). 
There are many reasons given by those researchers for not giving weights 
to items disclosed, for example, they argue that each item of disclosure is 
equally important, and to avoid subjectivity because weighting reflects the 
perception rather than actual information needs of the users of financial 
information. In addition, Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Robbins and 
Austin (1986) used both methods, they used the unweighted disclosure 
method to compensate for the limitations of the weighted approach 
discussed above. It is interesting to point out that the empirical results of 
both methods were the same. 
5. The total population and the sample from which it is taken are small, and 
this might place limitations on the ability of this study to be generalised. 
However, this has been taken into consideration when deciding upon the 
most suitable statistical analysis techniques to be used in the 
circumstance. 
11.8 Recommendations for Future Research 
This is the first study to be carried out on the effect of certain bank and country 
characteristics on the level of disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks 
operating in a number of developing countries in the region. Hence, the outcome 
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of this study could be used as the basis for future research. This section will 
provide recommendations for future research as follows: 
1. As mentioned above, this study has focused on the disclosure in the annual 
reports. Future work could extend the research by investigating other 
mediums of disclosure such as interim reports, prospectuses and press 
releases. 
2. This study considered only voluntary disclosure (except for testing HI) 
and it would be interesting to find out the disclosure behaviour of Islamic 
banks towards disclosing the items that are mandatory. Particularly, if we 
know that the level of disclosure by the banks operating in Sudan is less 
than that of those operating in Bahrain, because of the weak information 
environment due to the inactive rating agencies and financial analysts. 
3. This study considered only Islamic banks. Hence, future studies could 
replicate this study using other types of institutions doing their business 
according to Islamic Shari'a rules and principals, such as insurance 
companies (takaful) and Ijara (leasing) companies. 
4. In analysing the explanatory power of certain firm characteristics, it is 
possible that other variables such as level of involvement of rating 
agencies and financial analysts in the operations of the bank, effectiveness 
of the banking supervisors, other corporate governance issues, age128 and 
size of Islamic bank might influence the level of disclosure in the annual 
reports of Islamic banks. Thus, future research could extend the number of 
independent variables to cover those variables. 
5. The personal characteristics of the Chief Executive Officer or the Chief 
Financial Officer (see Gibbins et al, 1992) and the partner of the external 
audit firm may have a major influence on disclosure decisions. It may 
128 Alsaeed (2005 p. 313) argued that the rational for selecting the 'age' variable lies in the possibility that 
old firms might have improved their financial reporting practices over time. 
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therefore be interesting for future research to test whether changes in 
officers and audit partners have an impact on the disclosure of voluntary 
items. 
6. Future research may also compare disclosure level in the annual reports of 
Islamic banks operating in countries where all the banks are Islamic banks 
(e. g. Iran and Pakistan) with countries in which there is a mixture of 
traditional and Islamic banking system. In addition, Islamic banks with 
international branches could be compared with the ones with national 
branches. 
11.9 Concluding Remarks 
The study results provide evidence of the weak financial information 
environment in the countries covered by the study, with its implications for the 
lack of market discipline and the need for the relevant authorities, such as the 
central banks and the accounting professional bodies, to determine and 
investigate whether the level of disclosure in the annual reports of Islamic banks 
is adequate and meets the needs and expectations of various users. 
Although this study focuses on voluntary disclosure, relevant officials may 
consider the benefit of making some of the information mandatory. They may 
also consider issuing a general guideline of "best disclosure practice" with a 
minimum level of voluntary items to be disclosed as to enhance comparability 
between the Islamic banks' 29. However, there is of course the need to consider 
the feasibility and effectiveness of implementing this recommendation via 
weighing the costs against the benefits of providing the extra information. 
129 All Islamic banks are regulated by the central banks and monetary authorities; however, there is absence 
of commonly accepted regulatory and supervisory guidelines and best practices that cater for the 
specificities of Islamic banks (Archer and Karim, 2005). 
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Finally, the researcher believes that the findings of this study provide a useful 
insight into the disclosure practices of Islamic banks with regards to some 
independent variables that address the specificities of those banks, a subject 
matter that has not been covered in the previous studies on disclosure. Hence, 
this adds a new dimension to the studies in this area, and also provides a starting 
point for many future research possibilities in the area of financial reporting as 
discussed above. 
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Appendix 1 
List of the Standards Issued by AAOIFI 
Ref Description 
Accounting Standards: 
FAS! General Presentation and Disclosure in the Financial 
Statements of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions 
FAS2 Murabaha and Murabaha to the Purchase Orderer 
FAS3 Murabaha Financing 
FAS4 Musharaka Financing 
FASS Disclosure of Bases for Profit Allocation between Owners' 
Equity and Investment Account Holders 
FAS6 Equity of Investment Account Holders and their Equivalent 
FAST Salam and Parallel Salam 
FAS8 Ijarah and Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek 
FAS9 Zakah 
FAS10 Istisna'a and Parallel Istisna'a 
FAS11 Provisions and Reserves 
FAS12 General Presentation and Disclosure in the Financial 
Statements of Islamic Insurance Companies 
FAS13 Disclosure of Bases of Allocation of Surplus or Deficits in 
Islamic Insurance Companies 
FAS14 Investment Funds 
FAS15 Provisions and Reserves in Islamic Insurance Companies 
FAS16 Foreign Currency Transactions and Foreign Operations 
FAS17 Investments 
FAS18 Islamic Financial Services offered by Conventional Financial 
Institutions 
FAS19 Contributions in Islamic Companies 
FAS20 Deferred Payment Sale 
FAS21 Disclosure of Transfer of Assets 
FAS22 Segment Reporting 
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Auditing Standards: 
AS1 Objectives and Principles of Auditing 
AS2 The Auditor's Report 
AS3 Terms of Audit Engagement 
AS4 Testing for Compliance with Shari Rules and Principles by an 
External Auditor 
AS5 The Auditor's Responsibility to Consider Fraud and Error in 
an Audit of Financial Statement 
Governance Standards: 
GS1 Shari'a Supervisory Board: 
Appointment, Composition and Report 
GS2 Shari'a Review 
GS3 Internal Shari'a Review 
GS4 Audit and Governance Committee for Islamic Financial 
Insulations 
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Appendix 2 
Islamic Modes of Financing 
1. Mudaraba finance 
Mudaraba is a partnership in profit between capital and work. It may be conducted 
between IAHs as providers of fund and the Islamic bank as a Mudarib. The partners share 
the profits as agreed between them in the Mudaraba contract, and the losses being borne 
by the provider of funds except if they were due to misconduct, negligence or violation of 
the conditions agreed upon by the Islamic bank, in which case the bank will borne the 
losses( AAOIFI 1998). 
There are two types of Mudaraba contract: unrestricted (discretionary) and restricted 
Mudaraba: 
a. Unrestricted Mudaraba: 
Under this type, the investment account holders (IAHs) authorize the bank to invest their 
funds in a manner which the Islamic bank deems appropriate without laying down any 
restrictions as to where, how, and for what purpose the funds should be invested, and 
under this arrangement the Islamic bank can commingle the IAHs funds with its own 
funds or with other funds the bank has the right to use, such as the current accounts 
(AAOIFI, 1998). 
According to the terms and conditions of a Mudaraba contract, the IAHs are permitted to 
withdraw their funds at short notice subject to some loss of the profit share. Moreover, the 
bank in its capacity as Mudarib is entitled to receive a share of the profit when the invested 
funds generate a return. Yet, in case of loss, the bank receives no remuneration or share as 
Mudarib (Karim, 1995 and Archer and Karim, 1997). 
However, the bank may have the right to deduct a certain percentage from the net profit 
on IAH's funds in order to create a reserve. This reserve is primarily used to meet 
potential losses on IAHs' funds and it is also used to compensate IAHs during periods of 
low profit on the invested funds. The bank may also forego part of its profits or Mudarib 
share in favour of IAHs in order to offer a competitive rate of return (Archer et. at., 1998). 
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b. Restricted Mudaraba: 
Under this type, the IAHs impose certain restrictions as to where, how and for what 
purpose their funds are to be invested, and the Islamic bank may be restricted from 
commingling its own funds with the restricted IAHs funds for the purposes of investments 
(AAOIFI, 1996). 
2. Musharaka finance (profit/loss sharing instrument) 
Musharaka is the commingling of funds for the purpose of sharing in profit (AAOIFI, 
1996b). It is a form of partnership involving two or more parties, each party contributes to 
the capital of the partnership equally or in varying proportions so as to invest in a joint 
venture. In Musharaka each party becomes a part-owner of the acquired assets and is 
entitled to his due share of profits. However, each partner also bears the loss in proportion 
to his contributed capital. There are three types of Musharaka (AAOIFI, 1996b), namely; 
a. Constant Musharaka: 
With this type of Musharaka, the partners' shares in the capital remain constant 
throughout the period as specified in the contract. 
b. Diminishing Musharaka: 
With this type of Musharaka, one partner agrees to transfer gradually to the other 
party its share in Al-Musharaka. Therefore, as a partner's share declines, the other 
partner's share increases until the latter becomes the sole owner of the venture. 
c. Equity Joint Venture: 
With this type of Musharaka, an Islamic bank owns shares or units representing an 
equity stake in another firm's capital. 
3. Ijarah (leasing) 
Ijarah is defined as `the transfer of the services of an asset for an agreed upon 
consideration'. Some fuqaha (jurists) have defined Ijarah as `Ownership of the right to the 
benefits of using an asset in return for consideration' (AAOIFI, 1999a). Ijarah is an 
alternative way of financing fixed assets. According to Islamic scholars Ijarah has three 
elements: 
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a. Two parties: a lessor (the owner of the leased asset), and a lessee (the party who 
receives the services of the leased asset). 
b. A contractual form that includes an offer and consent. 
c. The subject of the Ijarah contract, which includes the rental amount and the 
services which, are transferred to the lessee. 
There are two types of Ijarah, namely: 
a. Operating Ijarah: 
Which is an Ijarah contract that does not end up with the transfer of ownership of the 
leased assets to the lessee. 
b. Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek: 
An Ijarah contract that stipulates the transfer of ownership of the leased asset to the 
lessee. 
4. Salam 
Salam is defined as the "purchase of a commodity for deferred delivery in exchange for 
immediate payment according to specified conditions or sale of ac commodity for 
deferred delivery in exchange for immediate payment (AAOIFI, 1997) 
The validity of a Salam contract depends on certain conditions which include the 
following: 
a. The purchase price should be known. 
b. The receipt of the Salam payment should take place where the contract is 
established. 
c. The commodity (Al-musallam fihi) should be subject to strict identification so as 
to negate lack of knowledge of its kind, type, quality and amount. 
d. Al-musallam fihi should be subject to specification and it should be recognized 
as a debt. 
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5. Istisna'a 
Istisna'a is defined as a" sale contract between al-mustasni' (the ultimate purchaser) and 
al-sani' (seller), whereby al-sani' - based on an order from al-mustasni'- undertakes to 
have manufactured or otherwise acquired al-masnoo (subject matter of the contract) 
according to specification and sell it to al-mustasni' for an agreed upon price and method 
of settlement whether that be in advance, by installments or deferred to a specific future 
time' (AAOIFI, 1998). 
In other words, the purchaser asks the seller to supply a specific product for an agreed 
upon price and method of payment. The conditions of validity of Istisna'a include the 
following: 
a. Al-masnoo must be known and specified to the extent of removing any lack of 
knowledge of its kind, type, quality and quantity. 
b. A future delivery date should be fixed. 
c. The price of al-masnoo should be known. 
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Letter sent to ask for copies of the financial statements 
Financial Controller 
(Bank) 
Address 
Dear Sir, 
This is to inform you that I am currently carrying out a Ph. D. research at the University of 
Surrey - U. K on the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of a sample 
Islamic banks and my research requires the availability of annual reports of those banks. 
May I kindly request you to send me the annual reports of your esteemed bank for the 
years 1997 and 2002 at the address stated below. 
Your assistance in this matter is highly appreciated. Waiting for your favorable reply. 
Yours faithfully 
Ahmed Ebrahim Abduigader 
P. O. Box 24775 
Manama 
Bahrain 
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List of the Islamic banks for 2002 (research population) 
Islamic Banks Operating in Bahrain 
Serial Bank 
Full Commercial Banks 
01 Bahrain Islamic Bank 
02 Kuwait Finance Bank House - Bahrain 
03 Shamil Bank of Bahrain 
Investment Units 
04 ABC Islamic Bank 
05 Al Khaleej finance & Investment 
06 Al Amin Bank 
07 Al Baraka Islamic Bank 
08 Citi Islamic Bank 
09 First Islamic Investment Bank 
10 Gulf Finance House 
11 International Credit Company 
12 Investors Bank 
13 Al-Khleej Investment Bank 
14 Arab Islamic Bank 
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Islamic Banks Operating in Sudan 
Serial Bank Ownership 
01 Bank of Khartoum Public 
02 Sudanese French Bank Joint 
03 Agriculture Bank Public 
04 Elnilein Industrial development Bank group Public 
05 Farmers Commercial Bank Joint 
06 Omdurman National Bank Joint 
07 Sudanese Islamic Bank Joint 
08 Tadamon Islamic Bank Joint 
09 Saudi Sudanese Bank Joint 
10 Animal Resources Bank Joint 
11 Alshamal Islamic Bank Joint 
12 Faisal Islamic Bank Joint 
13 Islamic Cooperative development Bank Joint 
14 Albaraka Bank (Sudan) Joint 
15 Elgahrb Islamic Bank (Export development) Joint 
16 Saving Social development Bank Public 
17 Workers National Bank Joint 
18 The Sudanese Estates Bank Public 
19 National Bank of Sudan Joint 
20 Al Gadarif Investment Bank Joint 
21 National Bank of Abu Dhabi Public 
22 Mashriq Bank Public 
23 Blue Nile Bank Joint 
24 Habeeb Bank Public 
25 Financial Investment Bank Joint 
26 Ivory Bank Joint 
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Islamic Banks Operating in Qatar and Jordan 
First: Oatar 
1. Qatar Islamic Bank 
2. Qatar International Islamic Bank 
Second: Jordan 
1. Jordan Islamic Bank 
2. Islamic International Arab Bank 
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Disclosure Items in the Annual Reports of 
Islamic Banks Befroe Implementation of AAOIFI Standards 
Name of the Bank : 
Type of 
the Bank 
Identification no : 
Auditor: 
Period : 1997 
INFORMATION DISCLOSED 1D 
N2A M3 4 Total Score Remarks 
5 
A DISCLOSURE OF GENERAL 
CORPORATE INFORMATION 
1 The vision and mission statements 
Address and contact number of head 
2 office, branches and representative 
office (s). 
3 List of all members of Board of 
Directors 
Members of Bank Committees 
4 ( such as: Audit, Executive and 
Remuneration) 
5 List of all Members of Shari'a 
Supervisory Board 
6 Bank Achievements during the 
current year 
7 Future outlook of the bank 
8 The range of banking services the 
bank provides 
9 Members of senior management 
Description of major issues in the 
10 national economic developments 
during the year (e. g. GNP, public 
budget and external trade ) 
11 Definition of Islamic products 
offered 
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12 
13 
List of correspondent banks 
The Rating of the Bank by 
International rating agencies 
14 Bank's objectives and strategies to 
achieve those objectives 
15 Financial and Business high 
lights 
(review) 
B DISCLOSURE OF REPORTS 
16 Board of Directors report 
17 Shari'a Supervisory Board report 
18 Independent Auditors report 
19 CEO/GM message (report) 
C 
DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION IN THE 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
THE BALANCE SHEET 
ASSETS: 
20 Balances with Central Banks and 
other Banks 
21 
22 
Various types of investments ( such 
as securities, real estates and 
managed funds) 
Fixed assets (net) 
23 Notes and Accounts Receivable 
24 Other assets 
LIABILITIES 
25 Due to central and other banks 
26 Customers accounts (Investments 
by 
managed funds) 
27 Other liabilities 
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SHAREHOLDERS EQUITY 
28 Share capital 
Reserves ( such as Statutory , 29 General and Investments revaluation 
reserves) 
30 Retained earnings (Deficits) 
OFF-BALANCE SHEET ITEMS 
IAS 32 
31 Funds Under Management 
32 Commitments and Contingent 
Liabilities 
THE STATEMENT OF INCOME 
( Profit and Loss Account) 
INCOME 
33 Income from Islamic financing/ investment activities 
34 Total Fees income from management 
of funds 
35 Fees income from management of 
either in as supplementary or in 
the notes to the Financial 
funds (Bank's share as a mudarib) 
Statements 
36 IAHs share of income from Islamic 
either in as supplementary or in 
the notes to the Financial 
financing and investments Statements 
37 Fees and commissions (revenue from banking services) 
1EXPENSES 
38 Operating expenses 
39 Provisions for the year 
either in as supplementary or in 
40 Taxation and/or Zakah the notes to the 
Financial 
Statements 
THE STATEMENT OF 
RETAINED EARNINGS / 
CHANGES IN OWNERS 
EQUITY 
41 Net profit for the year 
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42 Transfer to reserves 
43 Proposed dividend 
44 Directors remuneration 
45 Social contributions (charity) 
THE STATEMENT OF CASH 
FLOWS 
46 Cash flows from operating activities 
47 Cash flows from investing activities 
48 Cash flows from financing activities 
49 Net increase (decrease) in cash and 
cash equivalents 
50 Description of the cash equivalents 
either in the statement or as a 
note 
DISCLOSURE OF 
D INFORMATION IN THE NOTES 
TO THE FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS 
51 Incorporation and activities 
Significant Accounting Policies 
52 Basis of preparation of financial 
statements 
53 Accounting convention used 
54 Accounting treatment of receivables 
55 Methods used to determine the Fair 
LAS 32 
Value of various investments 
56 Revenue recognition policies 
either in as supplementary or in 
Accounting for Profit & Loss the notes to the Financial 
57 sharing customer deposits (Basis of 
Statements 
Income allocation to IAH's) 
58 Methods and rates of depreciation of fixed assets 
59 Accounting treatment of investment 
accounts 
either in as supplementary or in 
60 Zakah calculation method the notes to the Financial Statements 
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61 Accounting treatment of earnings 
either in as supplementary or in 
the notes to the Financial 
prohibited by Shari'a Statements 
62 Provisions for employee end of 
service benefits 
Cash balances with banks and 
central bank 
63 Identification of the components of 
the balances 
Detailed description of the nature of 
64 balances and the central banks 
requirements 
65 Description of the nature and type of 
short term and long term investments 
Description of the nature and type of 
66 Islamic Financing (e. g. Murabaha, 
Musharaka and Ijarah) 
67 Description of the share of profit 
for 
either in as supplementary or in 
the notes to the Financial 
IAHs Statements 
Fixed assets 
Composition of fixed assets (e. g. 
68 land& buildings, furniture and 
equipments) 
Detailed description of changes in 
69 each component ( e. g. additions and 
disposals) 
70 Accounts and notes receivables 
Share capital 
71 Number and par value of authorised 
share capital 
72 Number and par value of issued 
share capital 
Capital adequacy ratio compared to 
73 the minimum ratio accepted by the 
central bank 
223 
Appendix 5 
Reserves 
74 Types and amount of reserve 
accounts 
75 Legal and statutory basis of 
establishment of each type of reserve 
Risks 
76 Type of risks the bank is exposed to 
77 How the bank seeks to manage those 
risks 
78 Description of the fair value of the 
financial instruments 
Description of nature and type of 
79 commitments and contingent 
liabilities 
80 How the bank discharged its "social 
responsibility" 
Zakah 
either in as supplementary or in 
81 Basis of the Zakah computation the notes to the 
Financial 
(sources and uses of Zakah fund) 
Statements 
either in as supplementary or in 
Confirmation of whether or not the 
the notes to the Financial 
82 bank collects and pays Zakah on 
Statements 
behalf of IAHs and others 
7 T- either in as supplementary or in 
SUPPLEMENTARY FINANCIAL 
the notes to the Financial 
Statements 
F INFORMATION PREPARED IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH "FAST" 
ISSUED BY AAOIFI 
83 "ýtatLtnUttt ul financial Y0»itiý>n 
(Balance Sheet) 
84 Statement of Income (Profit and Loss 
A/C) 
224 
Appendix 5 
The Statement of Changes in 
Restricted Investment Accounts 
85 Deposits and Withdrawals 
86 Gross income 
87 Bank's fees as mudarib 
88 Administration expenses 
Information about types of 
89 investments (such as real estate and 
commodity mudaraba ) 
90 Financial Report of Good Faith Loan 
Unrestricted IAHs 
How they are invested by the bank 
91 (e. g. Murabaha, Islamic securities, 
Ijara ... etc) 
92 Description of the return on the 
Unrestricted investment accounts 
Comparative figures with last year 
93 ( including type of investments and 
rate of returns) 
Concentration of Assets, 
Liabilities and IA-Hs 
94 Concentration of assets by sector 
FASI section 3r1 
(industry) 
95 Concentration of assets by 
FAST section 3/7 
geographic area 
96 Concentration of liabilities and IAHs 
by sector. 
97 Concentration of liabilities and IAHS 
by geographic area 
Maturity profile of assets and 
[ 
liabilities 
Distribution of assets in accordance 
S9 8 with their respective periods to 
maturity 
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Distribution of liabilities in 
99 accordance with their respective 
_ _periods 
to maturity 
Comparative figures with last year 
100 (detailed maturity profile of last 
ear) 
Earning prohibited by Shari'a 
101 Sources of those earnings 
102 How they are utilised by the bank 
THE STATEMENT OF FASI section 4/6 
SOURCES AND USES OF 
CHARITY FUNDS 
Identification of the various sources 
103 of the fund ( basically non-Islamic 
income) 
Identification of the various uses of 
the fund ( such as contributions 
104 to charitable organisations, poor and 
needy people, and given Qard Hasan 
to bank staff ) 
TOTAL SCORE 
TOTAL EXPECTED SCORE 
FOR THIS BANK 
DISCLOSURE SCORE (%) 
Notes: 
1Y= Item disclosed and N= Item not disclosed. 
s Not Applicable for this particular bank. 
Mandatory = Required to be disclosed by IAS. 
Voluntary = Item disclosed in excess to what is required by AS 
5 Score = An item will score (1) if it is disclosed and (0) if it is not disclosed. 
.. items are not applicable 
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Appendix 6 
Disclosure Items in the Annual Reports of 
Islamic Banks After Implementation of AAOIFI Standards 
Name of the Bank : 
Type of the 
Bank : 
Identification no: 
Period : 2002 
Auditor: 
D N A M Total INFORMATION DISCLOSED 1 2 3 V4 Score Rcmarks 5 
A DISCLOSURE OF GENERAL 
CORPORATE INFORMATION 
1 The vision and mission statements 
Address and contact number of head 
FASI Iectioo 3/2 (d) 
2 office, branches and representative 
office (s). 
3 List of all members of Board of 
Directors 
Members of Bank Committees ( such 
4 as: Audit, Executive and 
Remuneration) 
5 List of all Members of Shari'a 
Supervisory Board 
6 Bank Achievements 
during the current 
year 
7 Future outlook of the bank 
8 Nature of activities & the major 
FAST section 3/ 2 le) 
banking services the bank provides 
9 Members of senior management 
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Description of major issues in the 
10 national economic 
developments 
during the year (e. g. GNP, public 
budget and external trade ) 
11 Number of staff 
12 List of correspondent banks 
13 Earnings per share 
14 Bank's objectives and strategies to 
achieve those objectives 
15 Financial and Business high lights (review) 
B DISCLOSURE OF REPORTS 
16 Board of Directors report 
Governance Standard No. 1 
17 Shari'a Supervisory Board report 
Auditing Standard No. 2 
18 Independent Auditors report 
19 CEO/GM message (report) 
DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL 
C INFORMATION IN THE 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
THE BALANCE SHEET 
FASI section 4/1 
ASSETS: 
20 Balances with Central Banks and 
other Banks 
Various types of investments ( such as 
21 securities, real estates and managed 
funds) 
22 Fixed assets (net) 
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23 Notes and Accounts Receivable 
24 Other assets 
LIABILITIES 
25 Due to central and other banks 
26 Customers accounts 
27 Other liabilities 
SHAREHOLDERS EQUITY 
28 Share capital 
29 Reserves ( such as 
Statutory , 
General 
and Investments revaluation reserves) 
FAS 11 section 3/5 
30 Retained earnings (Deficits) 
Paragrahp 44 (d) 
31 UNRESTICTED INVESTMENT ACCOUNT HOLDERS 
Paragraph (42) 
OFF-BALANCE SHEET ITEMS 
not required to be shown on the 
face of Balance Shcet, so if it is 
shown, it is considered as 
voluntary 
32 Restricted Investment Accounts 
33 Commitments and Contingent 
Liabilities 
THE STATEMENT OF INCOME 
( Profit and Loss Account) 
FASI section 4/2 
INCOME 
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34 Income from Islamic financing/ investment activities 
35 Fees income from management of funds (Bank's share as a mudarib) 
36 IAHs share of income from Islamic financing and investments 
37 Fees and commissions 
(revenue from 
banking services) 
EXPENSES 
38 Operating expenses 
39 Provisions for the year 
FAS (I section 2/5 
40 Taxation and/or Zakah 
THE STATEMENT OF CASH 
FLOWS 
FASI section 4/3 
41 Cash flows from operating activities 
42 Cash flows from investing activities 
43 Cash flows from financing activities 
44 Net increase (decrease) in cash and 
cash equivalents 
45 Description of the cash equivalents 
In the statement itself or as a note 
THE STATEMENT OF CHANGES 
IN EQUITY 
FASI section 4/4 
46 Net profit for the year 
47 Transfer to reserves 
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48 Proposed dividend 
49 Directors remuneration 
50 Social contributions (charity) 
FASI section 4/5 
THE STATEMENT OF CHANGES 
IN RESTRICTED INVESTMENT 
ACCOUNTS 
51 Deposits and Withdrawals 
52 Gross income 
53 Bank's fees as mudarib 
54 Administration expenses 
Information about types of 
55 investments (such as real estate and 
commodity mudaraba 
THE STATEMENT OF SOURCES 
FAST section 4/6 
AND USES OF CHARITY FUNDS 
Identification of the various sources of 
56 the fund (basically non-Islamic 
income) 
Identification of the various uses of 
the fund ( such as contributions 
57 to charitable organisations, poor and 
needy people, and given Qard hassan 
to bank staff ) 
DISCLOSURE OF 
D INFORMATION IN THE NOTES 
TO THE FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS 
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FAS1 section 3/2 (b) and O 
58 Incorporation and activities 
Significant Accounting Policies 
explecetly stated either separetly 
59 Statement of compliance with the or as part of 
the basis of 
AAOIFI standards 
preparation of the financial 
statements 
Basis of preparation of financial 60 
statements 
61 Accounting convention used 
FAS1 section 3/4 
62 Accounting treatment of receivables 
Methods used to determine the Fair 63 Value of various investments 
Methods used to determine the loss 
64 from the impairment and 
uncollectability of assets. 
FAS1 section 3/4 
65 Revenue recognition policies 
FASI section 3/4 and FASS 
66 Basis of Income allocation to IAH's section 2 
FAS1 section 3/4 
Methods and rates of depreciation of 67 
fixed assets 
Accounting treatment of unrestricted 
FAS1 section 3/4 
68 investment accounts 
Not required under FAS1 section 
69 Zakah calculation method 
314 (i. e to be disclosed under 
significant accounting policies) 
but, under sections 4/1 (f) and 3/6 
sec below) 
Not required under FASI section 
Accounting treatment of earnings 
3/4 (i. e to be disclosed under 
70 
prohibited by Shari' a 
significant accounting policies) 
but, under section 316 (see below) 
Provisions for employee end of 71 
service benefits 
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Cash balances with banks and 
central bank 
Identification of the components of 
FAST section 4/1 (g) 
72 
the balances 
Detailed description of the nature of 
73 balances and the central banks 
requirements 
74 Description of the nature and type of 
short term and long term investments 
Fixed assets 
Composition of fixed assets (e. g. FASI section 4/1 (g) 
75 land& buildings, furniture and 
equipments) 
Detailed description of changes in 
76 each component ( e. g. additions and 
disposals) 
FAST section 4/1 (g) 
77 Accounts and notes receivables 
78 Due to banks and other institutions 
FAS1 section 4/1 (k) 
FAS 5 section 2 and FAS 6 
Unrestricted IAHs section 3 
How they are invested by the bank 
79 (e. g. Murabaha, Islamic securities, 
Para 
... etc 
80 Description of the return on the 
Unrestricted investment accounts 
Comparative figures with last year 
81 ( including type of investments and 
rate of returns) 
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FASI section 4/1 (para 44) 
Share capital 
82 Number and par value of authorised 
share capital 
83 Number and par value of issued share 
capital 
Capital adequacy ratio compared to 
84 the minimum ratio accepted by the 
central bank 
FAS I1 section 3/5 
Reserves 
85 Types and amount of reserve accounts 
86 Legal and statutory basis of 
establishment of each type of reserve 
87 The movement(s) in the profit 
equalisation/Fiduciary reserve 
Risks 
88 Type of risks the bank is exposed to 
89 How the bank seeks to manage those 
risks 
Concentration of assets, liabilities 
and IAHs 
90 Concentration of assets by sector 
FAST section 3/7 
(industry) 
91 Concentration of assets by geographic 
FAST section 3/7 
area 
92 Concentration of liabilities and IAHs by sector 
93 Concentration of liabilities and IAHs 
by geographic area 
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94 
Comparative figures with last year 
( details of concentration of assets, 
liabilities and IAHs by sector and 
geographic area of last year) 
Maturity profile of assets and 
liabilities 
95 
Distribution of assets in accordance 
with their respective periods to 
maturity 
FAST section 3/10 
96 
Distribution of liabilities in 
accordance with their respective 
periods to maturity 
97 Comparative figures with last year ( detailed maturity profile of last year) 
98 Description of the fair value of the financial instruments 
Earning prohibited by Shari'a 
FASI section 3/6 
99 Sources of those earnings 
100 How they are utilised by the bank 
101 
Description of nature and type of 
commitments and contingent 
liabilities 
FASI sections 3/13 and 3/14 
102 How the bank discharged its "social 
responsibility" 
Zakah 
103 Basis of the Zakah computation 
FAS 9 section 3/1 
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104 
Confirmation of whether or not the 
bank collects and pays Zakah on 
behalf of IAHs and others 
FAS 9 section 3/6 
TOTAL SCORE 
TOTAL EXPECTED SCORE FOR 
THIS BANK 
DISCLOSURE SCORE (%) 
Notes: 
1Y= Item disclosed and N= Item not disclosed. 
z Not Applicable for this particular bank. 
Mandatory = Required to be disclosed by AAOIFI standards. 
° Voluntary = Item disclosed in excess to what is required by AAOIFI standards. 
5 Score = An item will score (1) if it is disclosed and (0) if it is not disclosed. 
.. items are not applicable 
Total expected score = the maximum number of items which a bank is expected to disclose, taking into consideration the items that are 
not applicable to the particular bank. 
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